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Marital names shape our ideas about marriage, about our children, and about our selves. 
For about a hundred years, American states required married women to take their husbands’ 
names in order to engage in basic civic activities such as voting. While the law no longer requires 
women to change their names, it still shapes people’s decisions about marital names in both formal 
and informal ways.  
For example, the formal legal default rule in most places is that both spouses keep their 
premarital names. This rule is minoritarian for women, which means it imposes a range of social 
costs on women who make the most conventional naming choice. But the rule is majoritarian for 
men, which means it does nothing to unsettle the most robust aspect of our current marital naming 
conventions—the fact that men almost never change their names, even to hyphenate. This fact 
about men’s names—coupled with the fact that children almost always have their father’s name, 
even if their mother makes an unconventional naming choice for herself—means that women are 
ostensibly choosing their marital names, but in fact they are choosing from a very limited decision 
set. That is, women effectively can have nominal continuity either with their past (their families of 
origin and premarital selves) or with their future (their children and possibly their spouse), but not 
across all three generations. The formal legal default that both spouses keep their names reinforces 
this bind for women. 
Informally, legal institutions also shape choices through “desk-clerk law,” that is, advice 
given by the government functionaries who answer public inquiries at state and local agencies. 
These legal actors frequently mislead people and discourage unconventional naming choices as a 
result of ignorance or their own views about proper practice. 
Because states historically reinforced a regime of patrilineal descent of names, what might 
seem a neutral default regime is inadequate. States should set defaults and frame choices to en-
courage more egalitarian decisions about whether to change names and how. States could try any 
number of creative solutions using existing categories for thinking about choice regimes, drawn 
from contract-law theory: default rules (what rule the state fills in if the parties don’t speak to the 
contrary); menus (what range of options parties are given); and altering rules (what steps parties 
must take to contract around the default rule into different alternatives). Most modestly, states 
could adopt a “forced choosing” approach, requiring both spouses to state their postmarital names. 
More ambitiously, states might encourage hyphenation and, at the next generation, “biphena-
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tion”—defined as the passing of one name from each hyphenated parent—by making this the 
default option. 
States could also create what might be called “framing rules,” which would dictate how the 
state asks the question of parties in a choice regime. Framing rules encompass what information 
the state gives parties, what words it uses, what context surrounds the question, as well as the timing 
of the question. Framing rules are particularly important in contexts, such as marital names, where 
social conventions exert a strong influence on choices, and where desk-clerk law is likely to be 
erroneous or misleading. 
INTRODUCTION 
What laws should govern spouses’ names at marriage? If a man 
and a woman marry, should the woman’s name change automatically? 
Or should the woman’s name remain the same unless she goes through 
more or less complicated steps to change it? Contrary to convention, 
should the man’s name change to the woman’s? Should both their 
names be hyphenated? Many variations could be imagined. 
The law of marital names has undergone a significant transforma-
tion over the past forty years. For about a hundred years of U.S. his-
tory, states required married women to take their husbands’ names in 
order to engage in basic activities such as voting and driving. Now, 
because of a series of decisions made in the 1970s, married women 
may choose the names they bear. In the language of contract law, then, 
a mandatory regime has been replaced with a default regime. 
But the law continues to matter. A growing number of studies 
show that default rules affect the choices that parties make across 
widely varying domains, from organ donations to pension plans to cor-
porate antitakeover measures. For instance, across these varied do-
mains, defaults are often “sticky.” That is, parties often choose whatever 
option is set as the default. Thus, even when private parties choose, the 
law shapes behavior by the way it frames those choices. 
Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to areas where 
social conventions strongly influence decisions. Marital names there-
fore present an interesting case study, because the default rule here—
Keeping—is not sticky for women. Although no longer required to do 
so, the majority of women take their husbands’ names at marriage. 
This suggests that something other than law is largely driving behav-
ior, at least for women. So what role is law playing, and what role 
should it play? 
One contention of this Article is that the law of marital names 
should try to encourage egalitarian choices—meaning choices that 
favor neither men nor women. Names are a highly personal matter, 
arguably constitutive of our selves. For this reason, names should gen-
erally be a matter of choice, and this Article does not even entertain 
proposals for mandatory naming regimes. 
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So why should the state be involved in marital names at all? In 
short, because it has to be. The state has to set some default for names 
at marriage—even that names change or do not change—and the state 
must decide how it asks the question and how costly it makes the rele-
vant choices. At present, in ways that this Article elaborates, the cur-
rent default regime formally and informally encourages the continua-
tion of inegalitarian conventions that the state used to mandate.  
In addition, the state’s default rule should be sensitive to the fact 
that naming choices are constrained by the social and historical con-
text in which they are made. Formally, names may be choices for adults, 
but children are born into this naming regime, with no way to opt out 
until they are grown. In addition, current preferences are likely to be 
endogenous to the state’s previous mandatory regime. It would be sur-
prising if women’s (and men’s) preferences did not adapt to that man-
datory regime, much as Aesop’s fox adapted to the unavailability of the 
grapes.  
Under current conventions, women’s choices in this area are 
sharply limited. This is true in the obvious sense that social costs ac-
company unconventional choices, thereby creating the collective ac-
tion problem surrounding any attempt to change social meaning.1 
Women’s choices are also limited in the sense that what men do with 
their names constrains the overall marital naming options: since men 
almost never change their names, and since children typically take 
their father’s name even when their mother makes an unconventional 
naming choice for herself, women lack a naming option that creates 
continuity among their parents, their spouses, and their children. 
The current law of marital names tends to discourage, rather than 
encourage, egalitarian alternatives to this bind. By setting Keeping as 
the legal default, the state does nothing to unsettle the most robust 
feature of our current marital naming conventions: the fact that men 
almost never change their names. More pointedly, through both for-
mal and informal means, states make any name change other than her 
becoming Mrs. His Name more difficult.2 Formally, some states place 
additional administrative burdens on unconventional marital name 
changes. And even more often, states and localities place such burdens 
informally, through what I call desk-clerk law. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943, 993–99 
(1995) (indicating that when an “individual or part of the collective wants to transform a social 
meaning, that individual or part faces a collective action problem, since it must succeed in induc-
ing a collective response from a sufficiently large portion of the total society to assure the social 
change of meaning”).  
 2 The phrase “Mrs. His Name” has been used by others. See, for example, Jean M. Twenge, 
“Mrs. His Name”: Women’s Preferences for Married Names, 21 Psych Women Q 417, 425 (1997). 
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Desk-clerk law is what the person at the desk tells you the law is. In 
the realm of marital names, the government functionaries who answer 
questions and direct choosing behavior around marital names seem fre-
quently to give incorrect or normatively driven responses that discourage 
unconventional choices. In this informal way, desk clerks effectively make 
the rules for many citizens. Desk-clerk law is important to government-
citizen interactions in the realm of marital names and beyond. 
In light of these considerations, and especially the states’ histori-
cal role in mandating an inegalitarian regime, the law of marital names 
should instead encourage egalitarian choices. This Article lays out a 
range of ways that states could design their default regimes to this 
end. Existing categories for thinking about default regimes—default 
rules, menus, and altering rules—could be used to vary the features of 
the naming regime that affect choice. For instance, a state could create 
a facilitative default, where the state supplies parties with a suggested 
version of their hyphenated names, by randomly generating the order 
of the names and, where necessary, which name from each. Or, follow-
ing research on contrast and compromise effects, the default could be 
set at a radical default, something extreme, such as the husband be-
coming Mr. Her Name, to make biphenation seem more moderate. 
Alternatively, menus could be used to favor certain options, since re-
search indicates that people tend to prefer the first option listed. Finally, 
altering rules—the rules that determine the steps the parties must take 
to contract around a default rule—could be varied to make egalitarian 
naming options easier than inegalitarian ones. 
The Article also introduces a new category to the default-rules 
literature: framing rules. Though the existing categories provide some 
interesting avenues for reform, the fact that marital names are a do-
main in which choices are strongly shaped by social conventions high-
lights the need to think about the problem differently. States not only 
determine which options are easier than others and how; states also 
determine how to ask the questions in a default regime. Framing rules 
therefore encompass the words used to ask the question (interrogatory 
frames), the information provided to accompany the question (infor-
mational frames), and the context that surrounds the question (em-
bedded frames). 
The idea of framing rules applies to a range of contexts. New York 
law provides an example of a framing rule about marital names, through 
a law passed in 1985 that requires marriage license applications to inform 
the parties that either can change his name, that neither must change his 
name, and that a specific, wide range of naming options is available.3 
                                                                                                                           
 3 NY Dom Rel Law § 15(b) (McKinney 1999). 
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
766 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:761 
Framing rules also have applications to many other domains, from the 
way parties are required to disclose contractual terms to one another (for 
example, unconscionability doctrine) to the words police officers must 
use to explain rights to a detainee (for example, Miranda warnings). They 
are likely to be particularly important in areas where social conventions 
strongly influence decisions and where desk-clerk law is therefore espe-
cially likely to be erroneous or misleading. 
This Article comes in seven Parts. The first Part discusses why 
names matter, both in general and in the context of marriage and fam-
ily formation in particular. The second Part lays out contemporary 
social trends of marital naming. The third Part then proceeds from the 
premise, supported by Part I, that an ideal social practice of family 
naming would not follow our historical practice of patrilineal naming, 
but would involve some workable solution that favors neither men 
nor women across generations. After considering various options, this 
Part proposes the “biphenation” convention, in which spouses hy-
phenate their own names (or just their children’s) and then biphenate 
across generations by choosing one of each parent’s names.  
The rest of the Article addresses the legal regime. Part IV sets out 
the current array of practices by states with regard to name changes at 
marriage. The fifth Part evaluates the merits of possible legal default 
rules that would, to differing degrees, encourage more egalitarian nam-
ing choices. Building on existing categories in the default rule literature, 
this Part lays out several innovative types of default rules, discusses the 
virtues of forced choosing, and considers possible approaches to design-
ing menus and altering rules in this context. In these ways, a state might 
modify its default regime to try to steer choices away from a convention 
shaped by the state’s past involvement in subordinating or even uncon-
stitutional past practices. The sixth Part develops the novel category of 
framing rules for marital names in order to show the utility of this 
category for marital names and across a wider range of legal domains. 
Finally, the seventh Part presents two possible proposals for reform, one 
more modest and the other less so, both building on the idea of framing 
rules to help overcome misleading desk-clerk law and ignorance of 
law’s departure from convention. 
*  *  * 
An audience member at a talk I gave on this Article asked me 
this question: “Do you judge women who make some naming choices 
rather than others?” I was troubled by the question—troubled that 
someone who had heard the talk could think that was my position—
but the answer came easily. I explained that I have no interest in judg-
ing individual women’s choices in this domain. On the contrary, I think 
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individual women are typically in a bind—with no particularly good 
choices, and with likely disapproval from someone for whatever choice 
they make. An aim of this paper is therefore to broaden the frame away 
from the choices that individual women make. The hope is to focus 
our attention on how we—as communities and lawmakers—could 
better frame decisions about marital names to make egalitarian 
choices more plausible for both men and women.   
I.  THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM  
I guarantee you that the first generation of women who grow 
up without scribbling “Mrs. Paul Newman” all over their 
notebooks “just to see what it looks like” is going to think we 
[the feminists who fought against mandatory name change 
for women] were mad. It is a very odd and radical idea in-
deed that a woman would nominally disappear just because 
she got married. 
—Ellen Goodman4 
Picture Rachel Smith and Sam Miller. If they choose to become 
Rachel and Sam Miller (or Mr. and Mrs. Sam Miller), we know the 
progression: Their kids are Millers, and if and when their kids grow up 
and marry, the boys continue to be Millers, and the girls become Mrs. 
Husband’s Name. Their kids’ kids follow the same practice—fairly sim-
ple. As one commentator wrote in the heyday of the lawsuits that 
stopped the practice of forcing women to change their names to their 
husband’s under law:  
Sure, it smacks of discrimination to require that a woman assume 
her husband’s surname upon marriage and that the children she 
bears also go by her husband’s name. But it is tidy. In a culture 
that developed as a male-dominated society, it was natural that 
the family name follow the male line of descent. . . . [W]hy don’t 
we leave well enough alone . . . ?5 
Everyone understands the practice of male surnames passing to the 
wife and the children. How could they not? It is very simple. 
The arguments for why names matter—that is, why it should mat-
ter that men’s surnames pass from generation to generation and 
women’s surnames disappear—were articulated at great length by those 
who fought to defeat our previous mandatory regime for women taking 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Ellen Goodman, The Name of the Game, Boston Globe 30 (Sept 24, 1974). 
 5 What to Call What’s-His-Name, Virginian-Pilot A10 (Jan 5, 1981). 
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their husband’s names.6 This Article will not rehearse all of these ar-
guments. Before proceeding to discuss social and legal alternatives to 
our current regime, though, this Part lays out several reasons why 
marital names matter.  
A. The Trouble with Names  
Suppose we had a tradition that when blacks married whites, the 
white name was always the name used by the family. . . . If you 
really think that there’s equality, ask him to change his name. 
—Morrison Bonpasse7 
Volumes have been written—and many more could be written—
on the history, law, and social meaning of names. This Part very briefly 
highlights a few noteworthy points about names in general and mari-
tal names in particular. 
1. Names in general. 
Names are peculiarly situated as among our most trivial, and yet 
our most foundational, social practices. Names are mere words—a 
string of letters and sounds typically chosen by someone else to iden-
tify us. Our first names and our last names are given by others before 
or shortly after we are born, when the choosers have no idea of our 
personalities or preferences, and thus are in some sense chosen 
blindly.8 When we are older, we can formally change our names, but 
very few men do so, and, outside the context of marriage, few women 
make a change.9 Mostly, outside marriage, we take the names we are 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See, for example, Julia C. Lamber, A Married Woman’s Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 
Wash U L Q 779, 783–807; Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz and Gloria Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, 
Married Women’s Surnames, 5 Conn L Rev 598, 602–20 (1972). 
 7 Morrison Bonpasse, quoted in Chris Poon, The Name Game—A Bride Has to Decide: 
Should She Change, Stay the Same, Hyphenate, or Invent?, Providence Journal-Bulletin 8L (Oct 
17, 1999). Bonpasse is currently the Executive Director of the Lucy Stone League, a group estab-
lished in the 1920s to fight for women’s right to retain their birth names after marriage, and 
rejuvenated in 1997 to promote egalitarian naming practices more generally. See also Amanda 
Bower, It’s Mrs., Not Ms.: In a Return to Tradition, More Brides Are Taking Their Husband’s 
Name, Time Bonus Section W4 (June 6, 2005). 
 8 Compare John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic 23 (Harper 1850): 
The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names. . . . A proper name is 
but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order 
that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that in-
dividual object.  
 9 People of course take nicknames and screen names, which informally alter their names. 
See, for example, Stephanie Rosenbloom, Mi, A Name I Call Myself. And You Are?, NY Times 
G1 (Apr 13, 2006). It may be that more people are formally changing their names outside of 
marriage, though still in small numbers. For instance, between July 2005 and June 2006, New 
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given, in spite of any embarrassment we may feel if our names seem 
outdated or unwieldy, or fail to reflect who we are. 
Though apparently trivial, names are also constitutive. To have a 
name at all is thought to be a fundamental element of identity and dig-
nity.10 From a young age, we are identified by our names.11 Our names 
are often among the first words we are taught to say and write. They are 
words that we learn early to associate with our selves.12 Moreover, for 
many, our names link us to our families and kin networks—whether 
through first, last, or middle names. And in the eyes of outsiders, our 
names link us to particular others. Sometimes these assumptions are 
right. (Elizabeth Dole and Bob Dole are in fact married; George 
Clooney is indeed related to Rosemary Clooney.) Sometimes such 
assumptions, no matter how strong the resemblance of the names, are 
terribly wrong. (Kenny Loggins, currently the subject of the prominent 
juvenile-life-without-parole case in Alabama, is apparently not the 
same person as, nor is he related to, the ‘70s singer, also named Kenny 
Loggins, who wrote and sang the theme song to Footloose.13) Most 
people have strong feelings, whether articulated or implicit, about the 
idea of Keeping, or changing, their names.14 Existing social practices, 
discussed in the next Part, certainly suggest that most men would balk 
at the idea of changing their names. Even more uniformly than their 
                                                                                                                           
Jersey state courts received 4,690 case filings for name changes outside of the marital context 
(equivalent to approximately 0.05 percent of the state population), which was a 15 percent in-
crease from the previous year. See New Jersey Judiciary Civil Statistics (June 2006) 87, table 
Civil Caseload Summary by Case Type. 
 10 The third principle of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 
adopted in 1959, is that “[t]he child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.” 
Resolution 1386, UN General Assembly, 14th Sess, 841st mtg (Nov 20, 1959), UN Doc A/RES. 
Although legal names are generally a matter of individual choice in the U.S. (in the absence of 
fraudulent intent), not having a name at all—and being identified by a number instead—is 
probably not an option. See In re Dengler, 287 NW2d 637, 639 (Minn 1979) (upholding a denied 
application for a change of name to “1069”); Thomas M. Lockney and Karl Ames, Is 1069 a 
Name?, 29 Names 1 (1981). To some, being identified by a number, even in addition to a name, is 
a spiritual harm. See Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 696 (1986) (rejecting the Free Exercise claim of a 
Native American father who argued that being assigned a “Social Security number . . . will serve 
to ‘rob the spirit’ of his daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power”). 
 11 See, for example, Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality 115 (Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston 1961) (noting that children’s names are integral to “awareness of inde-
pendent status in the social group”).  
 12 If identification with names seems doubtful, think how offended people can be when 
others forget their names. 
 13 See generally United States v Kenneth Loggins, 777 F2d 336 (6th Cir 1985). 
 14 See Margaret Jean Intons-Peterson and Jill Crawford, The Meaning of Marital Sur-
names, 12 Sex Roles 1163, 1165–71 (1985) (finding, in a study of university students and other 
affiliates, that both males and females tended to identify strongly with their names, but that both 
men and women thought women identified less strongly than men). See also Deborah A. 
Duggan, Albert A. Cota, and Kenneth L. Dion, Taking Thy Husband’s Name: What Might It 
Mean?, 41 Names 87, 91–92 (June 1993). 
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last names, men’s prefixes to their names don’t change through mar-
riage: unlike women, for whom the prefix “Mrs.” as opposed to “Miss” 
signifies their marital status, men stay “Mr.” whether single or mar-
ried.15 
The typical acceptance of women becoming Mrs. His Name is 
perhaps more puzzling in light of troubling historical associations with 
name changes. Historically, name change outside of marriage has often 
been an act of racial and cultural domination. Under the Nazi name 
decrees of the 1930s, Jews were required to add Sarah (for females) or 
Israel (for males) to their names.16 Immigrants to this country have 
been renamed due to the carelessness of clerks.17 Slaves in the U.S. 
were sometimes named and renamed by the whites who legally owned 
them.18 Among the dramatic portrayals of this renaming is the scene in 
Roots when Kunta Kinte is renamed by his master: “You To-by!” he is 
told by another slave. “Massa say you name Toby!”19 Such histories 
also affect the ethnic significance that many people attach to their 
names, as I discuss later.20 
2. Marital names in particular. 
For about a hundred years in this country, until about two dec-
ades ago, women were effectively subject to a mandatory regime of 
name change at marriage. This regime warrants a brief explanation, as 
it forms a useful background to our discussion of why names matter, 
and how the law should frame our contemporary choice regime. 
The curious history of women’s marital surnames in the U.S. is a 
story of custom influencing law influencing custom. At common law, in 
the U.S. as in England, both women and men were free to change their 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Of course, when men become doctors or professors or PhDs, few balk at adopting the 
new title of “Dr.” or “Professor,” and those who do refuse the title tend to do so in an attempt to 
resist hierarchy. 
 16 This applied to all those whose Jewish identity was not “already self-evident” from their 
names, and required that these new middle names be used in all official documents and commu-
nications. See Robert M. Rennick, The Nazi Name Decrees of the Nineteen Thirties, 18 Names 65, 
76–77 (1970). 
 17 See William Petersen, Surnames in US Population Records, 27 Population & Dev Rev 
315, 316 (2001). 
 18 See Omi [Morgenstern Leissner], The Problem that Has No Name, 4 Cardozo Women’s 
L J 321, 330–31 (1998); Frank Nuessel, The Study of Names: A Guide to the Principles and Topics 
4–5 (Greenwood 1992); Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 444–50 
(Pantheon 1974). 
 19 Alex Haley, Roots 181 (Doubleday 1976). This is after the word “name” has appeared 
thirty-four times in the book already—and prominently, as when Kunta is given his family’s 
name. Much emphasis is placed on the importance of Kunta’s name to his identity and pride, as 
he wants to “shout” in response to Samson who’s bearing this bad news: “I am Kunta Kinte, first 
son of Omoro, who is the son of the holy man Kairaba Kunta Kinte!” Id. 
 20 See Part III (discussing factors relevant to devising a sustainable egalitarian convention). 
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surnames through common usage, subject to certain exceptions for 
fraud.21 The law was required to recognize the surname by which a 
person, man or woman, was known. As one commentator wrote, “By 
the common law of England a man was entitled to adopt a new name 
for himself as one changes a coat.”22 The freedom to change one’s sur-
name is perhaps unsurprising in light of the fact that first names were 
generally the only names borne until the eleventh century, when sur-
names were added for functional purposes, to help differentiate the 
many people with the same first (or Christian) names.23 Surnames 
typically conveyed some kind of information about the bearer, such as 
his occupation, his characteristics, or his place of origin.24 
For married women, who were treated under coverture as legally 
subsumed by their husbands’ identity, bearing his surname was gener-
ally deemed the most informative moniker.25 Thus, up until the mid-
nineteenth century, women typically changed their names to their 
husbands’ as a matter of custom. There are some notable cases of 
women not doing so—by geographical custom, or by virtue of their 
own names’ distinction relative to their husbands’ (who sometimes 
changed their names to their wives’26)—but these were apparently the 
exception.27 Importantly, however, women plainly adopted their hus-
bands’ names by custom but not by legal mandate.28  
                                                                                                                           
 21 See Una Stannard, Mrs Man 112, 115 (Germain 1977) (remarking that, at common law, 
surnames had “original mutability” and did not require court approval for change). 
 22 Frederick Dwight, Proper Names, 20 Yale L J 387, 387 (1911). 
 23 See Stannard, Mrs Man at 112 (cited in note 21). Stannard says surnames did not be-
come common until the time of Henry VIII (the sixteenth century), though other sources suggest 
their widespread use prior to that time. See also David Hey, Family Names and Family History, 
51 Hist Today 38, 39 (July 2001) (stating that use of surnames “began to spread in southern Eng-
land and East Anglia from about the middle of the thirteenth century and was largely completed 
across the country within the next two hundred years”); Judith M. Bennett, Spouses, Siblings and 
Surnames: Reconstructing Families from Medieval Village Court Rolls, 23 J Brit Stud 26, 37 (1983) 
(noting that in the late thirteenth century, “almost all court citations identified individuals by 
both forename and surname”); G.S. Arnold, Personal Names, 15 Yale L J 227, 227 (1905) (stating 
that surnames became “universally necessary” in the early fourteenth century).  
 24 See Arnold, 15 Yale L J at 227 (cited in note 23). 
 25 Lamber, 1973 Wash U L Q at 781 (cited in note 6); Bysiewicz and MacDonnell, 5 Conn L 
Rev at 600–01 (cited in note 6). 
 26 Stannard, Mrs Man at 112–14 (cited in note 21). On this practice in some contexts in 
Japan, see note 144. 
 27 Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal Treat-
ment under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 Duke J Gender L & Policy 89, 91 (1994) (quoting a 
seventeenth-century treatise on this point: “When a small brooke or little river incorporateth 
with Rhodanus, Humber, or the Thames, the poor rivulet looseth her name”).  
 28 According to The American and English Encyclopedia of Law: “By custom, the wife is 
called by the husband’s name; but whether the marriage shall work any change at all is, after all, 
a mere matter of choice, and either may take the other’s name, or they may join their names 
together.” 9 The American and English Encyclopedia of Law 813 (Thompson 1887–1896), quoted 
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Custom became law by a series of cases in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century.29 These cases built dicta upon dicta until 
many states had plainly declared in case law30 or by statute31 that mar-
ried women’s ability to engage legally in certain activities—such as driv-
ing or voting—was dependent on her bearing her husband’s name. 
This legal regime largely continued until the 1970s, when a series of 
cases established the right of women to continue to bear their birth-
names after marriage.32 Courts generally avoided constitutional ques-
                                                                                                                           
in Una Stannard, Manners Make Laws: Married Women’s Names in the United States, 32 Names 
114, 117 (June 1984). 
 29 The foundational dicta came from Chapman v Phoenix National Bank, 85 NY 437, 449 
(1881), a case involving an overzealous wartime action to confiscate property. The court set aside 
the action to confiscate, reasoning that improper notice of forfeiture was given because the 
notice was in the married woman’s maiden name. Though reaching an apparently just result on 
the facts, the court gave us the following unfortunate dicta: “For several centuries, by the com-
mon law among all English speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her husband’s 
surname.” Of course, not only was this dicta, it was also incorrect, as this was not common law, 
but rather simply custom. See also Omi, 4 Cardozo Women’s L J at 352–54 (cited in note 18); 
Lamber, 1973 Wash U L Q at 783–95 (cited in note 6). 
 30 See, for example, Freeman v Hawkins, 77 Tex 498, 14 SW 364, 364–65 (1890) (concluding 
that constructive service in a married woman’s maiden name is not sufficient legal notice to give 
a court jurisdiction to bind the woman); Bacon v Boston Elevated Railway Co, 256 Mass 30, 152 
NE 35, 36 (1926) (involving a tort suit for a car crash in a car registered in the female driver’s 
maiden name); Rago v Lipsky, 327 Ill App 63, 63 NE2d 642, 647 (1945) (interpreting a state 
statute—and reversing a trial court’s interpretation to the contrary—to mandate that a woman’s 
voter registration in her maiden name is automatically cancelled upon marriage, and that she 
must reregister in her married name in order to vote). See also Forbush v Wallace, 341 F Supp 
217, 220–22 (MD Ala 1971) (concluding that the state’s unwritten regulation requiring married 
women to obtain drivers licenses in their husband’s names, and the state’s common law rule that 
a woman’s name automatically changes to her husband’s at marriage, both have a rational basis, 
particularly because she can apply for a name change through probate court (so the harm to her 
is de minimis), but noting that “no area of the law seems more unsettled today than the guaran-
tees and the protection of women’s rights under the Constitution”), affd without opinion, 405 US 
970 (1972) (affirming the three-judge district court’s decision without opinion one year before 
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications was established). For a discussion of this case, 
see Lamber, 1973 Wash U L Q at 795–800 (cited in note 6). Federal rulings have also built upon 
the erroneous dicta in Chapman. See In re Kayaloff, 9 F Supp 176 (SDNY 1934) (holding, under 
Chapman, that a female musician could not be naturalized in her maiden name, rather than her 
married name). For a chart of state laws as of the early 1970s, see Lois B. Gordon, Statutory 
Development: Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resumption and Reregistration Statutes, 74 Colum L 
Rev 1508, 1520 (1974).  
 31 Only one state passed a statute explicitly mandating that women change their names: 
Hawaii, apparently for reasons of westernization. See Hawaii Rev Stat § 574-1 (1968) (“Every 
married woman shall adopt her husband’s name as a family name.”). This law has since been 
superseded. See Hawaii Rev Stat § 574-1 (1993 & Supp 2004) (allowing for choice in marital 
naming). See also Stannard, 32 Names at 127 n 25 (cited in note 28) (referencing the Hawaiian 
exception); Bysiewicz and MacDonnell, 5 Conn L Rev at 602–03 (cited in note 6) (examining 
state laws of name change). 
 32 See, for example, Kruzel v Podell, 67 Wis 2d 138, 226 NW2d 458, 463–66 (1975) (conclud-
ing that a woman’s name does not—and need not—change to her husband’s on marriage, if she 
consistently uses her maiden name, in response to a petition from an art teacher whose public 
school insisted she register for health insurance under her husband’s name); Dunn v Palermo, 
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tions by reasoning that their decisions merely resurrected the proper 
interpretation of the common law.33 A key decision in this line was 
Dunn v Palermo,34 in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee struck 
down a state law requiring a married woman to register to vote under 
her husband’s name.35 Though the court did not reach the plaintiff’s 
constitutional claims under the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments, and relied for its decision only on the common law right to de-
termine one’s own name, the court spoke the language of equality: 
We are urged to the conclusion that the custom of women adopt-
ing the surnames of their husbands has ripened into law and that, 
therefore, a wife is under a legal duty to adopt her husband’s sur-
name. . . . [M]arried women have labored under a form of societal 
compulsion and economic coercion which has not been condu-
cive to the assertion of some rights and privileges of citizenship. 
The application of a rule of custom and its conversion into a rule 
of law[] would stifle and chill virtually all progress in the rapidly 
expanding field of human liberties. We live in a new day. We can-
not create and continue conditions and then defend their exis-
tence by reliance upon the custom thus created. Had we applied 
the rules of custom during the last quarter of a century, the hopes, 
aspirations and dreams of millions of Americans would have 
been frustrated and their fruition would have been impossible.36 
                                                                                                                           
522 SW2d 679, 688–89 (Tenn 1975) (holding that neither custom nor law requires that a woman’s 
name change to her husband’s at marriage, and thus that the plaintiff’s name was wrongly purged 
from the voter rolls when she declined to reregister in her husband’s name); Stuart v Board of 
Supervisors of Elections for Howard County, 266 Md 440, 295 A2d 223, 227 (1972) (concluding 
that a married female voter could continue to vote in her maiden name if she showed cause that 
she had used her maiden name consistently and nonfraudulently). See also Claudia Goldin and 
Maria Shim, Making a Name: Women’s Surnames at Marriage and Beyond, 18 J Econ Persp 143, 
144–45 (2004) (noting the legal changes regarding marital name change in the 1970s, especially 
the Dunn decision); Kif Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom is to Call Things by Their 
Right Names, 7 S Cal Rev L & Women’s Stud 1, 4–9 (1998) (surveying case law). An earlier 
precedent against mandatory name change for women is Krupa v Green, 114 Ohio App 497, 177 
NE2d 616, 620 (1961), in which the court denied a taxpayer’s petition to prevent a married 
woman from appearing on the ballot for municipal judge using her maiden name, Blanche Kru-
pansky. For a federal case under Title VII, see Allen v Lovejoy, 553 F2d 522 (6th Cir 1977) (hold-
ing that Title VII was violated when a county employer suspended a female employee for refus-
ing to sign a form authorizing postmarriage name change in personnel file). 
 33 See, for example, Kruzel, 226 NW2d at 466; Dunn, 522 SW2d at 689; Stuart, 295 A2d at 
228. Interestingly, these cases implicitly approve the constitutionality of differential procedural 
burdens on men and women in this regard; for instance, under Stuart, a female voter who had 
never used any name but her maiden name would still have to show cause to the Board of Elec-
tions to indicate that she had used only her maiden name, and nonfraudulently so, to be regis-
tered to vote in that name. 295 A2d at 228. 
 34 522 SW2d 679 (Tenn 1975). 
 35 Id at 688–89. 
 36 Id at 688. 
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Thus the values of liberty and equality coincided with a proper under-
standing of the common law to overturn mandatory name change for 
women.  
Though U.S. courts have avoided deciding such cases on broad 
principles of constitutional equality, the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee addressed the fundamental question directly in 2002. In Müller v 
Namibia,37 the Committee found a violation of the gender-equality 
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in the financial and administrative burdens that Namibia imposed on 
a man’s taking his wife’s name at marriage, but not on a woman’s tak-
ing her husband’s name.38 
While the meanings of one person taking another’s name vary, 
the act of naming is often an act of power. The ability to choose one’s 
own name is arguably therefore an important aspect of self-
possession.39 Fortunately then, under U.S. law today, women choose 
what to do with their names at marriage. However, for a variety of 
reasons, the issue of choice is a complicated one. This brings us to our 
next subject.  
B. The Trouble with Marital Naming Choices  
Society dictates that the woman change her name. Now, you 
can decide to keep your maiden name or hyphenate your 
name or take his, whatever you want. But men don’t normally 
change their names. I don’t know what else to tell you. 
—Clerk in Jasper County, Missouri40 
In our current discussions of marital names, the focus tends to be 
on choice. The important victory of the women’s movement, many will 
say, is that women can choose for themselves—whether about their 
bodies, their careers, or their names. In the words of Hanna Holborn 
Gray, former President of The University of Chicago, “I would say to 
young women on campuses today, ‘Remember that what the women’s 
liberation movement ought to be about is liberating you, giving you 
                                                                                                                           
 37 UN GAOR Human Rights Committee, 74th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/919 (2000). 
 38 Id. 
 39 This belief may be particularly common in the United States, with its peculiar brand of 
individualism. Though the footnotes mention cross-cultural reference points, the focus through-
out the Article is nonetheless U.S. laws and conventions. 
 40 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Jasper County, Missouri, Recorder of Deeds (June 
28, 2006) (responding to the question of whether a husband could legally take his wife’s name or 
hyphenate his name at marriage). For the protocol of these telephone conversations, see note 175. 
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choices to make, and don’t let people seduce you into thinking that 
there’s only one choice you can make.’”41 
Women surely should be permitted to make choices in any num-
ber of highly personal domains where they formerly had no choice—
including marital names. This Article therefore proposes only default, 
not mandatory, rules, in the interests of preserving individual choice 
for both women and men. But the popular emphasis on choice in con-
temporary discussions of marital names has a number of troubling 
features.42 It is as if the mere fact that women can choose their names 
in the U.S.—such progress from the olden days—should erase any 
concerns we might have about current practices. The points that follow 
elaborate the trouble with the choices available to women—and to 
men—concerning marital names.  
1. An incomplete decision set.  
First, it is women’s choices—and only women’s choices—that are 
typically discussed. The standard question about names surrounding a 
wedding is, “is she changing her name?” or perhaps “is she keeping 
her name?,” not “are they changing their names?” And surely few, if 
any, grooms-to-be are asked if they are changing their names. (Note 
the New York Times wedding pages’ traditional practice of noting, as 
the marked answer to an implied question, “the bride will be keeping 
her name.”) Of the numerous studies on marital names, few even dis-
cuss husbands’ names.43 Articles on the subject talk about how much 
time women spend discussing the issue of names, and how important it 
is for them (or how unimportant, depending on the article). While 
several studies report on how husbands feel about their wives’ mari-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Leslie Maitland Werner, The Gray Presidency—The First Ten Years, 81 U Chi Mag 7, 10 
(Fall 1988). 
 42 See, for example, Alison Lobron, The Same-Name Game, Boston Globe Magazine 40 
(Oct 30, 2005); Tracy E. Higgins, Why Feminists Can’t (or Shouldn’t) Be Liberals, 72 Fordham L 
Rev 1629, 1633–34 (2004). 
 43 See Part II.A (collecting sources). Among the notable exceptions is Laurie Scheuble and 
David R. Johnson, Marital Name Change: Plans and Attitudes of College Students, 55 J Marriage 
& Fam 747, 750 (1993), which gathered data on college student attitudes to male, as well as fe-
male, marital name change. They found, in response to the question “[i]f a man marries, under 
what circumstances should he take his wife’s last name?,” the following: “If his wife wants him to 
take her last name”—males (12.0 percent), females (19.0 percent) (not a significant difference); 
“If he wants to change his last name”—males (70.0 percent), females (84.8 percent) (a significant 
difference); “If he marries a woman who is well-known in her field of work”—males (14.0 per-
cent), females (19.0 percent) (not a significant difference); “A man should never change his name 
to the last name of his spouse”—males (33.0 percent), females (19.6 percent) (a significant dif-
ference). Id. In light of the study’s interest in those attitudes, however, it is striking that even 
Scheuble and Johnson asked only the female subjects if they planned to change their own names 
to their spouse’s if they married. See id at 749–50.  
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tal-naming choices and how included or not included the men felt in 
the decision, even most of these give hardly a nod to the idea that men 
are also free to change their names.44 
Of course the inattention to men’s names at marriage could re-
flect mere probabilities: perhaps so few men change their names in 
any way at marriage that there’s no reason to ask about it, any more 
than one would ask if the couple is getting matching garter belt tat-
toos or honeymooning in Antarctica. But the form of the question 
about marital names is more significant than that, as is plain from 
newspaper articles whose newsworthiness stems from the fact that 
men changed their names in some way at marriage.45 As I discuss fur-
ther below, the few men who alter their names at marriage are often 
greeted with disbelief or worse, evincing the obvious fact that the so-
cial meanings surrounding names, and marital names in particular, 
make any change of name at marriage a very costly decision for men.46 
The social pressures may be tremendous, but, in the language of 
choice, men are free to choose it, so there’s no problem. 
Thus, although a woman ostensibly has a wide variety of choices 
about her marital name, her actual options are quite limited if she’s 
marrying a man, because there’s no serious possibility of (most) men 
altering their names at marriage. She can Keep her name—and have a 
different name from her husband and typically her child as well.47 She 
can Change to Mrs. His Name—and leave behind her birthname, but 
share a name with her immediate family. Or she, and only she, can 
hyphenate—and share one part of her name with her parents and her 
past self, and another part with her husband and her child, while her 
husband has the same name as his parents and his child and thus con-
tinuity across all three generations of his family. If she hyphenates her 
name, she alone bears the hassle of all the computer forms that appar-
ently can’t accommodate such a name, and the people who can’t seem 
to remember it, and the people who think she’s constantly trying to 
make a point about her independence.   
                                                                                                                           
 44 See notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing these studies).  
 45 See, for example, Samanatha Sordyl, More Men Take Plunge—With Her Name: Although 
Still Rare, Husbands Are Changing Their Last Names When They Get Married, Orlando Sentinel 
E3 (Jan 6, 2005); Ann Doss Helms, How N.C. Sees the Male Name Game: Should Common Law 
on Married Women’s Names Apply to Men?, Charlotte Observer 2E (June 19, 2001); Jessica 
McBride, More Grooms Are Saying ‘I Do’ to Taking Bride’s Last Name in the Name of Love, 
Milwaukee J Sentinel sec Lifestyle at 1 (Nov 28, 1999); Paula Span, Taking a Wife, and Her Name, 
Wash Post F01 (Jan 9, 1998); Sam Howe Verhovek, My Maiden Name, NY Times sec 6 at 18 (May 
14, 1995); Roger L. Welsch, The Hyphenated American, 103 Natural Hist 24, 24–25 (1994).  
 46 See notes 64–65 (quoting articles and postings).  
 47 See Part II.B (citing data indicating that the vast majority of women who make uncon-
ventional naming choices for themselves still give their children his name). 
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In an article celebrating the increasing numbers of women who be-
come Mrs. His Name, Peggy Noonan implicitly chides the women who 
do otherwise as insufficiently committed to marital unity: “A bride 
[who] grew up in the Age of Divorce . . . may have fewer misconcep-
tions than [her] parents about how important freedom and self-
actualization are. [She] may think other things are more important, 
like constancy and commitment and loyalty.”48 Of course, to decline to 
become Mrs. His Name is to choose independence over marital unity 
only where there is no realistic possibility of him or both changing to 
create that nominal unity. 
It has gone out of fashion to quibble over language, and names 
may be one instance of this—as if what happens to names at marriage 
is on a par with whether we do or do not call first-year students 
“freshmen.” Abandoning the language wars is sometimes claimed as a 
sign of our recent progress towards real equality. Likewise, a woman 
who becomes Mrs. His Name will sometimes say that since women 
have enough real equality now—or at least, she may say, since “I” am 
independent enough of my guy not to fear losing my identity, I need 
not make a point about equality with something as trivial as my name. 
Abandoning the debate over freshmen may well be part of the path of 
progress, particularly now that women attain undergraduate and, in 
some fields, graduate degrees in roughly equal numbers as men.49 But I 
think it’s harder to claim a cultural embrace of Mrs. His Name as a 
sign of our progress. As one writer puts it,  
Of my married friends who have taken their husbands’ names, 
most say they did so for reasons of simplicity. . . . The decision was 
one of convenience, they assured me. It was totally neutral and 
nonpatriarchal. I’m glad they feel that way, but it seems to me 
that if we had really reached the stage of true equality, I’d know 
at least one couple who discovered that it was just as convenient 
for the man to take his wife’s name.50 
She may be choosing, but so long as his name is not up for discussion, 
she’s choosing from a very limited decision set. 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Peggy Noonan, Looking Forward, Good Housekeeping 208 (Oct 1996). She continues: 
Maybe, for these brides, taking their husbands’ names is a declaration not only of intention, 
but of faith. Maybe they are suspending disbelief. Marriage itself is a marvelously faithful 
act. It shows that you have faith in yourself and your spouse, and also in life, in the ability of 
things to stay and grow and endure. 
 49 See U.S. Census Bureau, Educational Attainment of the Population 15 Years and Over, by 
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 2005, online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/ 
socdemo/education/cps2005.html (visited July 8, 2007). 
 50 Lobron, The Same-Name Game, Boston Globe Magazine at 40 (cited in note 42). 
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2. Who cares. 
Another common trope surrounding marital names—and par-
ticularly the naming of children—is that he cares about his name more 
than she does. It simply matters more to him to keep his name, and to 
pass his name onto the children. So a basic utility calculus may suggest 
to the spouses that it makes sense to give the kids his name, and even 
more obviously, for him to keep his name. This might seem similar to a 
split in household chores based on who hates which tasks more: he 
hates making the bed and she hates cleaning the bathroom, so each 
does the other’s least favorite task, and everyone is happier for it.  
With names, though, the preferences may not be neutral. Imagine 
two people. One grew up knowing from a young age that his name is 
his to keep, and that it won’t change by virtue of his relationships. In 
fact, if he marries and has children, his name will spread to his family, 
and, if he has boys, to future generations. The second person grew up 
knowing from a young age that her name would disappear and be re-
placed by another name, if and only if she were lucky enough to be 
loved enough to be given a new name. Her children would bear that 
name as yet unknown to her, that name that would mark her success 
in love. With new boys she met, she scribbled out her new name and 
dreamily imagined herself as Mrs. Somebody Else.51 
How could the first person not care more about his name? It is 
his and he has always thought it would be his. It is, in a different sense 
than for her, his property. From studies of loss aversion and the en-
dowment effect, we know that people value what they own more highly 
than what they do not.52 If people can develop an attachment to indif-
ferent mugs once they own them, causing them to value the mugs they 
own more highly than those they do not, then it seems reasonable to 
think that something similar could be true of names.53 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See note 4 and accompanying text (supplying the epigraph to this Part). The other can-
didate for the epigraph to this Part was “I’ve always wanted to be Mrs. Somebody Else.” Conver-
sation with anonymous New York City hairdresser (May 26, 2006). 
 52 See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, The En-
dowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ Persp 193, 205 (1991). 
 53 Of course many women do become attached to their names. One study of university 
students and faculty and staff, mentioned earlier, found that about half of both the male and the 
female undergraduates—and more than half of the male and the female graduate students and 
faculty and staff—reported feeling identified with their (premarital) names, though both males 
and females thought that women identified less strongly and that it was psychologically easier 
for women to change their names than men. See Intons-Peterson and Crawford, 12 Sex Roles at 
1165–66 (cited in note 14). Even in this sample, the females nonetheless reported a significantly 
greater willingness to change their names than did men. Id at 1166–67.  
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It makes sense, then, that most men prefer that their wives take 
their names.54 Men whose wives don’t take their names will sometimes 
say that they were surprised at how disappointed they felt, surprised 
that it felt like a loss.55 But how could it not feel like a loss for men 
who grew up thinking that, as part of a meaningful and happy occa-
sion, their future wives would take their names? 
Moreover, women who decline to take their husbands’ names 
face not only the potential displeasure of their husband, but negative 
stereotypes from the wider public. Women who keep their own names 
are thought by others to be more assertive, more feminist, and more 
oriented towards their careers than their families.56 Women in earlier 
eras who wanted to keep or resume their birthnames were subjected 
to harsher words than “assertive.”57 A study of the psychology of 
names from the 1930s concluded that “the effect of a man’s changing 
his name [for any reason] may be extreme emotional disturbances, a 
split personality, or other maladjustments. But women who object to 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Susan J. Kupper, Surnames for Women: A Decision-Making Guide 65–67 (McFarland 1990) 
(reporting, in a study of women who made unconventional naming choices, that “it was unusual 
for husbands to have an immediate and unquestioning acceptance of their wives’ names. Many 
felt an initial ambivalence or even opposition to the idea, but gradually came to accept and 
support it”). This is consistent with another study that found that men whose wives kept or hy-
phenated their names reported feeling less happy with their wives’ names. Andrea Anderson, 
The Relationship between Wives’ Marital Last Name Style and Husbands’ Self-Esteem, Locus of 
Control, Gender Role and Perception of Power within Their Marriage 97–99 (unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Alliant International University, 2005).  
 55 See Kupper, Surnames for Women at 65–67 (cited in note 54).  
 56 See Claire E. Etaugh, et al, “Names Can Never Hurt Me?”: The Effects of Surname Use 
on Perceptions of Married Women, 23 Psych Women Q 819, 821 (1999) (reporting on a study of 
222 male and female university students who read a description of, and rated on fifty-one traits, a 
woman who took her husband’s name, kept her own name, or hyphenated her name, and finding 
that subjects viewed the women who kept their birth names or hyphenated as “more agentic and 
less communal”); Donna L. Atkinson, Names and Titles: Maiden Name Retention and the Use of 
Ms., 9 J Atlantic Provinces Linguistic Assn 56, 69–70 (1987) (reporting on a survey of 325 Cana-
dian respondents about women who keep their last names and who use “Ms.” and finding similar 
stereotypes about both practices, that is, that the women were “career-oriented,’” “independent,” 
and not “submissive”; “feminist” was also associated with “Ms.,” though not significantly; con-
trary to the author’s hypothesis, “unattractive” was not associated with “Ms.”); Sheila M. Emble-
ton and Ruth King, Attitudes towards Maiden Name Retention, 66 Onomastica Canadiana 11, 17 
(1984) (reporting on the results of having asked forty-three Canadian respondents (thirty-one 
males and twelve females) in a campus pub and in a strip bar about women’s names and finding 
that subjects associated a woman’s retaining her own name with assertiveness and, for the male 
subjects, orientation towards job rather than towards home or family). See also Duggan, Cota, 
and Dion, 41 Names at 95 (cited in note 14) (discussing such findings). Finally, one study showed 
substantial tolerance among male (57.0 percent) and female (91.8 percent) college students of 
women’s keeping their names, but a preference by both males (51.0 percent) and females (54.4 
percent) that, if there are children, the wife takes the husband’s name. The difference between 
male and female views on the latter point was not statistically significant. Scheuble and Johnson, 
55 J Marriage & Fam at 750 (cited in note 43). 
 57 See Omi, 4 Cardozo Women’s L J at 397–98 (cited in note 18). 
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change because of possible violation of important values are usually 
maladjusted anyway, and projecting their difficulties onto the norm.”58 
In a case from the 1970s, the Attorney General of Indiana described a 
married woman who wanted to resume her maiden name as “kind of 
odd ball” and “a sick and confused woman,” whose “need was not for 
a change of name but for a competent psychiatrist.”59 Researchers in 
the 1980s studying the related topic of women’s titles found that 
women who were called “Ms.” were thought to be less honest than 
those called “Miss,” “Mrs.,” or a name with no title.60  
Moreover, women considering an unconventional naming option 
that involves their birthname face the retort that they are merely decid-
ing between their husband’s name and their father’s name, so what does 
it matter? Of course what this argument ignores is that what was her 
father’s name is now her name, and has been so for her entire life.61 
Returning to our two people, we would therefore expect the sec-
ond person to care less about her birth name, particularly if her 
mother or grandmothers grew up without the legal option to do any-
thing other than take a husband’s name. Like the fabled fox who 
deemed the grapes sour, one who is fated to lose her name may well 
learn not to value it.62 Adaptive preferences of this sort are troubling 
because they suggest that some preferences result from, and can per-
petuate, inequality.63 
Additionally, any man who does not keep his name at marriage 
faces the problem of social costs. How could he not care more that his 
name stays the same when everyone else cares that his name stays the 
same (and gets passed on to any children he may have)? Whatever 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Robert R. Holt, Studies in the Psychology of Names 312 (unpublished BA thesis, Prince-
ton University, 1939). 
 59 In re Hauptly, 262 Ind 150, 312 NE2d 857, 861 (1974) (Hunter concurring) (quoting the 
state’s brief to the Indiana Supreme Court). The dissent from the majority decision to grant the 
name change expressed a similar view of the petitioner: “[T]he petitioner’s stated reasons for 
desiring the change indicate nothing but whimsey [sic] and an unusual psychological quirk. I know 
of no reason why the law should be concerned with such trivia.” Id at 862 (Prentice dissenting).  
 60 See, for example, Jane Connor, et al, Use of the Titles Ms., Miss, or Mrs.: Does it Make a 
Difference?, 14 Sex Roles 545, 547–48 (1986). This is perhaps because they were thought to be 
concealing something important about themselves, that is, their marital status. Id at 548. Interest-
ingly, though, the study did not find any other significant associations with “Ms.,” such as with 
stereotypically masculine traits. For a fascinating case, with three separate opinions, rejecting a 
married woman’s plea to register to vote under “Ms.” rather than “Mrs.,” see Allyn v Allison, 34 
Cal App 3d 448, 453 (1973).  
 61 For women who have already been married, they may no longer bear their birth name, 
but rather another name that they have been known by for a shorter or longer period of time. 
The subject of names on divorce raises many interesting issues, as noted earlier. See note 120. 
 62 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality 109, 125–33 (Cam-
bridge 1983). 
 63 See id. See generally Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (North-Holland 1985). 
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naming choice she makes—whether to keep or to change or to hy-
phenate, for example—some people may have views about the merits 
of her choice and thus impose costs for that choice. For him to do any-
thing other than keep his own name, though, is likely to meet even 
harsher and more uniform criticism.64 Some particularly colorful ex-
amples of the kind of criticism men receive can be found in internet 
forum postings in response to a lawsuit filed in Los Angeles County in 
2006 by a man seeking to take his wife’s name: the plaintiff is called, 
inter alia, “gay,” a “wimp,” and “the feminine spouse.”65 Put simply, the 
social meanings surrounding names strongly prescribe that his name 
should stay the same. Thus, unless more men change their names, the 
social costs are so great for any individual man who does so that the 
individual benefits of making such a choice will rarely outweigh the 
individual costs. This is an exemplary case of the collective action 
problem involved in trying to change social meanings.66 
3. Romance versus equality. 
The flip side of attachment to what is ours is the romance of 
name change. As Ellen Goodman suggests in the epigraph to this Part, 
generations of girls have indulged in “scribbling ‘Mrs. Paul Newman’ 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See, for example, Greg Risling, California Man Sues to Take Wife’s Name; Bureaucratic 
Hurdles Violate 14th Amendment, Petition Says, Wash Post A04 (Jan 21, 2007) (reporting that the 
plaintiff was told by a clerk at the DMV: “Men just don’t do that type of thing”); Jodi Rudoren, 
Meet Our New Name, NY Times sec 9 at 3 (Feb 5, 2006) (reporting comments to her husband 
after they merged their names, including “[i]t appears that married life has literally taken the 
‘man’ out of you”); Jeanne Phillips, Dear Abby: Man Takes Wife’s Name Despite His Mother’s 
Threat, Charleston Daily Mail P2D (Sept 5, 2005) (asking when and how to tell the husband’s 
mother that he took his wife’s name, in light of mother’s threat to “disown” him if he did so); 
Verhovek, My Maiden Name, NY Times sec 6 at 18 (cited in note 45) (noting the “[l]emme get 
this straight” response of a former New York Post writer to a wedding announcement of the 
groom taking the bride’s name, as well as the “occasional ribbing, always from other men, that 
real men don’t take their wives’ names”); Lou Gonzales, Man Finds Resistance to Name Change, 
Fla Times-Union D2 (Feb 10, 2000) (describing the reaction of the person in charge of name 
changes in military records as “[n]o dice. . . . ‘You’re the man. You’re the man of the house.’”). 
See also Lessig, 62 U Chi L Rev at 998 (cited in note 1) (“Social meanings act to induce actions 
in accordance with social norms, and thereby impose costs on efforts to transform social 
norms.”). 
 65 In more detail, here are some of the postings: “He is a wimp.”; “[T]his guy is gay (not 
that there is anything wrong with that) and wants to be the feminine spouse.”; “No. Of course I 
wouldn’t [take my wife’s name]. I am a man.”; “Sure, I’d take my wife’s name. Then my father 
would disown me, and he’d be right to do it.”; and more colorfully (and curiously), “Taking your 
wife’s last name?! [W]ow, no wonder this country is headed to hell in a handbasket. My sister is 
more of a man that [sic] a lot of men in this country.” See Comments, Taking Wife’s Name Not So 
Easy, USA Today (Jan 12, 2007), online at http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2007/01/ 
taking_wifes_na.html (visited July 8, 2007). On the lawsuit, see Risling, California Man Sues to 
Take Wife’s Name, Wash Post at A04 (cited in note 64). 
 66 See Lessig, 62 U Chi L Rev at 997–98 (cited in note 1). 
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all over their notebooks ‘just to see what it looks like.’”67 Of course the 
ritual involves more than just seeing what it looks like. The erotics of 
the name-change fantasy are captured in Erica Jong’s classic novel of 
female sexual adventure, Fear of Flying. 
Just after describing her intense desire for one Adrian Goodlove 
in no uncertain terms, Isadora Wing begins scribbling her desire into 
her notebook, beginning with the statement, “My name is Isadora 
Zelda White Stollerman Wing, . . . and I wish it were Goodlove.”68 She 
then covers a page of her notebook (and the novel) with fantasy 
names: 
Adrian Goodlove 
Dr. Adrian Goodlove 





Mrs. A. Goodlove 
Dame Isadora Goodlove 
Isadora Wing-Goodlove, M.B.E.69 
And the list continues, after which she writes, “I hastily cross all that 
out and turn the page. I haven’t indulged in this sort of nonsense since 
I was a lovesick fifteen year old.”70 In Jong’s novel, writing out the 
nominal union is the consummation of an erotic moment. 
This romancing of name change seems surprising coming from 
Jong, who elsewhere writes with concern about women giving up their 
birth names. “Naming is the crucial activity of the poet; and naming is 
a form of self-creation. In theory, there’s nothing wrong with a 
woman’s changing names for each new husband, except that often she 
will come to feel that she has no name at all.”71 Women artists often 
keep their birthnames, Jong writes, in a “last-ditch attempt to assert an 
unchanging identity in the face of the constant shifts of identity which 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Goodman, The Name of the Game, Boston Globe at 30 (cited in note 4). A college-age 
subject in a more recent study voiced a similar history of anticipating her name change: “This is 
something that I have been waiting to do since I was young, always wondering what my full 
married name will be. I see it as giving myself to my husband and although he won’t take my 
name, he will have given himself in other ways.” Twenge, 21 Psych Women Q at 426 (cited in note 2).  
 68 Erica Jong, Fear of Flying 78 (Holt 1973). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id at 79. 
 71 Erica Jong, The Artist as Housewife, The Housewife as Artist, in Francine Klagsbrun, ed, 
The First Ms. Reader 111, 113 (Warner 1973). 
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are thought . . . to constitute femininity.”72 Changing names all the time 
is “only disturbing because it mirrors the inner uncertainty.”73 
Under this kind of reasoning, the erotics of marital name change 
seems incompatible with a feminist commitment to formal equality. 
Yet in Fear of Flying Jong seemed to appreciate the erotics of name 
change. Must women with romantic visions of uniting with their beloved 
through their names thus simply relinquish such girlish fantasies?74 
Not necessarily. A stark tension between romance and equality 
exists only if there is no chance that he will change his name as well. 
In reality, name change at marriage need not be sexed at all, as sug-
gested, for instance, by the minority of same-sex couples who are 
choosing to merge their names in some way.75 
Indeed, under current conventions, men are denied the pleasures 
of merging through changing their own names, and both men and 
women are typically denied whatever pleasures could come from mu-
tual changing. While those might not sound like pleasures to many 
men now, it is hard to say how that might change if conventions and 
social costs changed. New possibilities might inspire new fantasies. 
There are various naming practices that incorporate union and 
equality, such as dual hyphenation or merged names, options discussed 
in detail in Part III. A small minority of couples has tried these op-
tions, and they are all legal, so of course no one is banned from adopt-
ing them. But as discussed, unless more couples try them and they 
become less socially costly, any romance to egalitarian name change is 
unlikely to outweigh the significant costs, especially to him. 
Of course nominal union isn’t everyone’s idea of romance. For 
some, perhaps many, the idea of union through names produces a dys-
phoric reaction. Some people—men or women—might feel erotic dis-
pleasure at the idea of such merging. The reasons could be varied, but 
at least for some, the aim in a relationship is to maintain enough sepa-
rateness to keep an erotic charge between them.76 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id at 113–14. 
 73 Id at 114. 
 74 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Adaptive Desires (work in progress). 
 75 See Part II.A.2. Of course the erotics may be complicated. One person’s submerging his 
identity by giving up his name and taking the other’s name may have a different charge than, say, 
both adding the other’s name to their birthnames. There’s no reason why that sort of change has 
to be gendered, however. And a certain romance of nominal unity could, in theory, also surround 
double hyphenation or merging, as discussed in Part III.  
 76 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous 
Existence, 29 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 277, 326–27 (2004) (describing the erotic aspects of 
privacy and separateness in a polyamorous context); Marny Hall, Turning Down the Jezebel 
Decibels, in Marcia Munson and Judith P. Stelboum, ed, The Lesbian Polyamory Reader: Open 
Relationships, Non-Monogamy, and Casual Sex 47, 53–54 (Harrington Park 1999). 
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I am not suggesting that people should be forced to merge or hy-
phenate their names; names are choices and should be so. But cur-
rently both spouses’ keeping their names may be seen as the only (or 
only realistic) egalitarian option. Under this view, women—and men—
who romanticize nominal union are therefore forced into the position 
of having to abandon either their romantic feelings about names or 
their egalitarian goal of nominal parity. This doesn’t seem like a real 
choice.  
4. Different for boys. 
Perhaps the most significant problem with our current regime of 
choice is that, while adults can choose their names, children don’t 
choose theirs. While they can change their names later, children enter 
the world with names, and within a naming regime, that has repercus-
sions for their sense of themselves, their family, and their future. 
Though we would like to think otherwise, the current naming regime 
may well affect both how parents behave toward their children and 
how children understand themselves.  
Patrilineal naming could affect parental behavior towards their 
children in at least two ways. To start, it may cause parents to prefer 
boys over girls. Parents who have genetic children show a preference 
for boys to girls, at least for the first or only child.77 Though adoptive 
parents sometimes prefer girls to boys—because, for instance, adopted 
girls are expected to be easier to raise—those parents who prefer to 
adopt a boy rather than a girl cite as a reason an interest in carrying 
on the family name.78 In this light, it seems reasonable to think that the 
birth-parent preference for boys is also to some extent related to the 
boys’ carrying on the family name. 
Relatedly, boys’ carrying on the name creates at least a mild in-
centive for parents to invest more in boys. For a father to have only 
daughters means, in common parlance, that his family “dies out” be-
cause his name “dies out.” Parents may intend not to treat boys and 
girls differently, but if parents care about the family name, they have 
reason to care more about what their boys do and how well they do it.79  
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Kristine Freeark, et al, Gender Difference and Dynamics Shaping the Adoption Life 
Cycle: Review of the Literature and Recommendations, 75 Am J Orthopsych 86, 92 (2005); Nancy 
King Reame, Gender by Design: Not Yet Ready for the Prime Time, 1 Am J Bioethics 29, 29 (2001). 
 78 Freeark, et al, 75 Am J Orthopsych at 92 (cited in note 77); Rosalind J. Dworkin, Report 
for Children’s Bureau, Department of Health and Human Services, Adoption of African Ameri-
can Children: Gender Preferences and Parental Coping 25–26 (1996). 
 79 A colleague suggested the following hypothetical: imagine that you’re a father with two 
children, an adopted boy and a girl who’s your biological child. Only one of them will have a 
child, your sole grandchild. Your daughter would pass along your genes, whereas your son would 
pass along your name. Which of your children would you prefer has your one grandchild? It 
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The current naming regime also tells children about their selves 
and their parents, as noted earlier. We may worry about the different 
self-understanding given to the child who expects to lose her name as 
opposed to the one who expects to keep and extend his name. And we 
might wonder what a child thinks the first time he learns that his 
mother’s family has a different name than he does, and than his mother 
does, and that his mother had a different name sometime before she 
became his mother.80 It would be surprising if these conventions didn’t 
affect children’s sense of their place in the world and their prospects 
for the future.  
II.  CURRENT SOCIAL DEFAULTS: PRACTICES OF FAMILY NAMING 
[W]e talk of you and Mrs. you. 
—Henry James81 
The vast majority of women who marry men change their names 
to Mrs. His Name, while very few men change their names at all when 
they marry. The alternatives adopted by the few who make different 
naming choices include both spouses’ keeping their names, hyphena-
tion (usually just her), and merged or entirely new names. Of those 
who adopt alternatives to Mrs. His Name, the vast majority give any 
children his surname. Though no studies have been conducted of 
same-sex couples’ naming choices, preliminary data suggest that a 
small minority of same-sex couples who form legal unions create 
nominal unity. This Part sketches the current landscape of the choices 
people are making about their names. 
A. What Spouses Do with Their Names 
1. Different-sex marriages.  
Overall, only 10 percent of married women in the U.S. have as 
their last name their own birthname or any name other than their 
husband’s birthname.82 That number is greater among more educated 
                                                                                                                           
makes sense that this could be a hard question for some men in light of our idea that a family 
“dies out” when the name stops being passed down, even if daughters have continued to repro-
duce and thus continue the family line genetically. 
 80 Relatedly, see the text accompanying note 127 (describing a conversation between a 
mother and daughter about the reasons women take their husbands’ surnames at marriage). 
 81 Henry James, Letter to William Dean Howells (Feb 21, 1884), in Philip Horne, ed, Henry 
James: A Life in Letters 152, 154 (Allen Lane 1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 82 See Joan Brightman, Why Hillary Chooses Rodham Clinton, 16 Am Demographics 9, 9 
(Mar 1994) (citing a poll conducted by NFO Research Inc for American Demographics in 1993). 
It is hard to say how reliable these numbers are. Attempts to find out the sample size or any 
other features of this study have been fruitless. Scheuble and Johnson report that fewer than 5 
percent of women over two generations did anything other than take their husband’s name at 
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women, and for those who have married more recently, but the his-
torical trend is apparently not linear. Note that reliable and consistent 
data are hard to come by in this area, so the findings should be taken 
with some caution. 
The study using the most varied types of data was done by Clau-
dia Goldin and Maria Shim who compared Harvard alumnae records, 
New York Times weddings announcements, and Massachusetts birth 
records.83 According to Goldin and Shim, the percentage of U.S. 
women college graduates keeping their surnames upon marriage rose 
from 2 to 4 percent in 1975 to just below 20 percent in 2001.84 Interest-
ingly, though, the peak in surname retention appears to have been the 
1980s, when as many as 25 to 30 percent of women with elite educa-
tions were keeping their surnames.85 
In another study, of the 10 percent of married women who used 
something other than their husband’s last name, half of those (5 per-
cent of the sample) used a hyphenated name, 2 percent used their 
maiden name, and 3 percent used some other name (presumably often 
a prior marital name, a not uncommon choice among divorced women 
with children from a previous marriage).86 Although the methodology 
is not clear, this study may have involved women of all ages, including 
women who would have married before Mrs. His Name ceased to be a 
mandatory legal rule.87 In some regions, particularly the South, women 
                                                                                                                           
marriage, though the older sample excluded women who had divorced during a relevant twelve-
year window, making it likely that the 5 percent figure is lower than the general rate in the popu-
lation. Laurie K. Scheuble and David R. Johnson, Women's Marital Naming in Two Generations: 
A National Study, 57 J Marriage & Fam 724, 727 (1995). 
 83 Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 143–44 (cited in note 32). Though Goldin and Shim 
worked to identify trends using multiple sources in order to verify their findings across populations, 
their data are hard to interpret, because the results vary so widely between datasets and over time.  
 84 Id at 144. Note that Goldin and Shim’s study separates women’s naming choices simply 
into “keepers” and “changers,” including among changers those who have hyphenated, appar-
ently without regard to whether the husband might have hyphenated or otherwise changed his 
name as well. Anecdotal information suggests that exceedingly few men change their surnames 
in any way at marriage, so the husband’s name dimension is unlikely to skew their data in any 
significant way, but since women who hyphenate are generally considered to be making nontra-
ditional choices, their conflation with the Mrs. His Name changers is surprising. Id at 147–48.  
 85 Id at 149–54. By contrast, a more recent study using New York Times announcements 
found no significant time trends—though this study looked only at data since 1987. See Michele 
Hoffnung, What’s in a Name?: Marital Name Choice Revisited, 55 Sex Roles 817, 819–20 (2006) 
(reporting that 71 percent of brides took their husband’s name, versus 29 percent who kept their 
own names or hyphenated). This study included in the nontraditional category the wife’s keeping 
or hyphenation, but even rerunning its data using Goldin and Shim’s categories, found no signifi-
cant time trends. Id at 820. 
 86 Brightman, 16 Am Demographics at 9 (cited in note 82).  
 87 See Hoffnung, 55 Sex Roles at 818 (cited in note 85) (noting this methodological prob-
lem in other work in this area). Hoffnung’s own study, part of which was based on a small sample 
of more recent college graduates (126 women) and therefore does not purport to be representa-
tive, found the following: 37.3 percent reported taking their husband’s name; 16.7 percent used 
 
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
2007] Changing Name Changing 787 
commonly make their maiden name a middle name and their hus-
band’s name their last name.88 In addition, some women use their hus-
band’s name socially and their maiden name professionally.89 News 
and anecdotal sources suggest, however, that this may be increasingly 
difficult under post-9/11 security measures, unless all of a woman’s 
legal documents are in the same name.90 
A woman is more likely to keep her own name if she has an ad-
vanced degree, marries later in life, and has her first child later in life.91 
More specifically, graduating from an Ivy League school, a top-twenty-
five liberal arts college, or a Seven Sisters school is correlated with 
surname retention.92 A woman with an advanced degree is more likely 
(14 percent more likely in 1991) to keep her name, though, interest-
                                                                                                                           
their husband’s name as their last name and their own name as a middle name; 11.9 percent used 
their husband’s name socially and their own name professionally; 28.6 percent kept their own 
name for all purposes; 4 percent hyphenated their own name with their spouse’s; and 1.6 percent 
did something else. Id at 820–22. This article also involved the New York Times–based study 
mentioned above. See note 85. Like most studies, the questions asked of the subjects did not 
even acknowledge the possibility of male name change. See Hoffnung, 55 Sex Roles at 820 (cited 
in note 85). 
 88 See Scheuble and Johnson, 57 J Marriage & Fam at 729–31 (cited in note 82). Interest-
ingly, this same study described this choice as “nonconventional.” Id at 726. 
 89 Twenge, 21 Psych Women Q at 422 table 1 (cited in note 2) (reporting in a study of col-
lege-age women at the University of Michigan in 1994 that 73.2 percent predicted they would 
use their husband’s name socially, and 59.5 percent predicted changing their names to their 
husband’s altogether). See also Laurie K. Scheuble and David R. Johnson, Married Women’s 
Situational Use of Last Names: An Empirical Study, 53 Sex Roles 143, 147–49 (2005). 
 90 See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-13, 119 Stat 231, 302 (2005), to be codified at 
8 USC § 1101 et seq (forbidding federal agencies from accepting, after the Act’s effective date, 
state-issued identification cards that fail to comply with the Act’s requirements); Nicole Gaouette, 
National ID Requirements Postponed under Criticism, LA Times A16 (Mar 2, 2007) (explaining 
that states may be able to postpone compliance with the Real ID Act until the end of 2009). See 
also Martin Frost, Driven Crazy at the DMV, Fox News, online at http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,182548,00.html (visited July 8, 2007) (explaining that Virginia has passed legislation 
implementing the Real ID Act, and describing a woman’s difficulties under the state legislation 
getting a driver’s license after she failed to notify the Social Security Administration of her name 
change). Further anecdotal reports suggest that states are following up with women who have 
documentation in different names and requiring them to reconcile their documents. I thank 
Nancy Sharples for taking the time to describe her experiences with this. 
 91 Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 158–59 (cited in note 32): 
A Ph.D. or an M.D. is associated with a reduction of about 25 percentage points in the 
probability of changing one’s name. Each year of marriage delay is related to a 1 percent-
age point decline, and each year of delay in having children is related to a 1.3 percentage 
point decline.  
 92 Id at 156: 
Graduation from an Ivy League or a top-25 liberal arts college is associated with an 11 per-
centage point increase in 1991 and 14 percentage point increase in 2001 relative to any col-
lege or university ranked below number 25 in its class. Graduation from a ‘seven sisters’ col-
lege is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in 1991 and a 16 percentage point in-
crease in 2001. Graduation from other top universities has no effect relative to the base 
group. 
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ingly, Goldin and Shim found that those women with MBAs were no 
more likely to keep their names than the base group of women with 
no advanced degree.93 The typical link between more education and 
Keeping may reflect, for instance, the potential loss in changing names 
if one has “made a name for oneself” professionally.94 
Race significantly affects married naming choices. In the late 
1990s, married, college-educated, African-American women retained 
their own name at the time of their first child’s birth at twice the rate 
(34 percent) of comparable white women.95 Perhaps more surprisingly, 
married African-American new mothers who had not gone to college 
retained their names at approximately the same rate as African-
American women who had gone to college; by contrast, the number of 
non-college-educated white women who keep their birth names is 
extremely low.96 Race aside, marrying in a religious ceremony corre-
lates with lower rates of surname retention.97 
A woman’s husband having a PhD correlates with higher rates of 
surname retention (independent of her having a PhD), whereas mar-
rying a husband with a suffix such as “Jr.” or “III” tends to have the 
opposite effect.98 (The authors puzzle over the effect of husbands’ 
PhDs, without considering the possibility that such husbands might 
value their wives’ attachment to their own names for affective or 
egalitarian reasons.99) Having a prominent father-in-law correlates 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. The data on graduate degrees are consistent with other research showing high rates 
of surname retention among women physicians. See Penelope Wasson Dralle, Women Physi-
cians’ Name Choices at Marriage, 42 J Am Med Women’s Assn 173, 173 (Nov–Dec 1987) (report-
ing on a sample of female physicians, among whom 64 percent had taken their husbands’ last 
names, approximately half of the remainder had kept their names, and the other half of the 
remainder used their birth names professionally and another name for legal or social purposes). 
Other research has found that women who retain their names or hyphenate report higher indi-
vidual incomes than those who take their husband’s name. See Christopher George Parigoris, 
Marital Surnames and Gender Roles of Contemporary Women 108 (unpublished PsyD disserta-
tion, The Chicago School of Professional Psychology, 2002). Interestingly, this study did not find 
significant differences in educational level. Id. 
 94 Compare Dralle, 42 J Am Med Women’s Assn at 174 (cited in note 93) (finding a signifi-
cant relationship between a female physician’s marital name choice—whether traditional or 
nontraditional—and whether she had married before or after obtaining her MD). 
 95 Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 152 (cited in note 32). Hoffnung also found that 
women of color generally were more likely (61 percent) to use nontraditional names than were 
white women (39 percent). See Hoffnung, 55 Sex Roles at 823 (cited in note 85). Some of the 
women of color explained their naming choice in terms of race or ethnicity. Id.  
 96 Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 152 (cited in note 32). 
 97 Id at 156. 
 98 Id at 157, 159. Hoffnung similarly found in the New York Times portion of her study that 
women who made nontraditional naming choices had husbands with more education. See Hoff-
nung, 55 Sex Roles at 820 (cited in note 85). In contrast, however, Dralle found that for female 
physicians, higher educational attainment by the husband correlated with a traditional naming 
choice for her. See Dralle, 42 J Am Med Women’s Assn at 174 (cited in note 93). 
 99 Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 159 (cited in note 32). 
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with women giving up their names, whereas having an academic fa-
ther-in-law correlates with women keeping their names.100 As the au-
thors note, “[t]he effects just mentioned suggest that the bride’s in-
laws—the importance they place on names, their wealth and their 
nontraditional views—exert an independent impact.”101 Of course they 
may be exerting their influence indirectly, through shaping the values 
and preferences of their sons. 
2. Same-sex marriages.  
The Mrs. His Name convention that prevails in straight culture 
obviously has no equivalent for same-sex couples. There is an interest-
ing question, then, about what same-sex couples do with their names 
when they create formal unions. There are no available studies of the 
subject, but I have acquired some data on the couples who formed 
civil unions in the first year the status was available in Vermont.102 Of 
the 2,305 couples whose names are both known, 6 percent share some 
or all of their last names, suggesting that one or both partners changed 
his or her name.103 Their sample is approximately two-thirds women, 
and the women disproportionately share names in some way (ap-
proximately 7 percent of female couples versus 4 percent of male cou-
ples). The most common way of sharing names was to have the same 
last name (4 percent overall), but this is not terribly telling, as there is 
no way to know from this dataset whether those couples with identical 
last names created a new name for themselves or asymmetrically as-
sumed one partner’s name for both partners (or had the same name to 
begin with). The next most common alternative was to hyphenate both 
partners’ last names (Mark and John Smith-Jones; 1 percent overall), 
though this choice was more common among men than women. A few 
couples hyphenated only one last name (Mark Jones and John Smith-
Jones; less than 1 percent overall). 
In sum, it appears that vastly fewer same-sex couples create name 
commonality when creating civil unions than do straight couples when 
marrying, and fewer male couples than female couples do so. The fact 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id at 157.  
 101 Id. One study specifically focused on husbands found that men whose wives kept or 
combined their names, among other things, endorsed more egalitarian beliefs and reported a 
smaller income difference with their wives, as compared to men whose wives changed their 
names to their husband’s name. Anderson, The Relationship Between Wives’ Marital Last Name 
Style and Husbands’ Self-Esteem at 100, 104 (cited in note 54). 
 102 Esther Rothblum and Glen Elder, researchers conducting the Civil Union Project, a 
significant study of same-sex couples forming civil unions under Vermont law, sent me their data 
on the civil unions formed between July 1, 2000, and June 30, 2001, for which I thank them. 
 103 All results are statistically significant at the p < .05 level or better. I thank Geraldine 
Wright for lending her statistical expertise to these questions (data on file with author). 
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that fewer male than female couples change their names is interesting, 
but perhaps unsurprising, given that the most robust feature of U.S. 
marital naming conventions is that men’s names do not change.104 
There is of course no sex-based default for same-sex partners’ chang-
ing, as noted, and I have found no suggestion of any gender-based 
trend, such as the more-butch partner’s name being adopted asym-
metrically by the less-butch partner. 
The gap between straight and gay couples could be attributable 
to the lack of “marriage” per se for gay couples in the Vermont sam-
ple, as well as to demographic or other individual factors.105 Regardless, 
a not insignificant number of same-sex couples are creating some kind 
of name commonality. Moreover, a quotation from one member of the 
Vermont dataset—who spontaneously, and apparently proudly, raised 
the issue—suggests that name change may be very meaningful to 
some individuals who choose it: 
Thought you would be interested to know that since we had our 
civil union, I changed my name at work . . . by showing my civil 
union certificate. Then we recently bought a new home here in 
___, applied for a VA loan, and have loan papers saying “mar-
ried,” based on our civil union certificate.106 
Case law also provides examples of gay couples’ changing their 
names to create commonality. There is a line of cases specifically fo-
cused on same-sex partners’ efforts to change their names, though not 
in conjunction with any legal change in their relationship status. Gen-
erally, in these cases, a lower court refuses the request for a name 
change on grounds of public policy—typically these days citing the 
state’s mini-Defense of Marriage Act (mini-DOMA)—and then an 
appeals court reverses the decision on the grounds that no fraud is 
involved.107 In such cases, some of the couples are trying to create a 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Part I.B. It might also be that couples are more likely to create some nominal com-
monality if they have children, and that more female than male couples in the sample have children. 
 105 For instance, Rothblum and Elder’s data also compare straight married couples who are 
family members of the gay civil union subjects, and indicate that the gay couples are generally 
better educated—a variable that tends to correlate with women keeping their names in straight 
marriage. See Sondra E. Solomon, Esther D. Rothblum, and Kimberly F. Balsam, Pioneers in 
Partnership: Lesbian and Gay Male Couples in Civil Unions Compared with Those Not in Civil 
Unions and Married Heterosexual Siblings, 18 J Fam Psych 275, 285 (2004). Moreover, though the 
researchers on the Civil Union Project have worked hard to obtain up-to-date records on the 
subjects, not all subjects have responded, so some names may have changed after the latest in-
formation was received. Email from Esther Rothblum (July 26, 2006). 
 106 Solomon, Rothblum, and Balsam, 18 J Fam Psych (cited in note 105). 
 107 See, for example, In re Miller, 2003 Pa Super 197, 824 A2d 1207, 1214–15 (holding that 
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a nonfraudulent name-change petition nominally 
unifying a same-sex couple on the grounds that it offended public policy); In re Bicknell, 96 Ohio 
St 3d 76, 771 NE2d 846, 849 (2002) (reversing the decision of the trial and appellate courts that a 
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hyphenated name,108 and others have devised a one-word name that 
combines their names in some way.109 There are also case-law examples 
of one partner changing to the other partner’s surname.110 The same-
sex couple name cases sometimes arise in the context of the couples 
trying to create a shared name among themselves and their children.111 
Perhaps the best known case involving a same-sex couple who 
adopted a married name is Shahar v Bowers,112 in which the Eleventh 
Circuit sitting en banc upheld the decision by Georgia Attorney Gen-
eral Michael J. Bowers to fire attorney Robin Shahar for marrying her 
female partner in a religious ceremony.113 The name Shahar, which 
both spouses adopted, means “the dawn” in Hebrew.114 
B. What Parents Do with Their Children’s Names 
Women married to men make even fewer unconventional naming 
choices for their children than for themselves. Of those women who 
make unconventional choices about their own names—that is, keeping 
their maiden names or hyphenating—the vast majority (59 to 77 per-
cent) still give their children their husband’s last name.115 And data on 
                                                                                                                           
couple’s request to change both their names to a word combining letters from each of their prior 
names violates public policy, that is, Ohio’s mini-DOMA, on the grounds that the partners have 
no criminal or fraudulent purpose and wish only to show their commitment to each other and to 
share a name with the child they are expecting); In re Bacharach, 344 NJ Super 126, 780 A2d 579, 
585 (2001) (reversing the decision of a trial court denying a woman the right to change her name 
to that of her same-sex partner because there was no fraud involved and the concern that some 
members of the public might be mislead about the status of same-sex marriage in the state was 
“farfetched and inherently discriminatory” (in a state with a law prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation, a law that the court mentioned but essentially found to be irrele-
vant to this name-change issue) and because the trial court had no authority to decide public 
policy of the state and thus to decide this name was against it). See also Decision of Interest, 231 
NY L J 18, 18 (Jan 23, 2004) (recounting the granting of a name-change petition to nominally unify 
a same-sex couple because it was untainted by fraud and did not interfere with the rights of others). 
 108 See Bacharach, 780 A2d at 580. 
 109 See Bicknell, 771 NE2d at 847 (explaining that appellants Jennifer Lane Bicknell and 
Belinda Lou Priddy wished to change their last names to “Rylen”). See note 107 (explaining the 
change). 
 110 See, for example, Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn L Rev 1758, 1761–64, 
1769–71, 1792–93 (2005) (discussing the 1970s efforts by Jack Baker and Michael McConnell to 
marry in one way or another, including a successful adoption and name change—Baker, who was 
adopted, became Pat McConnell—followed by an initially successful but ultimately failed at-
tempt to marry under the name McConnell). 
 111 See, for example, Bicknell, 771 NE2d at 849 (recounting Ms. Bicknell’s claim that “we 
just want to share a name so that when we do have kids, when this child is born seven or eight 
months from now, the three of us will share the same name and we’ll be a family”). 
 112 114 F3d 1097 (11th Cir 1997) (en banc). 
 113 Id at 1100–01. 
 114 Id at 1100 n 4. See also Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 
93 (Random House 2006) (discussing the linguistic significance of the couple’s name choice). 
 115 David R. Johnson and Laurie K. Scheuble, What Should We Call Our Kids?: Choosing 
Children’s Surnames When Parents’ Last Names Differ, 39 Soc Sci J 419, 419 (2002). The abstract 
 
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
792 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:761 
Harvard alumnae from the class of 1980 indicate that among those 
graduates who kept their names at marriage (52.3 percent), some of 
those who had children later changed their own surname to their hus-
band’s (12 percent).116 
Eighty percent of female college students surveyed in 1994 pre-
dicted that they would give their children their husband’s surname. 
(This is in a study in which 60 percent said they planned to take their 
husband’s name for themselves, 14 percent predicted they would use 
their own name professionally and their husband’s name socially, and 
24 percent anticipated a nontraditional choice.117) The second most 
popular prediction was for a hyphenated name for the kids (12 per-
cent), whereas an equally small number predicted giving them her 
name, giving them a new name, or giving her name to daughters and 
his name to sons (0.7 percent on all three).118 The main reason cited by 
the subjects for giving children his name was tradition. Other common 
responses were family unity and simplicity or avoiding confusion.119 
These numbers project a higher percentage of unconventional naming 
choices than contemporary practices reflect; whether this gap is re-
lated to the education level or other features of the women in this 
study, or whether women during college unrealistically predict that 
they will make less conventional naming choices than they eventually 
                                                                                                                           
reports that approximately 90 percent of women making unconventional marital naming choices 
still give their children their husband’s last name, but that means giving the children the hus-
band’s last name in any way, even in hyphenation. However, a narrower reading of their data 
(which they were generous enough to send me) still indicates that mothers who made unconven-
tional marital name choices (hyphenation or keeping their maiden names) gave their children 
their husband’s name as the kids’ only last name 72.6 percent of the time. More specifically, the 
percentage of children given their mother’s husband’s last name when the mother kept her 
maiden name is 73.4 percent (n = 177), and the percentage of children given their mother’s hus-
band’s last name when their mother hyphenated her name is 69.6 percent (n = 46). (This ex-
cludes the data on women who kept their previous husband’s surname, since there are different 
issues involved there, with about half the kids keeping their father’s last name.)  (Data on file 
with author.) 
 116 Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 153–54 (cited in note 32). 
 117 The remaining 3.3 percent formed an “other” category. The specific numbers for all 
categories are as follows: “take husband’s name” (59.5 percent); “keep own name for all pur-
poses” (9.8 percent); “use my name for professional purposes, husband’s for social” (13.7 per-
cent); “hyphenate my name, but not expect him to hyphenate his” (9.2 percent); “hyphenate my 
name and he will hyphenate his” (3.9 percent); and “husband and I will choose new name and 
both use” (0.7 percent). Twenge, 21 Psych Women Q at 422 table 1 (cited in note 2). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id at 422 table 2, 424–25 (reporting that, in response to open-ended questions for rea-
sons behind name choices (which can add up to more than 100 percent because some gave more 
than one answer), 45 percent of subjects cited tradition, 17 percent cited practical reasons of 
confusion/simplicity, and 14 percent cited bonding/union in marriage and family). 
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
2007] Changing Name Changing 793 
make, is not clear.120 Nonetheless, even there, the vast majority said 
they would give their children their husband’s name. 
There are apparently no available data on the names of the chil-
dren of same-sex couples. Case law indicates, though, that some same-
sex couples attempt to change their own names to share a name with 
each other and their children.121 
III.  SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES: 
CRAFTING A SUSTAINABLE EGALITARIAN CONVENTION 
Everyone in the family should have the same sirname [sic]. 
—Female undergraduate at the University of Michigan122 
Although fathers’ surnames are passed from generation to gen-
eration in most families today, there may be an alternative family 
naming convention that could be sustainable across generations with-
out favoring men’s names over women’s.123 At present, there is little 
reason to think that an alternative naming convention will take hold. 
As noted, any one individual or couple that makes an unconventional 
choice cannot change the convention, and their individual naming 
choices therefore take on meanings that exceed what they intend; 
change in this area therefore requires a feat of collective action. Law 
may be able to help with this, without inhibiting individual choice, in 
ways discussed in the next Parts. First, though, it is reasonable to ask 
whether there even is a promising alternative to the patrilineal Mrs. 
His Name convention.  
This Part therefore lays out and evaluates a range of possibilities 
for a sustainable egalitarian convention, to lay the groundwork for sub-
sequent discussion of how law does, and how law should, treat marital 
names. After considering common alternative naming practices in Part 
III.A, I describe in Part III.B one variation—biphenation—that I think 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Parents sometimes dispute their children’s last names after divorce, a fascinating subject 
which I do not address in this article. For a thorough and thoughtful treatment, see Merle H. 
Weiner, “We Are Family”: Valuing Associationalism in Disputes over Children’s Surnames, 75 NC 
L Rev 1625, 1761–62 (1997). Relatedly, the laws surrounding women’s (and men’s) names at 
divorce also present a rich subject, to which this Article does not purport to do justice. The pro-
posed convention of biphenation is well suited to divorce and remarriage, however, as explained 
in Part III.  
 121 See, for example, Bicknell, 771 NE2d at 847. 
 122 Female undergraduate at the University of Michigan on why children should have their 
father’s last name, quoted in Twenge, 21 Psych Women Q at 425 (cited in note 2). 
 123 See Johnson and Scheuble, 39 Soc Sci J at 425 table 2 (cited in note 115) (demonstrating 
the significant preference for giving children their mother’s husband’s last name). See also note 
115 and accompanying text (observing that, even among women who make unconventional 
naming options for themselves, between 59 and 77 percent give their children their husband’s 
surname). 
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better satisfies the range of interests at stake. Of course, reasonable 
minds could disagree on the relative merits of these conventions. The 
aim is to discuss the range of options and to present a relatively novel 
alternative that may not have been considered by many readers. Note 
that the focus here, as elsewhere in the Article, is on U.S. laws and prac-
tices, though the notes highlight comparative analogues. Finally, keep in 
mind that the topic here is alternative naming conventions—that is, so-
cial defaults—not legal or mandatory rules. 
A. Common Alternatives to the Mrs. His Name Convention 
Despite the social costs that attend unconventional naming 
choices, some partners and parents have departed from the Mrs. His 
Name convention, as noted earlier. The range of alternative approaches 
includes the following: Keeping; matrilineal naming; bilineal naming; 
hyphenating; Mr. Her Name; new names; and merged names.124  
1. Keeping: Mr. His Name and Ms. (or Mrs.) Her Name.  
There are some benefits to spouses both keeping their names. The 
solution is egalitarian, and while the spouses’ names may create in-
formation costs because they don’t signify the new family relation-
ship,125 neither does this solution require anyone to inform others, in-
cluding government entities, about a new name—nor does it require 
those others to learn the new name. Moreover, both spouses have the 
continuity of their names throughout their lives, which may be a bene-
fit if they have a constitutive or professional attachment to their origi-
nal names, or if they divorce or remarry, as many people do. They also 
maintain a connection with the past, with their families of origin, and 
thus with any ethnic or historical identity that name may represent. 
We generally accept the continuity of each spouse’s name, un-
blinking, from the famous men and women who marry. Query why 
famous women are considered exempt from—or even just separate 
from—the social conventions of marital naming. Are their independ-
                                                                                                                           
 124 There are of course an unlimited number of possibilities. One common approach is for 
women to make their maiden name their middle name, as noted in Part II. Sometimes the 
mother’s maiden name is also given to children as a middle (or even first) name, dropping out at 
the next generation. There are also some (presumably very small) number of men who take their 
wives’ birthnames as middle names. Other, more creative, variations include the decision by a 
woman I know who, when taking her husband’s surname, made her birth surname her first name. 
These approaches, among many others, may provide satisfying possibilities for individual couples, 
and would always be available as alternatives to any default convention. The aim in this Part is to 
search for an alternative convention that could be egalitarian across generations.  
 125 Compare Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 311–13 (Harvard 1994) (arguing that same-
sex marriage has signaling costs). 
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ent lives so much more significant than those of women who aren’t 
famous? Do they have more to lose in changing their names? Possibly 
the latter is true,126 though an anecdote published in Glamour in 1991 
offers an interesting take on the link between fame and names: 
I remember being ten years old, looking at my mother’s mail and 
asking why she was addressed by a man’s name with a Mrs. stuck 
in front of it. 
“It’s what’s done when you get married.” 
“Then why is Marilyn Monroe still Marilyn Monroe?” I knew 
she’d been married at least twice. 
“She’s a movie star. It’s her professional name.” 
The only women I knew who had professions were my teachers, 
each of whom changed her name—in a gleeful frenzy, mind 
you—the minute she got married. 
“That’s different,” my mother explained, “They’re not famous.” 
“Only famous women keep their maiden names?” 
“Something like that.”  
“But men keep their maiden names whether they’re famous or 
not? Or is it that all men are famous?”127 
To some then, like the author of this exchange, Keeping is the way 
forward for women as well as men.  
Though Keeping is our current legal default, it is not our current 
social convention: women typically become Mrs. His Name anyway. A 
key reason for this discrepancy is, I suspect, children’s names.128 As dis-
cussed above, children usually bear the husband’s name, even if the 
                                                                                                                           
 126 For a judge who firmly held a contrary view, see In re Kayaloff, 9 F Supp 176, 176 
(SDNY 1934):  
Furthermore, as all are well aware, many professional women of note and standing, and 
who are married, are known in private life by the surname of their respective husbands. In 
the artistic circles in which such women move, they are known by their stage or professional 
names. It is my judgment that none of them has been damaged professionally by the fact 
that, upon marriage, she took the surname of her husband. I am not convinced that any loss 
will accrue to petitioner if she be denied a certificate in her maiden name. 
 127 Jean Gonick, Save Me from the Woman Who Takes Her Husband’s Name, Glamour 260 
(Nov 1991). 
 128 See Hoffnung, 55 Sex Roles at 822 (cited in note 85) (reporting that 45 percent of the 
women (in their small study of college graduates) who became Mrs. His Name said they had 
done so for reasons of “family unity,” saying things like “I wanted our family to be one,” 
“[w]anted our whole family to have the same name,” and “I wished to be associated with my new 
family and to have the same surname as my child”). 
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wife has chosen an alternative naming practice for herself.129 Of course, 
children have to have some name, and there is no obvious choice, 
other than the current social default. But there are alternatives, as dis-
cussed in the next two Parts. If the children are going to have his 
name, though, then for the wife to choose to keep the name of her 
family of origin (and her life to date) is to choose not to have a nomi-
nal connection with her current nuclear family and any generations 
that follow her. 
Some women may also forgo Keeping because they romanticize 
nominal union.130 Indeed, it has been suggested that Keeping is more 
popular in Western European countries than in the U.S. because the 
U.S. has a more romantic idea of marriage.131 Some would say that the 
language of romance is just a cover for gender subordination. But the 
choices by substantial numbers of same-sex couples to create com-
monality of names suggest that nominal unity is not necessarily teth-
ered to sex-based subordination (though it still might be).132 And for 
straight couples, as discussed earlier, if she’s not the only one whose 
name could change, then the romance of nominal unity is not inconsis-
tent with equality of naming choices.133 
2. Matrilineal naming. 
One alternative convention—often accompanying Keeping for 
the parents—is to give the children her name.134 Some favor this ap-
                                                                                                                           
 129 See note 115 and accompanying text. 
 130 See Part I.B.3. 
 131 Patricia Wen, Tradition, in Name Only: Most Brides Keep Convention of Taking Hus-
band’s Surname, Boston Globe A1 (Mar 17, 2001): 
Annemette Sorenson, director of the Henry A. Murray Research Center at Radcliffe, 
said . . . that in Denmark, where she is from, women went from taking their husbands’ 
names to retaining their names within one generation in the 1970s. But Sorenson said the 
United States may have a more romantic notion of marriage, which keeps the name issue 
associated with emotional love, rather than a reminder of an old system in which a woman 
was the property of her husband. 
 132 Of course gender subordination can occur in same-sex relationships. The point here is 
only that (1) naming conventions do not have to follow sex-based lines, and (2) there is no evi-
dence to suggest that naming practices by same-sex couples follow gendered lines, as noted. See 
Part II.B.2.  
 133 See Part I.B.3. 
 134 This practice is associated with explicitly matrilineal indigenous cultures, such as the 
Minangkabau in Indonesia, see Tsuyoshi Kato, Change and Continuity in the Minangkabau 
Matrilineal System, 25 Indonesia 1, 3 (1978), and the Haida communities of North America, see 
Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-Centered Ap-
proach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W Va L Rev 1, 8 (1996). Matrilineal naming is also 
the default legal practice in some countries. See, for example, Family Law Legislation of the 
Netherlands 4 (Intersentia 2003) (Ian Sumner and Hans Warendorf, trans) (citing Dutch Civil 
Code Title 2, Art 5, § 1, which establishes that, even if paternity is determined, children take the 
mother’s surname unless both parents consent); Walter Pintens and Michael R. Will, Names, in 
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proach on the principle that the mother does more work to bring the 
child into the world, or typically does more work to raise the children, 
or typically stays with the children even across divorce and remar-
riage. Although various plausible theories support this—for example, 
the biological fact of labor or empirical reality of average relative time 
spent child rearing, or the importance of subverting the historical 
practice of legal disappearance of women in the family (that is, cover-
ture)—this approach may be troubling to some because it reinscribes 
traditional gender roles by associating women with children. In addi-
tion, it may also overvalue the biological contribution: why should that 
particular nine months define the name, as against care or education 
or financial support of the growing child? (Relatedly, if biology is 
paramount, one might even ask whether a surrogate should give the 
surname to a child that she bears.) Much more could be said on this, 
but in short, while one can see why matrilineal naming would appeal 
to some at this moment in history, and why it might raise awareness, 
we might prefer a longtime solution that favors neither men nor 
women. (As with all claims on this subject, this one is contestable; it 
fits, however, with my definition of egalitarian as favoring neither men 
nor women.) 
Interestingly, Miss Manners seems to endorse matrilineal naming, 
albeit obliquely, in the interests of avoiding so many name changes, 
which are inconvenient for self and (especially) others.135 After rec-
ommending that adults choose one permanent name at the moment of 
marriage or first serious career, she explains: 
It is wise not to associate these names with philosophies or 
spouses who are likely to prove fleeting, because this is the sur-
name they must keep. Miss Manners suggests sticking to the 
original family surname—but in the female line. The basic family 
unit has now become the mother and children of whom she has 
been awarded custody, and it is simpler if they all have the same 
name and keep it, no matter who happens to join them later. The 
system of the matriarchal line worked fairly well in ancient socie-
                                                                                                                           
Mary Ann Glendon, et al, eds, 4 Intl Encyclopedia Comp Law Ch 2 at 53–54 (Mohr 1995) (not-
ing that in the Scandinavian countries, children take their mother’s name if nominal consensus 
can’t be reached within a legal time limit). If the parents are unmarried, matrilineal naming is the 
statutory default in some U.S. states. See, for example, SD Cod L § 34-25-13.3 (Michie 1994 & 
Supp 2003) (codifying matrilineal naming for unmarried mothers unless the parents sign an 
affidavit confirming paternity). 
 135 See Judith Martin, Miss Manners’ Guide to Excruciatingly Correct Behavior 53–54 (Norton 
2005). Miss Manners doesn’t directly suggest naming one’s children in this way (presumably be-
cause Miss Manners does not like to make waves), but in suggesting that adults choose one surname 
for all of adulthood, she urges they choose the matrilineal name, as the next quotation indicates. 
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ties, before women made the mistake of telling men that they had 
any connection with the production of children.136 
Miss Manners’s explanation for her endorsement of this approach 
captures some of why we might worry that it reinscribes, rather than 
reforms, traditional gender roles.  
3. Bilineal naming: different for boys and girls.  
Another possible convention—also alongside Keeping for the 
parents—is to give the male children His surname and the female 
children Her surname.137 Of course this would not work for same-sex 
couples, and there are potential problems for different-sex couples 
here as well. Most notably, sex-aligned surnaming not only creates an 
additional layer of distinguishing children by their sex from the start 
(for example, pink and blue clothes, boy and girl first names), it also 
creates family alignments and disalignments along sex lines. We al-
ready heavily embed identity in sex/gender from birth: as Judith But-
ler has noted, the moment of assigning a child a gender is the moment 
of recognizing the child as human—“It’s a boy!” or “It’s a girl!”138 The 
moment of assigning a first name is almost invariably a gendering 
moment as well. To the extent gender roles confine individuals, then, 
there is something troubling about more gender differentiation within 
the family.  
Moreover, giving the boys the father’s name risks nothing for the 
father if the kids don’t follow their parents’ nontraditional naming 
route in their own marriages: the sons, whose surname matters tradi-
tionally, have the father’s name to pass along. If a couple really means 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Id. 
 137 See Sharon Lebell, Naming Ourselves, Naming Our Children: The Last Name Dilemma 
64–69 (Crossing 1988). There are some related precedents from cultural and historical contexts 
outside the U.S. For instance, according to traditional Icelandic naming practices, a child’s sur-
name is formed by attaching either the prefix of “son” or “dóttir” to either the father or mother’s 
first name. See Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Information on Icelandic Surnames, 
online at http://eng.domsmalaraduneyti.is/information/nr/125 (visited July 8, 2007). There is, 
however, some disagreement in the academic literature about the extent to which daughters 
actually take their mother’s name and sons take their father’s name. Compare Judith Rosen-
house, Personal Names in Hebrew and Arabic: Modern Trends Compared to the Past, 47 J Semitic 
Stud 97, 100 (2002) (“In Icelandic [culture,] . . . girls get the mother’s name as surname, whereas 
boys take the father’s name for surname.”), with Richard F. Tomasson, Iceland: The First New 
Society 172 (Minnesota 1980) (“Rarely, at any time, have daughters been named after their 
mothers.”). A related use of prefixes is found in Classical Hebrew and Arabic naming practices, 
according to which a child’s surname was created using the father’s name and “son of”; on occa-
sion, the mother’s name was used instead of the father’s. See Rosenhouse, 47 J Sem Stud at 100 
(noting that the practice occurs only when “the father has died at an early age or the mother is 
the dominant figure in the family”).  
 138 See Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter 232 (Routledge 1993). 
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to adopt a new tradition that resists patrilineal privilege, however, 
they might switch the groups: Father gives his name to any daughters, 
Mother gives her name to any sons. This would move away from patri-
lineal descent, and it would flip the sex-based identification. But this 
approach nonetheless introduces yet another way that boys and girls 
are distinguished based on their sex from a young age. 
A related option would be to alternate the last names of the chil-
dren: for instance, giving the first the mother’s, and the second the fa-
ther’s, and so on.139 This approach isn’t gendered, and, assuming more 
than one child, both names get passed on, regardless of the sex of the 
child. However, as with bilineal naming, the children wouldn’t share a 
surname with each other, or with both parents, though they could be 
given middle names that reflect the other parent’s name (and thus 
their siblings’). With alternating surnames, there is also the question of 
whose name comes first, since, unless there are twins, the parents don’t 
know for certain if there will be another child.  
4. Endlessly proliferating hyphenation.  
Hyphenation initially seems to be an appealing (although still un-
common) alternative.140 Typically, she hyphenates and he leaves his 
name the same, but in the egalitarian version, both spouses hyphenate, 
or the children hyphenate while the parents keep their names. Hy-
phenation has obvious benefits: it can be egalitarian, it involves the 
continuity of both names, and it can signify a connection among some 
or all members of the nuclear family. 
As commentators are always quick to point out, however, hy-
phenation presents new problems at the second generation of family 
formation.141 If the child of Rachel Smith and Sam Miller is Lara 
Smith-Miller, and if she marries Kevin Lee-Brown, then what name 
will their children bear? Will they really be Boy and Girl Smith-Miller-
Lee-Brown?142 And what of the next generation? Hyphenation, at least 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See Richard D. Alford, Naming and Identity: A Cross-Cultural Study of Personal Naming 
Practices 56 (Hraf 1988) (noting a variation of this practice among the Hokkien, an agricultural 
Taiwanese community in which parents sometimes alternate giving their surnames). 
 140 See Part II (reporting that one study found that 5 percent of women hyphenate, and 
reporting no data on how many men hyphenate). 
 141 See, for example, Span, Taking a Wife, Wash Post at F01 (cited in note 45); Neil A.F. 
Popovic, The Game of the Name, Ms. 96 (Nov–Dec 1994); Gerri Hirshey, Little Kids, Big Names, 
Redbook 40 (Oct 1993); Lance Morrow, The Strange Burden of a Name, Time 76 (Mar 8, 1993); 
Lebell, Naming Ourselves, Naming Our Children at 32, 51–52 (cited in note 137).  
 142 Compare Pintens and Will, Names at 54 n 499 (cited in note 134) (“Portugal admits up to 
four surnames (Law 51 on the civil register art 128 no 1), while most other countries expressly 
allow only two, amongst them Greece (CC art 1505) and Quebec (CC art 56.1).”). 
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standard hyphenation, thus does not seem sustainable across genera-
tions. I return to the topic of hyphenation at the end of this Part.143  
5. Mr. Her Name.  
Another option is for him to take her name.144 As mentioned ear-
lier, this option has received some attention in light of a suit brought 
by the ACLU to challenge the difficulty a couple faced in trying to 
change his name to hers in Los Angeles County.145 Mr. Her Name is 
simple and elegant, and it clearly doesn’t favor men’s names over 
women’s names. And it may have some salutary effects these days, 
such as demonstrating the odd asymmetry of our predominant con-
vention of Mrs. His Name, and showing that men are also capable of 
changing their names. But of course, like matrilineal naming for chil-
dren, it favors women’s names over men’s. 
6. New names. 
Another option is to create a new name for the newly formed 
family. The couple could choose a word or place name that has special 
significance to them. If Rachel Smith and Sam Miller met in Brooklyn, 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Part III.B proposes an alternative model for intergenerational hyphenation, which does 
not lead to endless proliferation of names, and which should therefore have more appeal. 
 144 As noted in Part I, men in the Anglo-American tradition have sometimes done this in 
special circumstances, such as when the wife’s family was more prominent. See note 27. In addi-
tion, according to one Japanese custom, it is not uncommon for a husband to take his wife’s 
surname in certain circumstances, that is, when her family has no sons or no sons remain in the 
household. See Kitteredge Cherry, Womansword: What Japanese Words Say about Women 11 
(Kodansha 2002) (stating that “[o]ne custom enables a family to adopt a son-in-law who assumes 
his wife’s surname and enters her family just as a bride would normally do”). See also Ekaterina 
Korobtseva, Late Marriages in Contemporary Japan 14 (unpublished MSc dissertation, Oxford 
University, 2003) (explaining that “another very Japan-specific norm which seems to affect mar-
riage is the traditional requirement for the eldest daughter from a family with no sons to find a 
groom who will agree to be symbolically adopted into his wife’s family and take her surname”); 
Keith Brown, Dōzoku and the Ideology of Descent in Rural Japan, 68 Am Anthro 1129, 1131–32 
(1966) (observing that among those families belonging to dōzoku—that is, a hierarchically organ-
ized corporation of families patrilineally related—it is common for a husband to take the wife’s 
surname when the wife’s family either doesn’t have a son or none of the sons remains in the 
household). While this traditional naming custom is apparently waning, anecdotal evidence 
suggests its persistence in some rural communities. See Misa Izuhara, Changing Family Tradition: 
Housing Choices and Constraints for Older People in Japan, 15 Housing Studies 89, 94–95 (2000) 
(discussing the importance of family continuity in Japan and the naming custom’s role in per-
petuating the family name). Currently, however, 98 percent of Japanese women take their hus-
band’s surname. See Masumi Arichi, Is it Radical? Women’s Right to Keep Their Own Surnames 
after Marriage, 22 Women’s Stud Intl Forum 411, 411–15 (1999).  
 145 See, for example, Risling, California Man Sues to Take Wife’s Name, Wash Post at A04 
(cited in note 64); Jennifer Steinhauer, He Does Take This Woman. Now, About Her Last Name, NY 
Times A1 (Dec 16, 2006). See also generally Complaint, Buday v California Department of Health 
and Services, Civil Action No CV06-08008 (CD Cal filed Dec 15, 2006) (“Buday Complaint”). 
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they could become Rachel and Sam Brooklyn. (This type of location 
choice would recall the historical practice in some regions of the world 
of using names to indicate geographical origin—think Leonardo da 
Vinci.) Or if they shared a fondness for a particular type of tree, they 
could adopt its name as their own. One couple in Susan Kupper’s study 
of naming choices adopted the family name of Ailanthus, commonly 
known as the tree of heaven, though they gave the name only to their 
children.146 As noted earlier, Robin Shahar and her partner took the new 
name of Shahar because it means “the dawn” in Hebrew.147 
7. Merged names.  
With some greater nod to continuity of identity, spouses could in-
stead merge their separate surnames into one surname. Thus Sam and 
Rachel become the Smillers or the Millsmis (or similar). Last year, 
Jodi Rudoren, who writes for the New York Times, combined her last 
name (Wilgoren) with her husband’s (Ruderman), and they both be-
came the Rudorens.148 Rudoren’s article seems to have prompted a 
flurry of articles in British newspapers claiming that merging is the 
new American suburban trend, but all indications suggest that merg-
ing is still rare.149 Web posts responding to Rudoren’s article about her 
name change nonetheless reveal a few further examples; for instance, 
a couple with the names Newstrom and Kotok became the Newstoks; 
and, more unusually, Brian Culkowski and Julia Lester blended the 
latter parts of their names into Sterkovsky.150 Moreover, the mayor of 
Los Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa, bore the name Villar until he mar-
ried Connie Raigosa.151 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Kupper, Surnames for Women at 87 (cited in note 54) (describing the choice of Kass 
Sheedy and Douglas Morea). 
 147 See notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Rudoren, Meet Our New Name, NY Times sec 9 at 3 (cited in note 64). Writing in 
1990 on couples who had made decisions prior to that time, Kupper mentions one merged name, 
which was applied only to the children: Marc Greenwood and Susan Ransom gave their kids the 
name “Ranwood,” which Susan called the “family name” although the parents didn’t assume it. 
Kupper, Surnames for Women at 86 (cited in note 54) (describing, however, Greenwood’s even-
tual regret). 
 149 See Benjamin Zimmer, Keeping Up with the Smoneses: Are American Newlyweds Blend-
ing Their Names?, Slate (Aug 16, 2006), online at http://www.slate.com/id/2147875 (visited July 8, 
2007). See also Denise Winterman, What a Mesh, BBC News Magazine, (Aug 3, 2006), online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/5239464.stm (visited July 8, 2007); Carol Sarler, 
Frankly, I Blame Brad and Angelina, Observer (July 30, 2006), online at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/ 
comment/story/0,,1833370,00.html (visited July 8, 2007); Chloe Rhodes, Why I Didn’t Want to 
“Mesh” with My Husband, Telegraph (July 28, 2006), online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/ 
main.jhtml?xml=/health/2006/07/28/hname28.xml (visited July 8, 2007). 
 150 Scott Newstok, Design Your Surname, Design Your Life (Nov 13, 2005), online at 
http://www.design-your-life.org/blog.php?id=350 (visited July 8, 2007). 
 151 See Rudoren, Meet Our New Name, NY Times sec 9 at 3 (cited in note 64). 
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Although it might seem difficult to determine how names would 
be merged, we know from linguistics that certain letter and sound 
combinations sound better (or worse) in certain languages, and some 
combinations are simply unacceptable. These kinds of considerations, 
among others, would likely drive naming choices.152  
Like hyphenation, this option brings together the two names into 
a new name, but without the length or questions about the next gen-
eration that hyphenation raises. Everyone in the immediate family—
the parents and all their children—would have the same last name, 
and neither spouse’s name would be privileged. The solution is thus 
egalitarian and, in some ways, parsimonious.  
This solution has one great disadvantage, though: because neither 
partner’s name is preserved intact, within one or two generations, fam-
ily names would bear little trace of the names of earlier generations. 
The history and intergenerational continuity of current surnames 
would cease. Specific ethnic or racial heritage would be lost through 
the blending of parts of names (though at least some names could be 
merged in a way to preserve identifiable parts). 
Embracing a social practice that would end the passing of names 
across generations may seem disconcerting, even sad. After all, both 
men and (perhaps to a lesser extent) women have reasons to be at-
tached to their names of origin.153 If everyone gave up his or her name, 
however, we might all develop less of an attachment to our birth 
names.154 Everyone would potentially anticipate this life transition, in 
much the way many women have for generations. In other words, the 
preference for birth names may itself be endogenous to norms and 
practices in a way that means that much less would be lost than we 
think, were the practice to change.  
And there might be gains from the loss of intergenerational name 
affinity. First, in addition to breaking any preference for sons that 
might result from patrilineal naming, ceasing the intergenerational 
transmission of names might reduce the pressure on children to pur-
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Alan Cruttenden, ed, Gimson’s Pronunciation of English 216–22 (Edward Arnold 
5th ed 1994) (discussing English phonotactics).  
 153 See Part I.B.2. 
 154 Some first-name practices suggest that the preference for names that bear marks of 
tradition and familiarity, rather than blending and creativity, is culturally specific. For instance, 
the creation of new first names through varying prefixes or suffixes or merging existing first 
names is not uncommon among African-Americans. See, for example, Sonia Weiss, The Complete 
Idiot’s Guide to Baby Names 133 (Alpha 1999) (stating that “[c]ombined names, often taking 
elements from the names of both parents, and creative spellings are also very much a part of this 
[African-American] naming fashion”); Pauline C. Pharr, Onomastic Divergence: A Study of 
Given-Name Trends among African Americans, 68 Am Speech 400, 401–02 (1993) (describing 
patterns of coined African-American first names, including adding prefixes or suffixes or creat-
ing “blends or compounds, such as Marshelle (Marsha/Michelle) and Maxille (Maxine/Lucille)”). 
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sue unsatisfying life and career paths to do credit to the Family Name. 
That said, it could also undermine whatever useful social pressure is 
created by such expectations. But, under this model, children do have 
the same name as their parents unless or until they marry—just not 
their grandparents. 
Second, new pleasures might even be found in the relinquishment 
of one name for the other. Much as many young girls have eroticized 
becoming Mrs. His Name, as discussed earlier, a naming practice that 
involves conjoining or blending names might thus invite new pleasures 
for men who’ve never had such pleasures, and novel forms of pleasure 
for women who haven’t experienced or likely even imagined this vari-
ety of nominal union shared equally with a spouse.155  
Moreover, this approach applies to same-sex couples as well as dif-
ferent-sex couples.156 The fact that a social practice is potentially inclu-
sive of historically excluded groups may be positive in its own right. In 
addition, the practice’s availability to partners who defy gender norms 
may signify the new practice’s break from marriage’s historical role in 
subordinating women.  
In addition, the merged or new name option is not incompatible 
with preserving names across generations in some way. For instance, one 
supplement to the new-name (or merged-name) option would be to pre-
serve family names across generations by accumulating middle names, as 
many women have done with their maiden names.157 These middle names 
would have odd echoes of the merged surnames, however. 
On the negative side, perhaps a social convention of nominal un-
ion smacks of coverture for all. Rather than just women losing them-
selves, now both spouses lose themselves in marriage, at least as signi-
fied by their surnames. One might worry that this is the opposite of 
progress. Another, more trivial, complaint about merged names is that 
their novelty may prompt mispronunciation or require their bearers 
always to spell them out. This cost isn’t unique to novel names, however; 
many people’s names are mispronounced. Nonetheless, while merged 
names have some appeal, they also have some notable costs—perhaps 
most particularly, the loss of the integrity and history of existing names.   
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Part I.B.3. 
 156 It also works for groups of more than two, which, if they do not follow a patriarchal 
model of polygyny, also lack a naming default. Since limited survey data on people in polyamor-
ous relationships suggests little interest in formal marriage, however, common surnames may be 
a matter of relative indifference. See Emens, 29 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 303, 353–54, 354 
n 14 (cited in note 76). 
 157 See note 88 and accompanying text (noting that women, particularly in the South, com-
monly take their given surnames as middle names at marriage). 
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B. A Promising Alternative: Biphenation  
Hyphenation by both spouses has numerous virtues, as noted 
above, including continuity of each person’s name, symmetry between 
spouses, and shared names between parents and children. But the dif-
ficulty comes with marriage at the next generation: surely the kids of 
Lara Smith-Miller and Kevin Lee-Brown won’t become Smith-Miller-
Lee-Brown. Superficially, then, hyphenation seems a one-generation 
solution.  
But there is no reason all the names have to be retained.158 What if 
only two names were hyphenated at every generation?  
This may sound complicated, but it’s not. The idea—which we 
might call clipped hyphenation or biphenation—is that when two hy-
phenators marry, each chooses one of his or her current names to 
merge into the new family name. So Lara Smith-Miller picks, say, 
Smith, and Kevin Lee-Brown picks, say, Brown, and their new family 
name is Smith-Brown. They might both adopt this new name, at the 
time of marriage or if and when they have kids, or they might just give 
the name to the kids (if any) that they have. With biphenation, then, 
everyone has a hyphenated name, but its component parts may change 
over time.   
Biphenation is thus similar to the common practice in many 
Spanish-speaking countries, in which children bear two names, one 
from their father and one from their mother, though typically without 
a hyphen.159 Under the Spanish convention, however, mothers’ names 
are dropped at the next generation.160 Thus, patrilineal descent is the 
operative principle across multiple generations. Under the biphena-
tion approach, by contrast, no patrilineal principle would dictate 
which name gets passed along. 
This approach has the virtues of merging, in that names do not 
become endlessly long, but they bear properties of each partner’s 
name. And it retains the key additional virtue of hyphenation: that 
existing family names—with their heritage, history, and individual rec-
ognition value—retain their integrity.  
                                                                                                                           
 158 I thank Kathy Baker for this point. 
 159 See Civil Code of Spain Book I, Title V, Chap I, Art 108–10 (allowing, among other 
things, the parents to decide on the order of the child’s double name); Barbara R. Hauser, Born a 
Eunuch? Harmful Inheritance Practices and Human Rights?, 21 L & Inequality 1, 29–30 (2003) 
(describing the mechanics and motivations of the Spanish system); Pintens and Will, Names at 54 
(cited in note 134). Note that Portugal and Brazil follow a similar practice, though the mother’s 
name typically precedes the father’s. Pintens and Will, Names at 54 (cited in note 134). 
 160 See Pintens and Will, Names at 54 (cited in note 134). Another difference is that the 
biphenation approach proposed here would invite the parents to adopt the biphenated name, not 
just the children. See note 148. 
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Biphenated names help create genealogies, even though they will 
not travel neatly or predictably. Given that women’s names have (al-
most) never traveled, this is not a loss of information, but instead a 
spreading out of the information gaps. And because each child bears a 
coherent part of each parent’s name, tracing family lines and connec-
tions should presumably be easier rather than harder. In addition, bi-
phenation preserves the connection between past and present and the 
ethnic significance of existing names. 
Moreover, both men and women could be more easily found by old 
friends, or traced through a publication record or website, under biphena-
tion than under merging (or under Mrs. His Name or Mr. Her Name). A 
Google search for Lara Smith-Miller has a decent chance of turning up 
Lara Smith-Brown, particularly if paired with some relevant information 
about her, and the chances would be much increased where the compo-
nent parts of the names are more unusual than Smith and Brown.  
The choosing of which half of each name to keep could be a mat-
ter of family ties, aesthetics, or the flip of a coin. Requiring couples to 
choose—both which names to include in their name, and the order of 
those names—might seem a burden to place on them and their fami-
lies of origin, creating guilt or hurt feelings. This concern may be over-
blown, though. Parents sometimes name children after family mem-
bers, giving them first or middle names of relatives with whom they 
feel, or want to forge, a particular connection. Principles other than 
elective affinity might appeal to some—such as choosing the shorter 
names or choosing which ones sound best together. The former might 
favor names from some national or ethnic traditions over others, 
though, and the latter may be subject to much disagreement, notwith-
standing the principles of phonotactics.161 Alternatively, some people 
might want to use a principle similar to the bilineal principle described 
above, though with a twist to disrupt patrilineal descent for reasons 
discussed in Part II: that is, men would keep the part of their names 
they got from their mothers, and women the part they got from their 
fathers.162 This creates another gendered principle for dividing people, 
however, and doesn’t work for the children of same-sex couples.  
To avoid these decisions, couples could choose biphenated names 
randomly, by, for example, three coin flips: first, to determine which of 
the first spouse’s names is included; second, to determine which of the 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See note 152. 
 162 So Lara Smith-Miller (the daughter of Rachel Smith and Sam Miller) passes Miller to 
her children, and Kevin Lee-Brown (the son of Patricia Lee and Jennifer Brown) passes Lee to 
his children. Their children therefore bear the last name of Lee-Miller. (Or it could be Miller-
Lee; for the order, I think aesthetics would often dictate, though randomness or alphabetical 
order could supply the default.). 
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second spouse’s names is included; and third, to determine the order 
of the two names selected.163 As I discuss later, the state could help 
make this choice easier and even more neutral by supplying a ran-
domly generated facilitative default.164 
I have spoken as if both parents and children would have the new 
biphenated family name, but part of the beauty of biphenation is that 
the parents can choose whether they wish to biphenate their own 
names or not—and the convention works equally well either way.165 
(Under the Spanish convention, by contrast, only the children receive 
the combination name; the parents’ names generally do not change.166) 
Couples will likely vary in whether they wish to change their own 
names to the new biphenated family name, or to reserve the new bi-
phenation for any children they may have. Factors may include how 
much they wish to share a name with each other or how much they 
wish to have the exact same name as their children, versus how much 
they wish for career or personal continuity reasons to retain their ex-
act birth names. Note, though, that even if couples change their own 
names, they retain a coherent portion of their birth names before and 
after marriage. 
Biphenation also permits partial continuity of a person’s name 
across marriage and remarriage, for those who wish to change their 
names with each marriage, because they can keep the same part of 
their birth name with each marriage. And even if a person changes his 
name with each new marriage, he can still share part of his name with 
his children from previous marriages, so long as he keeps the half of 
his name that they have. (This would be a good reason for a person at 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Several readers proposed coin flipping as a way to deal with any number of naming deci-
sions—including as a way to choose one family name for all (for example, Smith or Miller)—
perhaps even through public ritual, like the bouquet toss. This might appeal to some, but my suspi-
cion is that most (though not all) people would not take well to using randomness to decide 
whether they will keep or lose their name. That said, if they can be certain that they’ll keep some 
part of their name, randomness might be relatively more appealing as a way to decide which part. 
 164 See Parts V and VII. 
 165 In this way, biphenation is not a simple “ratcheting up” or “ratcheting down” solution. In 
antidiscrimination theory, solutions ratchet up if they focus on giving rights of the dominant 
group to the subordinate group; solutions ratchet down if they attempt to transform the norms 
or practices of the dominant group to look more like those of the subordinate group. Biphena-
tion is a hybrid. It ratchets up in that it extends to women the historically male practice of keep-
ing and passing on one’s name, but only partially. And it ratchets down in that it invites men to 
engage in the historically female practice of changing one’s name and passing on a spouse’s 
name to the children, but only partially. To the extent that it invites couples to decide whether 
they prefer to partially change their own names (to entirely match each other and any children) 
or to keep their own names precisely as is, biphenation gives them the option of ratcheting up or 
down to a greater or lesser extent. 
 166 See Hauser, 21 L & Inequality at 29 (cited in note 159). Some women, however, do add 
“de” or “y” and then their husband’s name at the end of their own. 
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remarriage to choose actively which name to keep, instead of leaving 
the choice to chance, or to a default.) Because no gendered principle 
determines the names, biphenation also works for both same-sex and 
different-sex couples.167 
In a sense, biphenation is very much like merging, except that it 
preserves the integrity and historical resonance of existing surnames. 
It brings together existing names rather than coining neologisms. And 
the basic underlying logic is simple: when families had one formal 
head of household, perhaps it made sense to have one family surname; 
now that in families of two parents both are heads of the household, 
two names seems sensible. 
Hyphenated names are generally longer than single names, and 
some find them unwieldy or unappealing. This is a meaningful con-
cern, but not an insurmountable one, in my view. Surely there is noth-
ing essentially unappealing or costly about two surnames connected 
by a hyphen.168 And as more people biphenated, we, and our filing and 
forms and computer systems, would adjust. In addition, with regular 
and genuine choosing built into our naming convention—in contrast 
to such a strong majority convention of Mrs. His Name—people might 
well make more choices on the basis of aesthetics, leading to an over-
all improvement in the appeal of the surnames we bear, without sacri-
ficing the integrity of the names that are passed on. Moreover, friends 
can (and sometimes do) create nicknames for the last names of their 
hyphenated friends, much as they create nicknames for friends with 
long first names.169  
Nothing complicated needs to happen to pursue biphenation as a 
solution to the naming problem. At present, for those prospective 
spouses with single surnames (for example, Smith and Miller), bi-
phenation simply means hyphenation. The prospect of biphenation 
merely solves the dilemma of what their kids can do, and their kids’ 
                                                                                                                           
 167 The term biphenation suggests that this approach couldn’t apply to polyamorous rela-
tionships, but twoness isn’t actually key here; the key is that each partner’s name contributes 
without names proliferating across generations. So a family of three could adopt the principle of 
biphenation to create a three-part name, such as Smith-Miller-Jones. As this could become cum-
bersome, though, particularly for larger families, poly families who wanted to share names or 
give shared names to children might choose simple merging over hyphenation. Nonetheless, 
biphenation offers approaches—merging and coin flipping—that could help poly families devise 
individualized solutions. 
 168 But see Howard G. Chua-Eoan, It Hyphened One Night, Time 78 (Apr 17, 1989) (de-
scribing hassles associated with hyphenated names, as well as a child who is proud of his hy-
phen). Note that biphenation may also be uniquely unappealing (or, I suppose, appealing) to 
some who come from cultural contexts in which double-barreled names signify posh upbringing 
or aspirations, as, for instance, in England. 
 169 I know of no work on this, so I can speak only anecdotally, for instance, of a family with 
kids that are the equivalent of Smith-Miller, and their friends call the family the “Smillers.”  
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kids, with the legacy of hyphenation. And if parents wish to help em-
brace the biphenation idea, they may wish to hyphenate their own 
names as well as their children’s, to help to inch along the acceptabil-
ity of hyphenated names, and thus, ultimately, of biphenated names. 
Moreover, it might help ease any burden that children with hyphen-
ated names might feel—from whatever administrative hassles and 
social costs accompany the two-part name until hyphenation is more 
widespread—to know that their parents have assumed those same 
hassles, and can advise them on how best to deal with them.170 
No solution is ideal from all perspectives. But biphenation may 
best satisfy the various values at stake, for the following reasons: 
• An individual’s name continues, either partially or completely, 
throughout that individual’s life.171 
• Existing family names continue across generations, thus pre-
serving their ethnic and historical significance and signaling con-
nections within extended kin networks. 
• Names can pass equally through the male and female line. 
• Couples can unite nominally if they choose, but still retain 
some continuity with their past identity and with their family of 
origin; or, just as easily, each spouse can choose to retain his or 
her entire birth name and yet share partial continuity of surname 
with any children. 
• Thus, parents always share some or all of their current names 
with their children.172 
• Family names will be a manageable length. 
• On average, names will convey more, not less, information for 
genealogists, particularly of an amateur sort, trying to track con-
nections between families. 
• Couples can make choices about their names, and their chil-
dren’s names, against a background convention that could 
(though need not) be based on randomness, which could mitigate 
parents’ and grandparents’ hurt feelings. 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Moreover, there might be reason to think that boys with hyphenated names would 
particularly appreciate a father’s having a hyphenated name if he has one himself, since males 
less frequently have hyphenated names. 
 171 That is, names continue partially or completely depending on whether couples adopt the 
new biphenation themselves or just give it to their children.  
 172 If there is any reason to think that parents (or fathers) might invest more in children 
who bear their name (an interesting question, on which I’ve found no data either way), then the 
fact of at least some nominal continuity across generations may be useful. See Part I.B.4. 
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• People can change names (or not) across marriage and remar-
riage; either way, they retain at least some nominal continuity. 
In short, biphenation offers the virtues of merging names—of 
gender equality, relative parsimony, and (potentially) shared names 
among nuclear families—while preserving certain values of our cur-
rent system—such as the passing of names across generations, the 
preservation of heritage and ethnic meaning, and the affective connec-
tions associated with nominal unity and continuity. 
*  *  * 
Thus, biphenation may, on balance, present the most appealing 
naming option across generations. Of course, a new social convention 
wouldn’t mandate that approach for everyone. Conventions are, in a 
sense, defaults. And the choices that couples make might mean more if 
they were truly choices, if spouses had greater social flexibility about 
their naming options. Indeed, taking his name could even have greater 
social and erotic charge if biphenation were the social default, because 
becoming Mrs. His Name would no longer be expected of her. But 
these are all social concerns. The next step is to consider how the law 
treats individual choice of marital names. 
IV.  CURRENT LEGAL DEFAULTS: 
STATE PROCEDURES FOR MARITAL NAMES 
Congratulations! You’ve just made married life easier. 
—Official New Bride Name Change Kit173 
Name changes at marriage are no longer mandatory for women. 
Marital names are thus a default regime, a choice regime. But in light 
of the recent history of mandatory name change, how is that choice 
regime structured? 
The basic legal default seems to be keeping one’s name. That op-
tion involves the fewest active choices and associated costs. By con-
trast, the most common choice made by women—to take their hus-
band’s name—involves numerous interactions with public and private 
entities: if done properly, according to the Official New Bride Name 
Change Kit, the process consists of contacting four separate public 
entities and nearly thirty different types of private entities. This seems 
a heavy toll, suggesting that we are placing substantial costs on those 
making the most conventional naming choice. 
                                                                                                                           
 173 KitBiz, Official New Bride Name Change Kit. For more information, see http://www. 
kitbiz.com (visited July 8, 2007). 
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By a traditional contract-law account of default rules, this is prob-
lematic, because the default is minoritarian and thus creates more 
costs than a majoritarian default.174 Alternatively, by an account that 
favors egalitarian naming options, the Keeping default might seem 
progressive, nudging the social practice in unconventional directions. 
This seems not to be so, however, because Keeping is apparently not 
sticky for women—and it is sticky for men. Arguably the most impor-
tant feature of our default regime is that it does nothing to challenge 
the most entrenched aspect of our naming conventions: the fact that 
men almost never change their names at marriage. 
In addition, although this legal regime places significant costs on 
women who become Mrs. His Name, it typically places greater costs 
on women (and men) choosing other naming options. In short, the 
current regime tends to make any other naming choice beyond Keep-
ing or Mrs. His Name even more challenging than a change to Mrs. 
His Name. Through an often unobtrusive set of decisions and interac-
tions at the federal and state or local levels, any unconventional nam-
ing choice that unites the couples by name—such as merging names 
and often even double hyphenation—typically requires an even more 
challenging process. The bottom line is that the existing rules and pro-
cedures—though all technically default rules—differentially burden 
choices that spouses might make about their names upon marriage. In 
this way, this regime may be steering unconventional choosers away 
from options that might lead to more sustainable egalitarian options 
across generations. 
Some of the obstacles to unconventional name change options 
occur at a level of government action that might be viewed as the most 
informal sort of rulemaking: desk-clerk law. By desk-clerk law, I mean 
the steering of choices by a government functionary, not through any 
official grant of discretion, but through her own ignorance, impatience, 
or normative views. 
This Part provides information about the current law of marital 
names across the country. What follows is based principally on stat-
utes, regulations, and many calls and emails to federal agencies, county 
clerks, Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs), and other govern-
ment entities. The inquiries were generally framed as questions about 
the options for a couple deciding what to do with their names and 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 96 (Aspen 6th ed 2003); Ian Ayres 
and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 87–92 (1989); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Con-
veyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand L Rev 829, 835–36 (1985); Charles J. Goetz and 
Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 
Va L Rev 967, 971 (1983). 
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considering the option of him changing his name.175 This Part also dis-
                                                                                                                           
 175 The information presented here stems largely from the determined efforts of my out-
standing summer research assistant, Leah LaPorte. Her inquiries were never designed as an 
empirical study of desk-clerk law or of state law as shaped by desk-clerk law; rather, her initial 
task was simply to try to figure out what the marital-naming laws were in different states. Given 
that there are so few statutes on the books, she set about trying to find out the relevant informa-
tion from the officials who were administering the name changes. Once she began reporting back 
on what she was finding, and on the striking comments the clerks were making, I asked her to 
start recording the range of responses, including quotations. LaPorte describes her process as 
follows:  
In order to collect marriage license application forms from each state, I began with a gen-
eral internet search for keywords “marriage application” and the state. I downloaded or 
bookmarked any forms that I found. If, from that initial search, the forms appeared to be 
consistent statewide, I searched on the state Department of Health website or called the 
department for confirmation. If the forms appeared to be local, county-wide forms, o[r] if 
my initial search did not yield any marriage license applications, I began searching by 
county within the state. I found a list of counties for every state on the National Association 
of Counties’ [NACO] website. . . . If the county had a website, I linked to that site and 
searched for either an application form, or an email address to contact the county clerk. If 
the county clerk’s email address was available, I sent the following message: 
To whom it may concern: 
I’m hoping you may be able to help me—I’m a student at Columbia Law School and 
I’m working on a project that concerns marriage application forms. I’m gathering appli-
cations from around [State X] and the rest of the country in order to compare the spe-
cific kinds of information requested before couples can receive a marriage license. Is 
there any way I could get a blank copy of the application a couple would fill out in 
[your county]? It would not be reproduced in any way, or made available to others. 
My goal was to collect forms from at least 10% of the counties in states where the applica-
tion forms were issued by the local county clerk; in a state such as Georgia with 159 coun-
ties, I sent emails to the 23 counties with email addresses available. The counties ranged in 
population size from over 600,000 to under 9,000, and their geographic location was ran-
dom. In total, I sent 294 request emails to county clerks.  
 To speak with county clerks about the name change options available to marrying cou-
ples, I again began from the list of counties on the NACO website. I generally called a large 
county (one with large population) first, and then contacted a smaller county. My initial 
question was generally the same: “My fiancé and I are talking about what we want to do 
with our names after we’re married, and we’re wondering if it is possible for him to take my 
name, or to hyphenate with my name?” and then [I] asked follow-up questions about other 
options. I called at least two counties in every state; if those two gave conflicting informa-
tion, I moved on to another state. If they were consistent, I called more counties until I 
found an inconsistency in the information, or had a conversation I found particularly nota-
ble. If I called four or more counties, I tried to ensure some variety in geographical location 
as well as population size. Hawaii is the only state where I was unable to communicate with 
any county clerks regarding name change. 
 [For c]ommunicating with DMVs about name change options[, b]ecause DMVs’ call 
centers often have very long wait times and occasionally refus[e] to answer questions if the 
caller does not have an in-state driver’s license, my first form of contact was email. I searched 
for contact information on each state DMV’s website, and sent the following message: 
I am interested in finding out more information about how to go about changing my 
name on my driver’s license after I get married. The website says that I should bring my 
marriage license with me, but my fiancé and I have not decided what to do with our 
names, and I am wondering if it is possible for us to: 
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plays some ways that desk-clerk law may shape people’s experience of 
the law in the realm of marital names and beyond. Note that the na-
ture of desk-clerk law means that someone else making similar inquir-
ies would likely get different information. The information that is pre-
sented here is therefore impressionistic and anecdotal rather than sta-
tistical, and it may not be representative.     
A. Keeping: The Least Sticky Default (But Only for Women) 
The simplest thing is just to take his name. Because that’s 
what you’re going to do anyway. What are you going to do if 
you have kids? 
—Clerk in Cuyahoga County, Ohio176 
The basic legal default in all or nearly all states is that both 
spouses’ names stay the same at marriage.177 This is therefore the easi-
est option in a strict legal sense; it is the option with the least costs 
                                                                                                                           
1) Both hyphenate our last names. 
2) Both take a combination name—he’s Jones and I’m Smith, can we become 
Smones?  
3) If he can take my last name instead of me taking his. 
If the DMV did not provide an email address for questions or did not respond to my re-
quest, I called the department and asked, “After my fiancé and I get married, if we come in 
with the marriage license, can he change his last name to mine, or can we both hyphenate 
our names?” and then asked further follow-up questions. In some cases where the DMV 
did respond via email, I also called the department; for most states, I just used one of the 
two forms of communication. 
 There were three states where I was unable to communicate with the DMV: North Da-
kota, Illinois, Massachusetts. These three states never responded to emails, and had phone 
systems that denied access to representatives without a state driver’s license number. 
Email from Leah LaPorte (Oct 13, 2006). Except where noted otherwise, all calls and email 
inquiries referenced in the Article were made by LaPorte. 
 176 Conversation with Clerk, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Probate Court (June 30, 2006) (re-
sponding to a question about the legal process for a husband to hyphenate his name).  
 177 The reason I say nearly all is that six states invite parties to state their postmarital names 
on their marriage license application form, and thus involve a kind of forced choosing. See Ga 
Code Ann § 19-3-33.1 (1999); Iowa Code Ann § 595.5 (West Supp 2001); Mass Ann Laws ch 46, 
§ 1D (Law Co-op 1991); Minn Stat § 517.08 (2005); NY Dom Rel Law § 15 (McKinney 1999); 
ND Cent Code § 14-03-20.1 (1996). As I later discuss, the choosing is more invited than forced. 
See note 339 and accompanying text. Moreover, given that the parties still would need to record 
their new names with all the relevant public and private entities, this forced choosing doesn’t 
change the fact that Keeping is by far the easiest option legally. In addition, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that costs are occasionally still imposed on Keeping as opposed to her becoming Mrs. 
His Name—such as a woman recently married in Kentucky who reported to me that she had to 
go before a judge to justify her choice not to change her name. Since the most authoritative 
source in Kentucky indicates that Keeping is the default, this woman’s experience was most likely 
an example of desk-clerk law rather than formal policy. See Part IV.C. Similarly, as explained below, 
a few clerks, particularly in Alabama, claimed that becoming Mrs. His Name is automatic, but that is 
unlikely to be the actual legal practice, as discussed. See text accompanying note 199. 
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imposed by the state at the time of marriage. The prospective spouses 
who wish to keep their names avoid the many steps required of those 
making a change, the subject of Part IV.B. 
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, very few women keep their 
names at marriage. Unlike so many default rules, Keeping is not 
“sticky” for women. This is interesting in its own right, since recent 
work indicates that default rules affect choices in a range of areas, in-
cluding some highly personal domains, such as organ donation, and 
some presumptively market-rational domains, such as corporate be-
havior.178 Ian Ayres has called this the “iron law of default inertia.”179 
Contrary to findings in other areas, though, in the realm of mari-
tal names the default rule seems to have little or no inertia effect on 
women’s choices. The iron law turns out not to be a law after all. It is 
an interesting empirical question as to why the default’s not sticky for 
women, and there is no work directly on point. Some theories can be 
generated by extrapolating from the research on default rules in other 
areas, with the caveat that substantial differences separate existing 
research and these hypothetical applications.  
1. Why Keeping doesn’t stick (for women). 
Research in decision science has identified three potential causes 
for the stickiness of defaults: (1) people may experience loss aversion, 
making them reluctant to depart from the status quo; (2) people may 
want to avoid the effort of making a decision, either through laziness 
or through some desire not to be actively responsible for their deci-
sions; and (3) people may interpret a default as a suggestion or rec-
ommendation from some better informed or authoritative entity.180 It 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See, for example, Eric J. Johnson, Mary Steffel, and Daniel G. Goldstein, Making Better 
Decisions: From Measuring to Constructing Preferences, 24 Health Psych S17, S18 (2005) (de-
scribing both laboratory studies and cross-national studies of actual behavior involving organ 
donation); Eric J. Johnson and Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 Science 1338 
(2003) (same); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical 
Examination 6 (Yale Law School Working Paper, May 2005) (showing that whether a state’s 
default antitakeover statute uses an opt-in or opt-out rule affects the likelihood that a corpora-
tion in the state will adopt the statute’s protections). See also note 277. See generally Ian Ayres, 
Menus Matter, 73 U Chi L Rev 3 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159 (2004); Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation 
for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U Pa L 
Rev 1211 (2003). 
 179 Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 5 (cited in note 178). 
 180 See Johnson, Steffel, and Goldstein, 24 Health Psych at S18 (cited in note 178) (discuss-
ing default options in the context of health care and suggesting the careful use of default op-
tions), citing Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss-Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Refer-
ence-Dependent Model, 106 Quarterly J Econ 1039, 1039 (1991); Jonathan Baron and Ivan Ritov, 
Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 Org Behav & Hum Dec Proc 475, 477 (1994); Eric J. 
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makes sense that none of these would operate to make Keeping into a 
sticky default for women in light of the strong social conventions in 
this area. We can see this with each of the rationales above. 
First, any loss aversion women experience is likely to be shaped 
more by the social conventions and expectations surrounding the legal 
decision than by the legal decision itself. That is, although some 
women may experience changing their names as a loss, more women 
may feel a loss at the idea of not becoming Mrs. His Name, to the ex-
tent that they grew up expecting to change their names at marriage, 
and even romanticizing it, as discussed in Part I.B.3. To depart from 
the convention might feel like the loss of something expected. 
Second, women might wish for a way to avoid the effort of mak-
ing a choice about their names, but they don’t really have that option 
because of the strong social forces surrounding the naming decision. 
Sticking with the legal default of Keeping may save them a few admin-
istrative costs. But in the social world, Keeping is likely to be greeted 
as at least as much, if not more, of an active choice. Given that his 
name is rarely up for discussion, and the children almost always get his 
name, she may feel that the choice involving the least overall effort is 
the social, rather than the legal, default. 
Third, women are unlikely to understand the default of Keeping 
as an authoritative suggestion of what they should do with their 
names. The Keeping default endorses the social convention for him, 
and merely treats her the same as him. The effect is that the “default” 
is just what-their-names-were-before-marriage. Marriage often in-
volves a lot of administrative costs—whether for a wedding (especially 
if large) or for changing life details (such as addresses and names on 
leases and bills, where applicable).181 Her having to endure costs to 
change her name is likely to seem like just another of those marriage-
related hassles—not a statement by the government that it is best for 
her to keep her name. 
2. Why Keeping isn’t a progressive penalty-default rule. 
One might interpret Keeping as a kind of penalty-default rule, that 
is, a minoritarian rule that is information-forcing.182 If women don’t 
speak about their choices, they end up with a result that most don’t 
want. This may effectively force them to think about and to articulate 
                                                                                                                           
Johnson, et al, Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 
35, 50 (1993). 
 181 There are fewer administrative costs of the latter sort for couples who live together before 
marriage (or who never live together or share property). For a brief discussion, see note 196. 
 182 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan L Rev 
1591, 1591–94 (1999). See also note 251 and accompanying text. 
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their naming preference—typically, of Mrs. His Name—and may there-
fore discourage complacent acceptance of the patrilineal convention. 
Understood in this way, Keeping might seem to be a legal rule 
that is more progressive than the social convention, and in some way 
encourages a more progressive naming result. Perhaps even more 
women would choose Mrs. His Name if Keeping weren’t the default 
and if departing from the default weren’t costly. Indeed, at least one 
study of marital names offers anecdotal evidence of a few women say-
ing that they didn’t change their names because they couldn’t be both-
ered with the administrative hassle.183 
There are several problems with the view that this is a progres-
sive rule, however. First, Keeping is having little, if any, inertia effect 
on women keeping their names. Even the study that reports on some 
women who cite convenience acknowledges that “[t]hese sorts of 
statements [about convenience], however, were generally cited only as 
secondary factors in women’s decisions. Usually, the primary factors 
involved more positive convictions.”184 And the data show that such a 
small percentage of women keep their names that the inertia effect on 
women, if any, must be small.185  
Second, the legal default of Keeping for both men and women is 
leading to differential costs imposed on the two groups. The rule is 
majoritarian for men, so few men bear the costs of contacting the 
thirty or so different types of entities mentioned earlier as part of the 
process of name change.186 The sheer number of steps outlined by the 
Official New Bride Name Change Kit (with its slogan “You’ve just 
made married life easier”) might lead one to believe that few men 
would put up with so much administrative hassle; if most men changed 
their names at marriage, then perhaps the law would change to make 
that the easiest choice.187 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Kupper, Surnames for Women at 47 (cited in note 54): 
Most women who kept their own names explained this for reasons that involved their feel-
ings: They wanted to maintain their identities or professional reputations, keep their family 
names, make feminist statements, and so on. Others, however, cited purely pragmatic rea-
sons such as convenience, credit, simplicity, or even laziness. In some cases, they found it 
was just easier and more convenient for them to keep the names they were currently using 
than to make a change. 
 184 Kupper, Surnames for Women at 48 (cited in note 54). 
 185 See Part II. 
 186 See Part IV.B. 
 187 Indeed, it calls to mind Gloria Steinem’s famous essay which imagines major and minor 
ways the world and its laws would be different if the positions of men and women were switched. 
Gloria Steinem, If Men Could Menstruate, reprinted in Gloria Steinem, Outrageous Acts and 
Everyday Rebellions 367 (Owl 1995): 
So what would happen if suddenly, magically, men could menstruate and women could not? 
Clearly, menstruation would become an enviable, worthy, masculine event: Men would brag 
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Finally, as I discuss next, Keeping is probably still steering choices, 
though in conventional directions. 
3. Why Keeping matters. 
All this might lead one to think that the Keeping default doesn’t 
matter. Indeed, social conventions are probably the most important 
determinant of marital naming choices. Nonetheless, in light of the 
robust literature on the behavioral effects of defaults, it would be sur-
prising if the legal default mattered not at all.188 And in fact, the legal 
default is likely shaping behavior in important ways, at least around 
the margins. 
The default rule of Keeping likely steers women—and perhaps 
men—away from unconventional naming choices other than Keeping. 
For those couples who might consider doing something other than the 
most conventional Mr. and Mrs. His Name, the state does nothing to 
facilitate their choice unless they both choose to Keep their names. 
And in fact, most states effectively may make any other unconven-
tional option hardest, as discussed in the next Parts. 
More broadly, a default that involves both spouses Keeping does 
nothing to invite men to choose to alter their names in any way, nor 
does it acknowledge or facilitate any alternative to children bearing 
their father’s name. If neither the man’s name nor the child’s name is 
up for discussion, women may feel that the costs of an unconventional 
naming choice far outweigh its benefits—especially when they are the 
only ones who will bear them. 
B. The Process (Costs) for Various Marital Name Changes 
It’s the lady who changes her name after she gets married. 
—Clerk in Harrison County, Mississippi189 
Any choice other than Keeping is costly. And to different degrees 
in different states, those costs are unevenly distributed across different 
naming options. The biggest cost divide is between those name changes 
that require a court order and those that can be made, at least in the 
                                                                                                                           
about how long and how much. Young boys would talk about it as the envied beginning of 
manhood. Gifts, religious ceremonies, family dinners, and stag parties would mark the day. 
To prevent monthly work loss among the powerful, Congress would fund a National Insti-
tute of Dysmenorrhea. Doctors would research little about heart attacks, from which men 
would be hormonally protected, but everything about cramps. Sanitary supplies would be 
federally funded and free. Of course, some men would still pay for the prestige of such 
commercial brands as Paul Newman Tampons. 
 188 See note 178. 
 189 Circuit Clerk, Harrison County, Mississippi (June 30, 2006). 
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first instance, through marriage alone. (A person can, theoretically, 
change his or her name simply by using that new name consistently; 
however, the administrative state now effectively obligates people to 
engage in formal name change.190) Thus, in looking at the marital name 
change options, there are two questions: How many and which entities 
need to be contacted and persuaded to change the name, and is a 
court-ordered name change necessary or is marriage alone sufficient 
evidence of the change? 
This discussion will begin with Mrs. His Name, the choice that has 
as few, or fewer, costs than any other option, a striking fact in light of 
just how many steps even that process seems to involve. 
1. Mrs. His Name. 
A woman who wants to change her name to her husband’s at 
marriage has to go through a multitude of steps. She has to complete 
forms and send a copy of her marriage license to as many as four 
separate public entities: 
• the Social Security Administration (SSA) (for a new Social Se-
curity card; the SSA supplies this information to the federal and 
state tax agencies);191 
• the state Department of Motor Vehicles (for a new driver’s li-
cense);192 
• the state Voter Registration Bureau (to change her voter’s reg-
istration record);193 and 
• the United States Passport Agency (to change her passport re-
cord). 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See, for example, sources cited in note 90. 
 191 See Official New Bride Name Change Kit (cited in note 173) (reporting no changes that 
need to be made with the state or federal tax entities). The IRS website tells taxpayers that they 
need only change their names with the Social Security Administration. See Tips for Recently Mar-
ried or Divorced Taxpayers, online at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105969,00.html 
(visited July 8, 2007) (reflecting common assumptions, the IRS refers only to women changing their 
names upon marriage). 
 192 Even with increasing synchronization of state DMV databases with the SSA in response 
to the Real ID Act, an individual still needs to contact the DMV to obtain a new driver’s license. 
See Real ID Act, 119 Stat at 311–16 (providing in part instructions to states and localities for 
identification card requirements). See also notes 90 & 259; Karen Keller, What’s in a Name?: 
Blending In, Kin Cited for Change, Herald News (Passaic County, NJ) B1 (Dec 17, 2006). 
 193 This step apparently doesn’t usually require a copy of her marriage license, see Official 
New Bride Name Change Kit (cited in note 173), but voting is likely to require some form of 
identification, and one might expect states to begin to require more documentation for voter 
registration in the future. This step may also be eliminated by Motor Voter, which allows name 
and address changes, as well as voter registration, with license renewal. National Voter Registra-
tion Act of 1993, 42 USC § 1973 (2000).  
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The kits available on the internet to help newlyweds with these 
tasks—the Official New Bride Name Change Kit and the (less gen-
dered) Findlegalforms.com Just Married Name Change Kit—also set 
out checklists of all the types of private entities to which notification 
should be sent. According to the New Bride kit, these include the fol-
lowing: 
• Banking and financial records (seven types of records, some of 
which require personal appearances, such as entities maintaining 
one’s checking and savings accounts, investment accounts, re-
tirement accounts, mutual funds, and credit cards);  
• Household records (eleven types of items, including land-
lords/mortgages, property tax or title records,194 vehicle insurance, 
homeowners’ insurance, health insurance, and life insurance); 
• Personal records (four types, including employer records, medi-
cal records of all sorts, and records with professional service pro-
viders such as lawyers); 
• Memberships/organizations (seven types of items, including 
health clubs, alumni organizations, and frequent flier programs).195 
Thus, to be thorough, a new bride (or groom) should tell thirty-
three different types of entities about her new name (and that number 
assumes she has only one healthcare professional in her life).196 
Nonetheless, there is one important shortcut available to women 
seeking to become Mrs. His Name, relative to citizens who want to 
change their name for reasons unrelated to marriage.197 Interestingly, 
to change a bride’s name, both public and private entities require only 
a marriage license stating her and her husband’s premarital names. 
Thus the apparent hassle imposed upon the prospective Mrs. His 
Name is not as great as it appears at first, relatively speaking. Al-
though the woman who wants to become Mrs. His Name has to en-
                                                                                                                           
 194 For property records, the standard practice is apparently to add an “AKA” to one’s 
property record. The new married name will also appear on the property record. The Official 
New Bride Name Change Kit (cited in note 173) comments that “[t]his method is the easiest way 
to record your new name on your property record. If you require a complete deletion of your 
maiden name, call your County Assessor and have them provide you with an alternate method.” 
 195 Id. 
 196 If couples move in together or otherwise pool resources at the moment of marriage, then 
some of these contacts would be necessary in order to include both names on bills, etc. If couples 
already live together, own property, or otherwise pool resources before marriage, or do no such 
pooling before or after marriage, then any such contacts to change a name are more likely to be 
due to the name change alone. To the extent that more couples live together before marriage, the 
name change imposes more unique costs.  
 197 Whether men can avail themselves of this shortcut at marriage is discussed shortly, as 
are women who want to become something other than Mrs. His Name at marriage. See note 198. 
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dure many steps to make the change both publicly and privately—as 
enumerated above—she does not have to get a court-ordered name 
change before proceeding with those steps (as she would have to do if 
she just wanted to change her name to something else for personal, 
not marriage, reasons). A regular court-ordered name-change proce-
dure may cost hundreds of dollars in fees, plus the cost of publishing 
notice of the name change in a local newspaper, in addition to a possi-
ble court appearance to explain the name change.198 Even without all 
that work, every entity—public and private—can be expected to be 
receptive to her name change through her marriage license, stating 
premarital names, alone. 
In inquiries made in 2006, a few local clerks—in Alabama, Geor-
gia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—claimed that a woman’s name 
“automatically” changes to her husband’s at marriage.199 Further in-
quiries with the state DMVs suggest, however, that these clerks are 
mistaken as to the law. (One way to understand the clerks’ comments 
is that the clerk is giving her view that the wife becomes Mrs. His Name 
in almost a magical legal way—as if the words “I now pronounce you 
man and wife” automatically make her Mrs. His Name ever after—even 
without any specific action by the state.) But the mere fact that clerks 
in disparate states could think this was an automatic change highlights 
the fact that this type of name change will confront no obstacles other 
than several uncomplicated bureaucratic contacts. 
2. Mrs. Hyphenated. 
In most places, becoming Mrs. Hyphenated appears to involve the 
same process as her becoming Mrs. His Name, with a few potential 
hassles. First, in a handful of jurisdictions—Alabama, Ohio, and Wyo-
ming—at least one clerk claimed that a court order would be required 
to become Mrs. Hyphenated.200 The statement from Wyoming was 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See, for example, Party Talk, 67 Tex Bar J 948, 953 (2004) (noting that to legally change 
one’s name in Texas requires the filing of a formal petition for name change and a hearing in 
front of the judge). 
 199 For explanation of the context of the queries, see note 175. This answer was given more 
than once in Alabama. Telephone conversation with Clerk, Calhoun County, Alabama, Probate 
Court (June 22, 2006); Telephone conversation with Clerk, Cullman County, Alabama, Probate 
Court (June 22, 2006). But a similar suggestion was made by individual clerks in Georgia, Penn-
sylvania, and South Carolina. Telephone conversation with Clerk, Augusta County, Georgia, 
Probate Court (June 9, 2006); Telephone conversation with Clerk, Allegheny County Court 
House, Pennsylvania (June 29, 2006); Telephone conversation with Clerk, Horry County, South 
Carolina, Probate Court (June 28, 2006) (saying “as soon as you’re married, you have his name”). 
 200 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Calhoun County, Alabama, Probate Court (June 22, 
2006); Telephone conversation with Clerk, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Probate Court (June 30, 
2006); Telephone conversation with Clerk, Wyoming Department of Motor Vehicles, Wyoming 
(June 27, 2006). 
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from a clerk at the DMV, which as a state agency tends to have more 
control over these matters, and therefore may be considered more 
authoritative. Contacts in most states, however, said that they permit-
ted the change, often agreeing to whatever is in the SSA’s database, 
including her name becoming hyphenated. 
Second, the Social Security Administration’s database will record 
a hyphenated name, and SSA is formally willing to hyphenate her 
name (or his) based just on a marriage license with the premarital 
names.201 (As discussed in the Parts on desk-clerk law, however, an ap-
plicant’s ability to do this may depend on the desk clerk.202) Appar-
ently, though, the hyphen will not appear on the social security card 
itself.203 From a formal legal perspective, the hyphen is part of the 
name, as the official database apparently contains the hyphen. This 
helps, for instance, with those state DMVs that synchronize their com-
puters with the SSA. But informally, the lack of hyphen on the social 
security card could present a hassle for anyone who wanted to use the 
social security card as evidence of her official name to other entities. 
Third, some entities—public as well as private—reported that 
their computers do not permit hyphenated names. For instance, clerks 
at the New Hampshire DMV reported that their computer cannot 
handle hyphens.204 So the DMV clerk can put the second name in the 
database after the individual’s birth name as an additional last name, 
but no hyphen will appear. This can cause hassles similar to those 
noted above. 
Finally, and relatedly, some states will hyphenate the names only 
in a particular sequence.205 This not only limits the order in which an 
individual hyphenator could structure her hyphenated name (an in-
teresting question in its own right206), but it may mean that a couple 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See author’s notes on repeated calls to the Social Security Administration (callers in-
clude Jordan Connors). 
 202 See notes 232–35. 
 203 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Social Security Administration (June 7, 2006). 
 204 Telephone conversation with Clerk, New Hampshire Department of Motor Vehicles, 
New Hampshire (June 26, 2006); Telephone conversation with Clerk, New Hampshire Secretary 
of State, Bureau of Vital Records, New Hampshire (June 26, 2006).  
 205 See, for example, Idaho, Department of Motor Vehicles regulation IDAPA 39.02.75.200 
(2005) (requiring women to hyphenate names as “maiden-married” name and men to hyphenate 
as “surname-maiden” name), email from Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles (June 13, 2006) 
(requiring Her Name–His Name for the bride, and Surname–Maiden Name for the groom); 
Michigan, phone conversation with Clerk, Michigan Department of State (June 29, 2006) (same); 
Oklahoma, OAC § 595:10-1-35 (2005) (same); South Carolina, email from South Carolina De-
partment of Motor Vehicles (June 26, 2006) (requiring Married Name–Maiden Name; this only 
applies to females since males would need a court order to hyphenate); Virginia, email from 
Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (June 7, 2006) (requiring Birthname–Other Name).  
 206 Some uncertainty surrounds the question of which position in the hyphenated name, if 
any, is the dominant position. Anecdotally, opinions on this vary, with some saying that the first 
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couldn’t create the same hyphenated name.207 For instance, a clerk at 
the Michigan Department of State (which handles driver’s license in-
quiries) reported that hyphenated names are ordered as Birthname–
Spouse Name.208 For some spouses, then, this would mean a court order 
would be necessary to obtain their chosen name.209 
Though some additional costs present themselves, typically her 
becoming Mrs. Hyphenated is unlikely to be much harder than her 
becoming Mrs. His Name. Beyond these two types of name changes, 
the hassles multiply, as the next Parts discuss. 
3. Changing his name: Mr. Hyphenated or Mr. Her Name. 
The gap between formal and informal rulemaking becomes more 
pronounced with any attempt to change his name. As a formal matter 
of law—if a prospective spouse persists across agencies and, ideally, 
hires a lawyer—changing his name seems harder than changing her 
name in only seven states;210 it should be equally difficult to change his 
name as to change hers in thirty-nine states;211 and in four states it is 
unclear if there is a difference in difficulty.212 
Informally, however, the picture looks somewhat different. From 
contacts in eleven states it appeared practically more difficult to change 
                                                                                                                           
part could readily become a middle name, and others arguing that it is easier to drop the latter 
part of a hyphenated name, since the first part alphabetizes and otherwise more readily identifies 
you. See, for example, Karen Heller, Playing the Name Game in Modern America, Chattanooga 
Times Free Press F2 (Dec 14, 2003) (acknowledging the equity of hyphenated names, but also 
discussing the attendant difficulties such as hyphenation over generations and ordering). Note 
that in the Spanish tradition of providing both parents’ names to children, the father’s name 
comes first, whereas in Brazil and Portugal, the order is reversed; in both traditions, however, it is 
the mother’s name that drops out across generations. See Pintens and Will, Names at 54 (cited in 
note 134). Until amendments to the Civil Code in 1999, the order in Spain was mandatory. Johan 
Verlinden, European Court of Justice, Judgment of October 2, 2003 Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia 
Avello v. État Belge, 11 Colum J Eur L 705, 706 (2005). 
 207 If both are hyphenating, then creating commonality of surname is presumably important 
to them. 
 208 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Michigan Department of State (June 29, 2006).  
 209 Telephone conversation with Clerk, New Hampshire Department of Motor Vehicles 
(June 26, 2006); telephone conversation with Clerk, Michigan Department of State (June 29, 
2006).  
 210 Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. 
Note that this conclusion is a matter of interpretation, however, since the forms are sometimes 
ambiguous. See, for example, note 296 and accompanying text (discussing forms that ask for the 
bride’s maiden name “if different”). 
 211 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 212 Florida, Illinois, Vermont, and Virginia. 
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his name than to change hers;213 in thirty it looked practically no less so;214 
and in nine it was unclear.215 More starkly, in a limited number of calls to 
county clerks and DMVs in all states, at least one clerk in each of thirty-
eight states indicated that it would be harder to change his name than 
hers,216 and in ten states at least one clerk suggested contacting an attor-
ney to attempt a change in his name.217 In only five states did no clerks 
contacted suggest that changing his name was harder.218 
Thus a couple fiercely determined to hyphenate their names, could 
probably do so without a court order (for him) in at least thirty-nine 
states. But anyone merely considering that possibility might well en-
counter obstacles in the vast majority of states. Rather than helping 
couples overcome the collective action problem associated with 
changing social meaning to favor egalitarian naming practices, then, 
state and local governments are apparently exacerbating, not reduc-
ing, the costs of change. 
4. Merging or new names. 
Merged or new names would require a court order in nearly all 
jurisdictions. This is the result of a combination of federal and state 
policies. Federal agencies do not automatically accept merged or alto-
gether new names through marriage. A new bride or groom who 
wanted to make either of these choices would therefore have to pro-
duce either (1) a state marriage license that stated their new names on 
it as part of their regular marriage application process, or (2) a court 
order of their new names. Very few states invite parties to list new 
names on their marriage license, and of those that do, even fewer permit 
merging or new names as an option. Specifically, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota permit merged names 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. 
 214 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
 215 Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
 216 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 217 Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Mew Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Texas, and Utah.  
 218 Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. One commentator believes 
that men would have difficulty changing their names in most states. See Michael Rosensaft, Com-
ment, The Right of Men to Change Their Names upon Marriage, 5 U Pa J Const L 186, 192 (2002). 
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through marriage, and only the first three of those permit wholly new 
names through marriage.219 Even if a state does recognize name change 
through marriage, not every federal and private entity will necessarily 
recognize the new or merged name without a court order.220 
Particularly as to wholly new names, the resistance to facilitating 
such name changes may be unsurprising. States may worry about mak-
ing the invention of an entirely new name too easy, because of con-
cerns about fraud, identity theft, and criminals avoiding detection.221 
Merged names at least bear traces of the previous names, but new 
names create a completely new nominal identity. 
Thus, couples who wanted to adopt merged or new names would 
typically need to obtain a court-ordered name change, in addition to 
all the steps Mrs. His Name or the hyphenators have to go through. 
C. Desk-Clerk Law: The Most Informal Form of Rulemaking 
Q: My fiancé and I are wondering if, after we’re married, he 
can take my name, or if he can use a hyphenated name?  
A: Hon, we had one other person come in here and take the 
woman’s name, and it was the biggest mess you’ve ever seen. 
It turns out he was in trouble in other states, and that’s why he 
wanted to take her name. 
Q: So do you think it would be a big hassle for us?  
A: I truly do. I do not think you want to do that. 
—Conversation with Clerk in Henderson County, 
North Carolina222 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See Iowa Department of Public Health, Bureau of Vital Records, Application to Marry 
in Iowa, online at http://www.dubuquecounty.org/offices/recorder/Marriage_Application.doc 
(visited July 8, 2007); Massachusetts Department of Public Health Registry of Vital Records and 
Statistics, Notice of Intention to Marry, Form R-202m (“Massachusetts Notice of Intention to 
Marry”); Cass County, Minnesota, Application for Marriage License, online at 
http://www.co.cass.mn.us/auditor/pdfs/marriage_lic_app.pdf (visited July 8, 2007); New York 
Department of Health, Affidavit, License and Certificate of Marriage; North Dakota, Applica-
tion for Marriage License. 
 220 Social Security Administration clerks gave inconsistent and unclear answers as to 
whether a merged name would always require a court order, but it seems likely that if it were 
printed on the marriage license, the SSA would approve it. See telephone conversations with 
SSA clerks (June 7, 13, 20, and 30, 2006). The Passport Agency used to have particularly strict 
policies on name change, but seems to be relenting; a representative there thought that a merged 
name on a marriage license might be sufficient for the Agency to recognize the new name, but 
recommended getting a court order just to be safe. See telephone conversations with Passport 
Agency clerks (June 7 and 13, 2006). 
 221 See note 243 (noting the range of state interests in naming). 
 222 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Henderson County, North Carolina Register of 
Deeds (June 28, 2006). 
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One of the most striking results of this inquiry into marital names 
was the degree to which federal, state, and local government clerks 
gave inaccurate, incomplete, contradictory, or normative responses to 
specific questions about legal options. These officials, without any spe-
cifically delegated discretion, effectively make the rules for many in-
dividuals through desk-clerk law.223 
Clerks in nine states gave information that directly conflicted 
with a state statute,224 and clerks in twenty-six states gave information 
that conflicted with a stated DMV policy.225 Numerous clerks referred 
the questioner to a lawyer (in eleven states) or to another agency with-
out facilitating the communication (seven states).226 (Note that advising 
callers to contact a lawyer, while ostensibly neutral advice, is effectively 
telling them that making that choice will be very costly.) In twenty-
eight states clerks from different agencies gave conflicting information 
(typically, a county clerk contradicted a clerk from the DMV).227 Even 
                                                                                                                           
 223 Their lack of any official grant of discretion contrasts desk clerks with what Michael 
Lipsky has called “street-level bureaucrats,” which are the cadre of police officers, welfare work-
ers, and teachers who administer with “considerable discretion” the public services of the state to 
those who need them. See Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy 13 (Russell Sage 1980). 
Lipsky contrasts his group with the type of functionaries I am discussing when talking about the 
greater harm street-level bureaucrats can do because of their knowledge and discretion:   
It is one thing to be treated neglectfully and routinely by the telephone company, the motor 
vehicle bureau, or other government agencies whose agents know nothing of the personal 
circumstances surrounding a claim or request. It is quite another thing to be shuffled, cate-
gorized, and treated “bureaucratically,” (in the pejorative sense), by someone to whom one 
is directly talking and from whom one expects at least an open and sympathetic hearing. 
Id at 9. This may be true, but Lipsky may also underestimate the kind of personal knowledge and 
policymaking power in the hands even of those with no official discretion—largely because no 
one typically prevents them from administering the law in their own image. And in contexts such 
as marital names, desk clerks often do have personal information—if only incidentally—about 
the citizens with whom they interact. In this sense, what Lipsky says about street-level bureau-
crats may be true in a more disconcerting way of desk clerks because their influence is deemed 
nonexistent or innocuous rather than a matter of discretion to be monitored and subjected to 
public scrutiny:  
I argue that the decisions of street-level bureaucrats . . . effectively become the public poli-
cies they carry out. I argue that public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures 
or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually 
made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers. 
Id at xii. 
 224 Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and 
West Virginia. 
 225 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. 
 226 Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Texas, and Utah; California, Georgia, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas, and Utah. 
 227 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, 
Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
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in New York, which requires the marriage license application form to 
state the marital naming options, some clerks at the county level and 
even the DMV gave misinformation.228 
Clerks often provided their own views spontaneously. Some sup-
ported unconventional choices, and some discouraged them. Specifi-
cally, clerks in thirty-nine states suggested some opinion on the issue 
of marital name change;229 at least one clerk in each of twenty-four 
states endorsed a conventional view of marital names,230 and at least 
one in twenty-nine states endorsed an unconventional view of marital 
names.231 But keep in mind that these responses were in the context of 
questions posed to the officials about the legal possibilities for making 
unconventional choices. It seems unlikely that clerks spout off uncon-
ventional views to people who call up to inquire about the process for 
conventional name changes. 
Clerks at the Social Security Administration also provided both 
inconsistent and normatively inflected responses to queries about un-
conventional name changes.232 When asked whether a husband can 
adopt his wife’s name, three out of ten clerks contacted in 2007 said 
that a marriage license with their premarital names would suffice; four 
said a court order would be required; and three said to contact the 
local SSA office.233 Some offered their opinions in response to queries 
about this unconventional choice, such as “[i]n a typical marriage, the 
wife takes the husband’s name.”234 One clerk candidly captured the 
essence of desk-clerk law: “You have a 50-50 chance when you go to 
the SSA to have your name changed. Although states have different 
                                                                                                                           
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 228 NY Dom Rel Law § 15(b). See Part VI. See also notes 343–44 and accompanying text 
(discussing the erroneous information in more detail). 
 229 Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 230 Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. 
 231 Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 232 See telephone conversations with SSA clerks (Feb 16 and 22, 2007) (Jordan Connors). 
Connors’s queries were similar to LaPorte’s, see note 175.  
 233 Id. 
 234 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Social Security Administration (June 22, 2006) 
(Jordan Connors).  
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laws on this, most of the agents don’t know the law and are not ex-
pected to know the law, so it just depends on them.”235   
Some past work on the naming issue has noted the problem of 
normative interventions by clerks. A qualitative study of women’s un-
conventional marital naming choices offers the following anecdote: 
While filling out all the forms [to have my name changed back to 
my maiden name while still married], an older male bureaucrat 
told me I had to get my husband’s signature on the form before 
he would file it. There was not space on the form for this, but he 
insisted, and wouldn’t give me a reason. Fuming, I went back 
home, got Peter’s signature, took more time off from work, and 
brought the forms back to the office. I brought all the papers to 
another office worker—a woman this time—and asked her why I 
had to get my husband’s signature. She said, “[o]h, you don’t need 
it—some of the men around here like to give you a hard time.”236 
The plaintiff in the recently filed ACLU lawsuit challenging a man’s 
relative difficulty changing his name to his wife’s also encountered 
desk-clerk difficulties. At the Department of Motor Vehicles, “Buday 
said he was told by a woman behind the counter: ‘Men just don’t do 
that type of thing.’”237 
Intentionally or not, clerks surely influence decisions in a wide 
range of government interactions with citizens. Of course officials ex-
ercise discretion, more or less warranted, all the time, from police offi-
cers walking the beat to local judges deciding whether to grant minors 
permission to obtain abortions without parental consent.238 But unlike 
judges or police officers, desk clerks have been granted no discretion-
                                                                                                                           
 235 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Social Security Administration (June 22, 2006) 
(Jordan Connors). The agent began this remark by saying, “I spoke with my technical advisor 
and she said that she would allow the man to change his name using only a marriage certificate, 
but it depends on the agent.” Id. 
 236 Kupper, Surnames for Women at 121 (cited in note 54). Kupper reports that this is not a 
direct quote, but is the “gist” of the anecdote. Id. 
 237 See Risling, California Man Sues to Take Wife’s Name (cited in note 64). See also Buday 
Complaint at 4–5 (cited in note 145): 
Michael went to the Santa Monica Department of Motor Vehicles where he presented his 
marriage license and asked to change his name. The representatives laughed and ridiculed 
him for wanting to take his wife’s name. They were rude, disrespectful and unprofessional. 
Michael asked to speak to the manager of the Santa Monica Department of Motor Vehicles 
who also ridiculed him and acted discourteously and unprofessionally. 
 238 See Helena Silverstein and Leanne Speitel, “Honey, I Have No Idea”: Court Readiness 
to Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 Iowa L Rev 75, 77 (2002). 
Silverstein demonstrates that not only are some clerks uninformed but some judges exceed their 
allotted discretion and simply defy the law in the realm of judicial waivers for minors seeking 
abortions. See id. See also note 223 (discussing work by Michael Lipsky on the exercise of discre-
tion by police officers, teachers, and welfare workers). 
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ary authority. Nonetheless, they become the face of the government, 
the source of information as well as the immediate authority encoun-
tered by most citizens, and thus can exert tremendous influence. 
V.  NEW USES OF EXISTING DEFAULT CATEGORIES: 
SETTING THE DEFAULT 
You can also hyphenate your names. But that is sort of 
frowned upon in our office, because it creates problems. Be-
cause now you have two last names, and what order do you 
want them in, how should they be entered in the computer? 
But it’s entirely up to you. 
—Clerk in Boxford County, Massachusetts239 
Imagine a state legislature that wanted to leave marital names to 
individual decisions, but also sought to use the legal default rule to 
encourage egalitarian choices. Legislators might have various reasons 
for wanting to set the default in this way. They might be concerned 
about their state’s history of forcing women to become Mrs. His Name 
in order to vote or to drive. They might think that the state has helped 
create current preferences for patrilineal descent of names through a 
history of mandatory rules, and thus that their default should at least 
put a thumb on the scale toward more egalitarian choices. They might 
worry that the social costs imposed on more egalitarian choices ensure 
that individuals aren’t choosing as freely as they might. They might 
fear that unless legislators take affirmative steps to the contrary, desk 
clerks will urge inegalitarian choices. They might think that egalitarian 
names could encourage more equal treatment of girls and boys. They 
might simply think that, since the state has to set the default somehow, 
an egalitarian default is best. 
So how could a state use default rules to shape marital naming 
choices? Majoritarian default rules (for example, Keeping for men) 
generally reduce transaction costs for private parties by supplying a 
default that tracks what most people would want. Minoritarian, and 
particularly penalty, default rules (for example, Keeping for women) 
force parties to convey information—to reveal their preferences—to 
each other and to third parties such as courts.240 But what kinds of de-
fault rules are most likely to alter preferences or, at least, choices? 
                                                                                                                           
 239 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Boxford, Massachusetts, Town Clerk’s Office (June 
22, 2006). 
 240 Ayres and Gertner’s second article on default rules clarifies that there are many poten-
tial functions of minoritarian defaults, with information forcing as only one such function. Ayres 
and Gertner, 51 Stan L Rev at 1596 (cited in note 182). 
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In light of “sticky norms” in the realm of marital names,241 it 
would be surprising if changing the choice regime caused tectonic 
shifts in social practices, but as discussed earlier, it would also be sur-
prising if the structure of the choice regime mattered not at all.242 And 
given that the state must set some default rule, it is worth considering 
what default rule stands the best chance of helping to overcome the 
collective action problem in changing social meanings that encourage 
patrilineal descent of names. 
Note that our hypothetical state legislature may have any number 
of interests in legal names, beyond their egalitarian quality. State in-
terests in legal names include administering an effective tax system; 
reducing costs; avoiding and detecting fraud against the state and 
among citizens; identifying and apprehending those in violation of the 
law; and policing borders.243 One might also understand the state to 
have an interest in protecting citizen self-expression through control 
of one’s own name. The aim in this Article is not to provide a compre-
hensive account of how states should define and balance these inter-
ests, but to identify ways that states might help to encourage—rather 
than discourage—egalitarian naming choices.244 That said, biphenation 
seems to fit better with these state interests than naming regimes that 
involve one or both parties changing their names entirely, to the ex-
tent that biphenators retain at least part of their last names through-
out their lives and share names with multiple kin networks past, pre-
sent, and future.     
                                                                                                                           
 241 See Part IV. For the term “sticky norms,” see generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. 
Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U Chi L Rev 607 (2000) (discussing “sticky 
norms” in the context of law enforcement). 
 242 See Part IV.A. See also note 277; Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl L J 389, 413–14 (1993) (expressing skepticism that 
defaults could alter preferences). 
 243 Many of these functions may be served, and are increasingly served, with social security 
numbers. See, for example, Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 709–12 (1986) (discussing how social secu-
rity numbers help promote the state interests in avoiding fraud and promoting efficiency in 
administering welfare benefits). Technological advances in tracking people—such as retinal 
scanning—may also render names redundant for these state purposes. From this perspective, one 
might think that the state might as well get out of the business of legal names. In addition to 
whatever self-expression interest the state may respect through legal names, though, names may 
serve state interests in avoiding fraud and assisting detection even alongside such technological 
advances. For instance, recording the names by which people are known in formal and informal 
transactions (and through those names knowing to whom they are related) may nonetheless help 
to track those individuals who find comparably sophisticated ways to elide such systems (not to 
mention being useful in the meantime). Among other things, recording names can help the state 
to publicize investigations and warnings and to seek information from others who would know 
suspects only by name.  
 244 A more thoroughgoing account would discuss, for instance, the ways that shared family 
names might assist nepotism in hiring and other forms of advantage, a point for which I thank 
Mary Anne Case.  
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The next two Parts of the Article identify a range of possible ways 
that a state might structure its choice regime to try to encourage egali-
tarian (and typically socially costly) preferences. This Part develops 
new uses for existing categories: switching the default to a normative, 
facilitative, queer, or radical default; altering the altering rules; forcing 
choices; and carefully designing menus of options. The next Part intro-
duces a new category—framing rules—to the default-rule literature. 
These two Parts together identify in some detail a wide range of op-
tions under each of these categories, using the topic of marital names 
as a site for exploring some ways that existing and new categories of 
default-rule theory might be used to try to shape choices in a realm 
with a strong background social convention. The final Part of the Arti-
cle, Part VII, then narrows the focus to two simple proposals—one 
modest and one more ambitious—for how a subset of these ideas 
might be implemented, were there the political will to do so. This dis-
cussion is highly speculative, extrapolating from studies in very differ-
ent contexts, but the hope is to identify avenues for future research as 
well as, in the meantime, to formulate some promising proposals based 
on the current literature. 
A. Switching the Default: Normative, Facilitative, Queer, and  
Radical Defaults 
A state could build upon the classic contract-law idea of default 
rules to try to shape choices. This Part first discusses the general cate-
gory of normative defaults, then introduces three new types of default 
rules: facilitative, queer, and radical defaults. 
1. Normative defaults. 
The state could switch the default to a preferred, or normative, 
default.245 Based on the discussion in Part III, a preferred default might 
be hyphenation or (for those already hyphenated) biphenation. As 
discussed, defaults are often sticky, so a state might hope that this one 
would be too. Given, though, the extent to which Keeping doesn’t ap-
pear to be sticking for women, it is possible that the new default alone 
would not be enough. Subsequent Parts discuss some other ways to 
approach the issue—such as menus, altering rules, and framing rules—
                                                                                                                           
 245 See Schwartz, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl L J at 391 (cited in note 242) (defining normative 
default as “direct[ing] a result that the decision maker prefers on fairness grounds but is unwill-
ing to require”). These might also be considered transformative defaults, to the extent that they 
may aim to transform preferences in the preferred direction, even when parties don’t choose to 
accept the default. Id. See also David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of 
Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich L Rev 1815, 1867–68 (1991). 
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
830 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:761 
but first let’s consider some more creative angles on the basic tactic of 
switching the default. 
The simplest change would be to supply parties with the pre-
ferred default. This could have some of the default effects discussed 
earlier, most notably, the effect of making people think that others are 
making this choice and an authoritative source supports it.246 Unlike 
the Keeping default, a new default of hyphenation would seem an en-
dorsement of the approach.  
Switching the default to hyphenation or biphenation could in-
volve the state eliciting from the parties their preferred hyphenated 
name (that is, what order for the names) or biphenated name (that is, 
which name from the spouse named A-B, which name from the spouse 
named C-D, and what order). The form could have two blanks for the 
postmarital name, separated by a hyphen, and ask the parties to fill in 
their postmarital name in the blank. The form could require them to 
check a box, or take whatever alternative steps, to choose a different 
approach to their name. In a sense, this is a default, because it assumes 
the parties will have a hyphenated name, unless they say otherwise. A 
purer default, however, would involve the state actually supplying the 
default name. To supply a default of hyphenation or biphenation, 
though, the state has to make various choices for the parties, which 
brings us to the next type of default. 
2. Facilitative defaults. 
The state could set the legal default in a way that helps to solve 
practical problems involved in adopting certain alternative naming 
practices. We might call this a facilitative default, because it aims to 
enable certain choices by helping the decisionmakers overcome ob-
stacles to making those choices.247 
Facilitative defaults might usefully facilitate hyphenation or bi-
phenation for those who would consider this option if it were less 
complicated or burdensome. As discussed, hyphenation and biphena-
tion involve choices about the order and selection of the names. So 
when Rachel Smith marries Sam Miller, if they hyphenate, they have 
to decide whose name comes first. There is no obvious principle for 
choosing, and, according to some, there is no obvious power position 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See Part IV.A. Of course, this is a highly theoretical discussion, as this legal default 
would be created only if there were more popular or legislative support for it than presumably 
exists at present. 
 247 Another apt term for what I’m calling facilitative defaults would be problem-solving 
defaults, but that term has already been used to characterize defaults that aim to supply the terms 
the parties would have wanted. See Schwartz, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl L J at 390–92 (cited in note 242). 
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of the hyphenated names.248 For biphenation, there are three decisions: 
which name of spouse Smith-Miller, which name of spouse Lee-
Brown, and the sequence. 
The state could ease people’s decision costs in hyphenation by 
supplying them with a randomly generated version of their name—by 
effectively flipping a coin once (for hyphenation) or three times (for 
biphenation) for them. Or the state could supply a default based on 
another principle, such as mellifluousness—based on the judgments of, 
say, trained linguists. 
The clerk’s office would provide this facilitative default, which 
the parties could, as with all defaults, either accept or reject. The 
state’s generated version of the new name might reduce the complex-
ity or hurt feelings (of parents) that could arise if the couple chooses 
the biphenated name themselves.  
The state’s supplying prospective spouses with this facilitative de-
fault could make the process of choosing that option easier. Such an 
approach would contrast sharply with the reaction of at least some 
present-day clerks, who respond to questions about hyphenation by 
highlighting the onerous set of choices it presents to the couple. For 
instance, as noted in the epigraph to this Part, a clerk in Massachusetts 
stated, “You can also hyphenate your names. But that is sort of 
frowned upon in our office, because it creates problems. Because now 
you have two last names, and what order do you want them in, how 
should they be entered in the computer? But it’s entirely up to you.”249 
This example of desk-clerk law looks particularly imposing in light of 
research indicating that decisionmakers, when presented with too 
many choices, often revert to simpler decisionmaking strategies;250 in 
the realm of marital names, the simplest choice may well be the con-
ventional one, that is, the social default. A clerk who, rather than com-
plaining about the burdens hyphenation imposes on the parties and 
her office, readily supplied parties with a suggested hyphenation could 
diminish, rather than compound, the costs of making this choice. 
In addition, the state-generated defaults might help facilitate the 
egalitarian development of this tradition. One might imagine if the 
                                                                                                                           
 248 See note 206. On name order and other issues in biphenation, see Part IV.B. 
 249 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Boxford, Massachusetts, Town Clerk’s Office (June 
22, 2006). 
 250 See, for example, Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 178); Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U Chi L Rev 1203, 
1226–27 (2003) (arguing that as choices increase, so to does cognitive effort, and thus decision-
makers “adopt simpler choice strategies to cope with that complexity”); Sheena S. Iyengar and 
Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 
J Personality & Soc Psych 995, 996 (2000) (finding the same in a study where subjects were asked 
to choose from a selection of jams). 
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order of the names in hyphenation was always gendered (for example, 
man’s name first), the convention itself might turn into a gendered 
tradition (for example, the mother’s name being dropped at the bi-
phenation point). If the order were randomly generated by the state 
and supplied as a default, though, a gendered convention would be 
less likely to develop. 
3. Queer defaults. 
Alternatively, the parties could be provided with a default that no 
one wants. Penalty default rules are minoritarian rules that aim to be 
information forcing by requiring a majority of parties to express their 
preferences to contract around the unwanted default.251 What I call 
queer defaults take this to an extreme by supplying a default that not 
even a minority wants. 
For instance, the spouses’ last names could be switched: Rachel 
Smith and Sam Miller could become Rachel Miller and Sam Smith. 
This is egalitarian and involves a name change for him as well, but it is 
a bit silly, such that it is hard to see anyone wanting that solution. Or 
the bride and groom could be randomly assigned a default name from 
the phone book. Or queerer still, the couple could be presented with a 
default postmarital name with a completely unappealing sound. Ap-
pealingness might seem subjective, but as mentioned earlier, we know 
from linguistics that certain languages have sounds that go together, 
and sounds that do not.252 For example, in English we never have the 
letters “bn” in sequence at the beginning of a word. What if Rachel 
and Sam were given a form assigning them both a postmarital name—
unless they say otherwise—of “Bnaxt”? 
This could have several possible effects. In theory the Bnaxts 
could accept the new name—though this would be most surprising. 
Names are such a personal matter—as well as a matter of quotidian 
significance—that it seems unlikely that most anyone would accept a 
decidedly unappealing name to which they have no prior connection. 
More likely, the prospective Bnaxts would go ahead and choose a dif-
ferent name or names. Perhaps imagining themselves for a moment 
with a meaningless and unappealing (and unpronounceable) name 
could jar them to think more creatively and deliberate more fully on 
alternatives to her taking his name. In this view, a queer default might 
be understood to be information forcing, or even deliberation forcing, 
                                                                                                                           
 251 See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 91 (cited in note 174). 
 252 See note 152 and accompanying text. 
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with a vengeance. Deliberation has costs of course, which must be 
taken into account.253 
4. Radical defaults. 
Rather than randomly assigning a default name, the state could 
pick a more normatively driven default. A radical default is radical in a 
preferred direction, overshooting the mark of the preferred default to 
propose something more extreme. Unlike a queer default, which we 
assume no one would want, a few people might want to stick with the 
radical default; but unlike a normative default, the aim is not to make 
the default stick. Radical defaults might be thought of as a type of 
transformative default, in that transformative defaults aim to alter 
preferences, even among those who do not adopt the default.254 
For instance, the default naming option for the spouses could be 
that only his name changes—to hers. So our couple would become 
Rachel and Sam Smith. As discussed in Part III, this alternative con-
vention shares with the current convention of Mrs. His Name the vir-
tues of simplicity and family unity for each new family, and in the 
short term, this reversal may usefully highlight the asymmetry of cur-
rent conventions. As this option prefers one sex over the other (now 
women over men), though, a more egalitarian convention over the 
long term would incorporate both family names. 
Most couples probably would not accept this new default. But 
forcing him to think about what it means to have his name change to 
hers, and hers remain the same, and setting this undesirable solution as 
the default, might shift the terms of their discussion—and the larger 
social discussion—of desirable naming options at marriage. After be-
ing presented with the possibility of becoming Mr. and Mrs. Her 
Name, the couple might view hyphenation or a merged name as less 
radical or disruptive. 
Research on context dependence in decisionmaking supports this 
supposition.255 In short, our appraisal of an option may shift because of 
                                                                                                                           
 253 For another concern about queer as well as radical defaults, see note 280 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Lessig’s “Orwell effect”). Ultimately, I do not think queer defaults would be the 
best proposal for change in this area. The most promising solutions in my view are in Part VII. 
 254 I think that transformative defaults are generally imagined to be normatively desirable 
defaults in their own right as well, so radical defaults might best be thought of as a distinct varia-
tion on the same theme rather than a subset. See Charny, 89 Mich L Rev at 1867–68 (cited in 
note 245); Schwartz, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl L J at 391 (cited in note 242). 
 255 See, for example, Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Amos Tversky, Context-
Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J Legal Stud 287, 289 (1996) (conducting experiments 
to test for “compromise and contrast in legal judgments” and “legalized products”). See also 
Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects, 16 
J Consumer Res 158, 159 (1989) (discussing how consumers preferences move towards the mid-
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the alternatives that accompany it. Specifically, we are likely to rate an 
option more favorably in two situations: when we consider it in rela-
tion to a more extreme alternative (that is, compromise), and when we 
consider it in relation to a less appealing alternative (that is, con-
trast).256 Mr. Her Name seems more extreme than hyphenation, both in 
terms of prevalence of current practices, and in terms of its political 
distance from the existing convention. Thus, radical defaults might 
help to steer choices towards alternatives such as hyphenation. Much 
more could be said on this subject, and even if radical defaults may 
not be the best solution to the problem of names, they may be useful 
in other areas. 
B. Altering Rules: Making Some Options Easier than Others 
A state could also redesign its altering rules for marital names to 
encourage certain choices. Altering rules “tell private parties the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for contracting around a default.”257 
They define the steps parties have to take to opt into each alternative 
to the default. 
Current altering rules—both formal and informal—create a hier-
archy among different marital naming options. As discussed in Part IV, 
Keeping is the default, so that is legally the easiest option for both 
men and women. After that, though, in most jurisdictions, her becom-
ing Mrs. His Name is the next easiest—that is, it is easier for her to 
“contract into” that option than any other. She just has to send her 
marriage license with their premarital names stated on it to the vari-
ous public and private entities relevant to her name change, and all 
will accept it without question. For every other option (in the vast ma-
jority of states), the ease or difficulty depends on whether each rele-
vant public and private entity, such as the DMV or a bank, wants to 
recognize the proposed change—such as Mr. Her Name or hyphena-
tion—as a reasonable name change at marriage. Some entities for-
mally require different evidence for other name change options, such 
as hyphenation or merged names, and even where official rules permit 
the option, desk-clerk law often imposes additional costs.258 
                                                                                                                           
dle of a given set); Seymour Sudman, Norman M. Bradburn, and Norbert Schwarz, Thinking 
about Answers ch 6 at 130 (Jossey-Bass 1996) (noting that the “order in which alternatives are 
presented has also been shown to influence decisions with potentially important consequences”); 
Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness 
Aversion, 29 J Marketing Res 281, 281 (1992) (studying how “preferences are influenced by the 
set of alternatives under consideration” in market research). 
 256 See Kelman, Rottenstreich, and Tversky, 25 J Legal Stud at 288 (cited in note 255). 
 257 Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 6 (cited in note 178). 
 258 See Part IV. 
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At the very least, states should make the altering rules for egali-
tarian naming options such as biphenation no more burdensome than 
they are for conventional marital name-change options. This interven-
tion is discussed further in relation to forced choosing below and in 
Part VII. More creatively, altering rules could instead be used to make 
egalitarian, but unconventional, marital naming choices easier than 
sex-based, conventional choices. Consider a few examples. 
A state could make unconventional choices even easier than con-
ventional choices are now by notifying other public entities of name 
changes on behalf of the changer—for the types of name changes the 
state wanted to encourage. So, for instance, a state could offer to no-
tify the DMV, the SSA, and the Passport Agency of any choices by 
couples to hyphenate both their names. To save (or make) money, the 
state, or a private entity, could even charge a small fee to perform this 
service, which would probably be more appealing to many people than 
the hassle; of course those who preferred the hassle could still do it 
themselves.259 
A hierarchy could be created by not providing this service to 
those making the most conventional choices. Or, more aggressively, 
additional steps could be added to the name-change process for con-
ventional options. Couples making a conventional naming choice could 
be asked to appear before a judge to explain their choice or, more sim-
ply, write (or record orally) an explanation of their choice. No evalua-
tion of the merits of their claims need be introduced; this is not a sub-
stantive obstacle, but a procedural one. The aim would be to force cou-
ples to deliberate and to explain the choices that are conventional, and 
that are thus generally subject to less social pressure for explanation. 
Legal rules that distinguish conventional from unconventional 
naming options might run afoul of state or federal constitutional re-
quirements, given that the most conventional option involves different 
behavior by men and women. In particular, making the altering rules 
different for men and women arguably raises constitutional problems. 
So we would need a facially neutral law creating the different altering 
rules. One option would be to distinguish those naming choices in which 
both spouses change from those in which only one spouse changes. 
                                                                                                                           
 259 Note that this streamlining might not be as difficult for the government as it sounds, 
though. At present the SSA apparently makes its database available to the IRS for updating of 
naming records, which the IRS reports doing every four weeks. See note 191. Some DMV clerks 
also reported that their database is regularly synchronized with the SSA’s in an effort to comply 
with the Real ID Act. Other entities could perhaps access that database as well, though privacy 
concerns might dictate that these be only (certain) public entities. If a private service did this for 
a fee, the service could also potentially contact all of the private entities in a changer’s life, such 
as doctors, clubs, employers, and other types of entities listed in Part IV. 
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
836 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:761 
Where only one spouse changes, it is almost invariably the woman, so 
this would sort the Mrs. His Name couples from most everyone else. 
(This would bring the Mr. Her Name couples into the burdened camp 
as well, along with the single hyphenators (Mrs. Her-His Name), but it 
might be worth it if this is the best available option.) For instance, 
perhaps the state could print new names on the marriage license—
thereby eliminating the need for a court-ordered name change—only 
if both spouses are changing their names. If the state wanted to put its 
imprimatur on double hyphenation more directly, say, it could make 
especially easy altering rules for that option alone.260 There are many 
good reasons for a state not to take steps to create these differential 
costs—not least that women will likely bear the bulk of them under 
current conditions. But, as noted earlier, states should at least make 
egalitarian marital naming options as easy as more conventional, ine-
galitarian options. One way to facilitate this would be through forced 
choosing, our next topic. 
C. Forced Choosing: Leveling the Playing Field (a Bit) 
Another option would be forced choosing: that is, the state could 
force couples to choose their postmarital names as a condition of civil 
marriage.261 This solution respects choice in that it invites parties to 
make their own choices about their names. It also does away with 
some portion of the unequal administrative burdens currently placed 
on the majority of women as opposed to men under the typical Keep-
ing default. And it could address other problems with the dominant 
regime at present, such as its imposing the most costs on those who 
want to make unconventional choices other than Keeping. Forcing 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Altering rules can also direct choices if the rules themselves are made more or less 
explicit. See Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 6 (cited in note 178). That is, an official state website could 
give very clear instructions on what all the alternatives to the default are, and what steps one has 
to take to achieve them. Or it could make the steps clearer for some options than for others, such 
that people have to buy things like the Official New Bride Name Change Kit to figure out how a 
woman changes her name to match a man’s. At present, people have reason to use such kits for 
any name changes, mainly because there are multiple steps requiring multiple entities. But such 
private facilitation would be even more helpful for options other than Mrs. His Name, since 
personnel at the relevant entities know what Mrs. His Name requires, but often give conflicting 
and even incorrect information about whether and how one can make any other name changes. 
See Part IV. In a twist on this, the steps to hyphenation could instead be spelled out plainly by 
the state, and conventional options could be left opaque. This example, with its emphasis on what 
information surrounds the choice, ties into the discussion of framing rules in Part VI. 
 261 “Forced choosing” is also known as “required active choosing,” see Sunstein and Thaler, 
70 U Chi L Rev at 1189, 1173 (cited in note 178); or, relatedly, as “affirmative choice rule[s],” 
which Ian Ayres describes as “a type of penalty default that forces contractors to make an af-
firmative choice in order to create a contract,” see Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholar-
ship, 112 Yale L J 881, 899 n 79 (2003).  
File: 1 Emens Final 8.10 Created on: 8/10/2007 10:00:00 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2007 12:51:00 AM 
2007] Changing Name Changing 837 
choice could make it equally easy to make other minority choices—
such as merging names or hyphenation—as to make the majority 
choice of Mrs. His Name. 
A few states already impose minimal forced choosing by asking 
marrying couples to write their postmarital names on the marriage 
license.262 For instance, New York allows either or both spouses to take 
either spouse’s current or former name, or either or both to take a 
hyphenated or merged name. Because many women (especially in the 
South263), and also some men (anecdotally) change their middle names 
at marriage,264 though, a better forced choosing regime would pre-
sumably improve on New York’s regime by allowing a change of mid-
dle name as well.265 
This forced choosing is minimal, though, because choosers still 
have to go through the relevant steps involved in changing their 
names;266 the process is just facilitated by having a marriage license 
that states their chosen postmarital names. A more robust forced 
choosing regime would further the parties’ new choices, by forwarding 
their names to the additional entities, for instance, as discussed in rela-
tion to altering rules.267 Current forced choosing regimes nonetheless 
eliminate some transaction costs, particularly informal ones from dis-
agreeable or ignorant clerks at subsequent entities, by providing 
spouses making unconventional name changes with documentation of 
their new names. 
Forced choosing imposes its own costs, though. People may not 
want to choose (because of the time or tension involved in doing so), 
and under forced choosing, everyone faces the at-least-trivial cost of 
checking a box or filling in a blank, even if their preferences match the 
majority or preferred practice.268 But all things considered, forced 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota. See note 177. 
 263 See note 88 and accompanying text (reporting on the frequency, particularly in the 
South, with which women who become Mrs. His Name take their birth name as a middle name). 
 264 See note 124 (noting this among possible variations on naming options). 
 265 Note that New York doesn’t allow the adoption of an entirely new name, such as Mr. 
and Mrs. Place-Where-We-Met, through the marriage license process. While there might be 
reasons to want to facilitate this choice, as noted earlier, this choice presumably also presents the 
greatest chance of facilitating fraud, as it allows complete self-reinvention. A state might well 
want people making up wholly new names to go through the formality of the regular court-
ordered name change process, perhaps with a strong presumption in favor of marriage as a rea-
son given for such changes. See Part IV. 
 266 It is also minimal in that such choices are not actually forced in that no penalty likely 
follows the failure to make an active choice in response to the state’s invitation. See, for example, 
note 339.  
 267 See Part V.B. This could involve greater implementation costs, though perhaps not as 
much as expected. See note 259 (discussing the sharing of information between some govern-
ment agencies). 
 268 See Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1189, 1198–99 (cited in note 178). 
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choosing may be a modest way for states to level the playing field be-
tween various unconventional options, as discussed in Part VII.  
D. Menus: Designing Options 
Decisions in a choice regime can also be solicited through lists of 
available options, or menus.269 Various features of menus can affect the 
choices people make. A state hoping to steer choices could vary the 
following features of a menu of marital naming options to try to steer 
choices: the order of the options listed, the number of options listed, 
whether the menu is exhaustive or nonexhaustive, which options are 
listed explicitly rather than merely permitted to be written in on a 
blank (in a nonexhaustive menu), and whether the menu forces choice 
or offers a default option if parties choose not to choose.270 
For instance, if a state wanted to steer choices towards hyphena-
tion, it might list hyphenation first on an explicit menu on the mar-
riage license application form. Research on order effects reveals a 
primacy effect, a preference for the first item on the list.271 For example, 
data on randomized ballots in California elections indicate that people 
are more likely to vote for the first candidate in a list of choices.272 
In addition, which options are included in the list could matter. 
For example, a menu that expressly listed only unconventional naming 
options—then included a write-in blank, on which people seeking a 
conventional name had to write their choice (that is, Mr. and Mrs. His 
Name)—might plausibly make hyphenation seem more appealing, as 
                                                                                                                           
 269 See Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 3 (cited in note 178) (defining a menu as “a contractual 
offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than one type of contract”). 
 270 See id at 9–10; Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? at 37 (cited 
in note 178). 
 271 See Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz, Order Effects within a Question at 130 (cited in 
note 255) (using the example of a political candidate receiving more votes if his or her name is 
placed earlier on the ballot sheet). Alternatively, though, the order of items can lead to a recency 
effect, to favoring items heard most recently; this may be more likely when items are aurally, 
rather than visually, perceived. See id at 143. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, 
when visually presented, implausible items presented early on (in an opinion survey) may not 
lead to this effect, because they are not subject to a confirmatory process, which would accom-
pany plausible items. Id at 142–43. 
 272 Daniel E. Ho and Kosuke Imai, The Impact of Partisan Electoral Regulation: Ballot 
Effects from the California Alphabet Lottery, 1978–2002 1 (Princeton L and Pub Affairs Paper No 
04-001; Harvard Pub L Working Paper No 89, Oct 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=496863 (visited July 8, 2007). See also generally Jon A. Krosnik, Joanne M. Miller, and 
Michael P. Tichy, An Unrecognized Need for Ballot Reform: The Effects of Candidate Name Or-
der on Election Outcomes, in A.N. Crigler, M.R. Just, and E.J. McCaffery, eds, Rethinking the Vote: 
The Politics and Prospects of American Election Reform 51 (Oxford 2004). Interestingly, this 
effect holds for primaries but not for general elections. See id. Moreover, the first item might not 
be most favored in all contexts. See Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 14–15 (cited in note 178) (speculat-
ing on other ordering preferences in different contexts).  
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it might seem a relatively moderate choice.273 This is an extreme exam-
ple but it might also be that a menu that simply listed a wide range of 
alternatives, possibly ordered from least conventional to most conven-
tional, could make some unconventional options look like compromises.  
Too many options on the menu could lead people to invoke a 
simple heuristic to guide their decisionmaking.274 As noted earlier, this 
might lead them to revert to the social default: the convention of Mr. 
and Mrs. His Name. But note that menus can involve strictly forced 
choosing—that is, you have to choose an item on the menu—or menus 
can be accompanied by a default—that is, if you don’t choose an item 
on the menu, a default is supplied. If hyphenation were then supplied 
as a default—and that default was facilitative in the sense that it sup-
plied them with a randomly generated version of their hyphenated or 
biphenated names—then decision overload might lead them down 
that route instead. 
To the extent that decisions about menus are decisions about the 
way that the question is asked, the subject of menus leads to our next 
subject: framing rules. 
VI.  FRAMING RULES: REGULATING HOW THE QUESTION IS ASKED 
Thus the law . . . command[s] us to do certain things and for-
bid[s] us to do others; and it does so rightly if it is rightly 
framed, but less well if hastily framed. 
—Aristotle275 
The problem of marital names has a notable feature that invites 
us to recognize a new category relevant to choice regimes. Marital 
names are a context in which social conventions, rather than legal 
rules, seem largely to drive behavior. The fact that women contract 
around the legal default of Keeping to such a large extent—in other 
words, the fact that Keeping is not sticky for women—exemplifies the 
force of norms rather than law here. 
One might ask whether, in light of the role of social conventions 
here, law is simply irrelevant. But, as discussed earlier, the current regime 
reinscribes the most unquestioned feature of our marital names regime—
men keeping their names—and it makes some unconventional choices 
(such as double hyphenation or merging) harder than others (both keep-
ing). The law is therefore pushing in a conventional direction. 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See note 256 and accompanying text (discussing compromise and contrast effects). 
 274 See note 250 and accompanying text.  
 275 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book E, 1129b, 79–80 (D. Reidel 1975) (H.G. Apostle, 
trans). 
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Could law instead push in a more egalitarian direction? The pre-
vious Part identified various ways that the basic categories of a de-
fault-rule regime—default rules themselves, altering rules, forced 
choice, menus—could be used to try to alter choices in this domain. 
These are creative proposals under existing rubrics. But the conven-
tion-dominated realm of marital names, and others like it, also suggest 
a need for a new category of interventions. 
In any regime, but particularly in a regime heavily dominated by 
social conventions, an important tool of a default-rule regime is what I 
call framing rules. Framing rules are the rules that govern how the 
question is asked. Default rules tell us what rule the state fills in when 
the parties don’t say otherwise; altering rules tell us what steps the 
parties have to take to contract around the default; menus dictate 
what options are provided to choosers. Framing rules, by contrast, fo-
cus on how the question is asked. They include the words that are used 
to ask the question (interrogatory frames), the context that surrounds 
the question (embedded frames), and the information that accompa-
nies the question (informational frames).276 
How questions are asked—and what questions are asked—affects 
choices and behavior across a range of domains.277 For instance, if a 
patient considering an operation is told that, of 100 people who un-
dergo this operation, “90 live through the postoperative period . . . and 
34 are alive at the end of 5 years,” he is more likely to agree to the 
procedure than if he is told, “10 die during the postoperative period 
. . . and 66 die by the end of 5 years.”278 Nothing is different but for the 
way the information framing his decision is presented. Moreover, 
merely asking a question—for example, asking a registered voter if he 
                                                                                                                           
 276 In their work on asymmetric paternalism, Colin Camerer and his coauthors provide 
useful discussion and examples of the subspecies of framing rules that I call informational 
frames. See Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1230–38 (cited in note 178). 
 277 See Jonathan Levav and Gavan J. Fitzsimons, When Questions Change Behavior: The 
Role of Ease of Representation, 17 Psychological Sci 207, 208 (2006); Johnson, Steffel, and Gold-
stein, 24 Health Psych at S22 (cited in note 178); Gavan J. Fitzsimons and Baba Shiv, Noncon-
scious and Contaminative Effects of Hypothetical Questions on Subsequent Decision Making, 28 J 
Consumer Res 224, 225 (2001); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J Behav Dec 
Making 183, 185–88 (1999); Anthony G. Greenwald, et al, Increasing Voting Behavior by Asking 
People if They Expect To Vote, 72 J Applied Psych 315, 318 (1987); Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453, 456 (1981). 
See also Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J Leg Stud 199, 202 
(2006); Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 4 (cited in note 178); Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 
1160 (cited in note 178); Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev (cited in note 178). 
 278 See Donald A. Redelmeier, Paul Rozin, and Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients’ 
Decisions: Cognitive and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993) (reporting that this 
“framing effect was just as large with physicians as with lay people”). 
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“expects that [he] will vote or not” the next day—leads to a greater 
likelihood of voting among those asked, as compared to controls.279 
Framing rules could thus be important to any default regime. But 
there are reasons to think that framing rules will be particularly im-
portant where social conventions depart from the law and exert a 
strong influence on choices. First, where strong social conventions sur-
round choices, choosers are more likely to be ignorant of the law if it 
departs from those conventions. Information given to choosers may 
therefore be particularly important to correcting misconceptions. 
Second, desk clerks may be more likely to misrepresent the law 
where it departs from strong social conventions. Desk clerks may them-
selves be ignorant of the law, or they may be more inclined to share 
their normative views or to allow their views to shape how they repre-
sent the law. Simply put, desk-clerk law may be more of a problem. 
Finally, in areas where strong social conventions tend to drive be-
havior, laws that depart from those conventions—even default rather 
than mandatory rules—may provoke what Lawrence Lessig has called 
the Orwell effect,280 causing people to dig in their heels against pro-
gressive suggestions. Lessig has noted the way that people tend to ob-
ject to government efforts to shape social meaning when government 
is trying to change existing social meanings. That is, if people feel the 
state is trying to steer their choices away from conventions, they may 
view an intervention as mind control and resist it. (As Lessig notes, 
people rarely feel the state is unfairly steering their choices when the 
state reinforces existing traditions or current conventions. 281) In such 
contexts, default rules that obviously defy convention may have little 
effect because people feel the state is trying to change them. For re-
lated reasons, Dan Kahan has proposed gentle nudges rather than 
hard shoves in legal responses to “sticky norms.”282 Framing rules may 
be experienced as milder interventions, and thus be more effective, 
especially where they merely involve supplying information or asking 
questions in an apparently neutral way. 
                                                                                                                           
 279 Greenwald, et al, 72 J Applied Psych at 316 (cited in note 277). In this study, subjects 
were also then asked to state the most important reason to vote, but subsequent studies have 
replicated this “mere measurement” effect without including the additional question about 
significance or reasons. See, for example, Levav and Fitzsimons, 17 Psychological Sci at 207 (cited 
in note 277). 
 280 See Lessig, 62 U Chi L Rev at 1016–18 (cited in note 1). Lessig’s Orwell effect is akin to 
what psychologists call “reactance.” See, for example, Sharon S. Brehm and Jack W. Brehm, Psy-
chological Reactance 3–4 (Academic 1981) (explaining the “theory of psychological reactance 
[as] hold[ing] that a threat to or loss of freedom motivates the individual to restore that free-
dom”).  
 281 See Lessig, 62 U Chi L Rev at 1018 (cited in note 1).  
 282 See Kahan, 67 U Chi L Rev at 607 (cited in note 241). 
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One state has explicit framing rules for choosing marital names. 
New York requires by statute that marriage license application forms 
supply information about the law of marital names, and about the op-
tions for name change available to spouses.283 By contrast, outside New 
York (and even in New York sometimes284), much of the framing of 
marital-names questions seems inadvertent, merely reflecting prevail-
ing assumptions or current practices. In light of growing knowledge of 
the extent to which the context, wording, or mere presence of a ques-
tion can affect choices and answers, indifference to these matters 
seems, at best, naïve.285 Given the extent to which desk-clerk law tends 
to reinforce, rather than helping to unsettle, prevailing conventions, an 
inattention to framing may be cause for serious concern. 
In an area strongly driven by social conventions, the law may be 
playing, at best, a marginal role. But the impact on the margins may 
nonetheless be significant. The tipping point for changing social mean-
ing is never clear, and so change may indeed result from whatever 
small push the law gives to help individuals overcome the collective 
action problem involved in changing social meaning. 
For the reasons discussed earlier, notably the state’s history of 
preventing choice and mandating an inegalitarian naming scheme, 
here I introduce the idea of framing rules through examples that aim 
to promote active choices and egalitarian values in the realm of marital 
names. As in the previous Part, the values I endorse here are of course 
controversial. The key point, though, is that framing rules are an impor-
                                                                                                                           
 283 NY Dom Rel Law § 15. The statute reads, in relevant portion: 
Every application for a marriage license shall contain a statement to the following effect: 
NOTICE TO APPLICANTS  
. . .  
(2) A person’s last name (surname) does not automatically change upon marriage, and nei-
ther party to the marriage must change his or her last name. Parties to a marriage need not 
have the same last name. 
(3) One or both parties to a marriage may elect to change the surname by which he or she 
wishes to be known after the solemnization of the marriage by entering the new name in 
the space below. Such entry shall consist of one of the following surnames: 
(i) the surname of the other spouse; or 
(ii) any former surname of either spouse; or 
(iii) a name combining into a single surname all or a segment of the premarriage sur-
name or any former surname of each spouse; or 
(iv) a combination name separated by a hyphen, provided that each part of such com-
bination surname is the pre-marriage surname, or any former surname, of each of the 
spouses. 
 284 See notes 343–44 and accompanying text (discussing instances of erroneous desk-clerk 
law despite New York’s framing rules). 
 285 See note 277 (citing the behavioral effects of simple queries). 
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tant way to shape choices, and we should think seriously about how we 
are already shaping choices through our existing frames and how we 
want to do so in the future. 
A. Interrogatory Frames: How the Question Is Worded  
The most basic framing issue concerns how the state actually asks 
the question that invites the relevant decision. On its face, the ques-
tion “will the bride be changing her name?” is, for example, quite dif-
ferent from “will the spouses be hyphenating their names?” 
We know that the way a question is asked can matter. Studies 
have found that people are more likely to vote or to floss their teeth if 
they have been asked whether they will do those activities, but only if 
they are asked in a way that makes imagining themselves doing the 
relevant activity easy rather than difficult.286 For example, if people are 
asked whether they will floss their teeth seven times in the coming 
week, they are more likely to floss their teeth in that period; but if 
they are asked whether they will floss their teeth eight times in the 
coming week, they are no more likely to do so.287 The difference lies in 
whether the manner of asking the question makes it easy for people to 
visualize themselves engaging in the activity.288 Note that these results 
depend on whether the activity is a desirable one; the effect reverses 
when it is undesirable.289 
With this in mind, then, a state should think carefully about how 
exactly it asks the question, formally and informally, about marital 
naming choices. Most marriage license application forms now pose the 
question of marital names—where they do so at all—in a gender-
neutral fashion, asking, for instance, for both spouses’ “Surname after 
marriage”290 or “Legal Name After Marriage.”291 At least informally, 
then, these states seem to have gender-neutral framing rules for the 
marital names question. But in practice many desk clerks apparently 
                                                                                                                           
 286 See Levav and Fitzsimons, 17 Psychological Sci at 208–10 (cited in note 277); Greenwald, 
et al, 72 J Applied Psych at 315 (cited in note 277).  
 287 See Levav and Fitzsimons, 17 Psychological Sci at 208 (cited in note 277). 
 288 See id. 
 289 See Fitzsimons and Shiv, 28 J Consumer Res at 226–28 (cited in note 277); Vicki G. 
Morwitz, Eric J. Johnson, and David Schmittlein, Does Measuring Intent Change Behavior?, 20 J 
Consumer Res 46, 53–54 (1993). But see Lauren G. Block, Gavan J. Fitsimons, and Patti Williams, 
When Consumers Do Not Recognize “Benign” Intention Questions as Persuasion Attempts, 31 J 
Consumer Res 540, 550 (2004) (demonstrating that the valence question is a complicated one). 
 290 Town of New Castle, New York, Marriage License Application, online at http://www. 
town.new-castle.ny.us/Marriage%20License%20App.pdf (visited July 8, 2007). 
 291 Iowa Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Records, Application to Marry in Iowa, 
online at http://www.dubuquecounty.org/offices/recorder/Marriage_Application.doc (visited July 
8, 2007). 
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frame these questions in anything but a gender-neutral fashion.292 
Moreover, the marriage license application forms still implicitly con-
vey conventional assumptions about marital names in various ways, 
through what we might call embedded frames, our next topic. 
B. Embedded Frames: The Context of the Question  
Marriage license application forms provide a good example of 
embedded frames, by which I mean the subtle suggestions about how 
the world is or should be, conveyed through the layout and context of 
the forms’ question about marital names.293 
For example, twenty-five of forty-two states with state-wide con-
sistent forms ask for the bride’s and groom’s information in noniden-
tical ways.294 The most common differences involve the questions about 
her name.295 Some jurisdictions seem to imply that her name will 
change through the ways that they ask her to record her name. For 
instance, a number of states’ forms request something like “Bride’s 
Maiden Last Name (if different).”296 This “if different” is ambiguous; it 
                                                                                                                           
 292 See Part IV.C.  
 293 In very different contexts from marital names, cues from context have been shown to 
affect both perceptions of reality and decisionmaking. See Fitzsimmons and Shiv, 28 J Consumer 
Res at 225 (cited in note 277) (discussing how hypothetical questions can change reference 
points and thus contaminate the stated preference). For instance, studies of mental contamina-
tion have shown that inaccurate factual assertions embedded in questions can lead subjects to 
come to believe the truth of those assertions against their independent perceptual abilities. In a 
striking example, Elizabeth Loftus found that asking the question, after subjects have watched a 
video of a car accident, “[h]ow fast was the white sports car going [when it passed the barn] while 
traveling along the country road?” (with the bracketed portion left out for control subjects), 
made those to whom the barn was mentioned six times more likely to report seeing a barn than 
controls. Id, citing generally Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard 1979). Effects of 
inaccurate information included in questions, even as hypothetical, is a common theme in the 
literature on survey effects, referred to push polling. Fitzsimmons and Shiv, 28 J Consumer Res at 
225 (cited in note 277). 
 294 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, 
for example, Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Division of Health Care 
Financing HCT 506, online at http://www.co.green-lake.wi.us/forms/ml.pdf (visited July 8, 2007). 
 295 There are other types of differences as well. Perhaps the most entertaining difference 
between His and Hers forms is the form from Chesterfield County, Virginia, which asks for de-
tails about the wedding—date, place, officiant—only on the bride’s form. Compare 
http://www.co.chesterfield.va.us/JusticeAdministration/CircuitCourtClerk/PDFs/MarriageLicens
eFormBride.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (bride’s form), with http://www.co.chesterfield.va.us/ 
JusticeAdministration/CircuitCourtClerk/PDFs/MarriageLicenseFormGroom.pdf (visited July 8, 
2007) (groom’s form). 
 296 Thirteen of forty-one states with consistent forms. See, for example, Mobile County, 
Alabama, Marriage License Application, online at http://www.mobilecounty.org/probatecourt/ 
frame-marriagelicense.htm (visited July 8, 2007) (requesting “Bride’s Maiden Last Name (if 
different)”). See also, for example, Los Angeles County, California, Marriage License Applica-
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might seem to mean “if different from the man she’s about to marry,” 
and it could be interpreted that way by a desk clerk.297 But as an offi-
cial matter it seems more likely to mean “if different from her current 
name (because she’s been married before).” The former more strongly 
implies a state expectation of changing her name with this marriage, 
though either way, the suggestion is that the bride’s name changes at 
the time of marriage. On some forms, the otherwise symmetrical for-
matting for bride and groom’s information tries to accommodate the 
extra space for her maiden name, such as by asking him for a suffix, 
such as “Jr., Sr., III”298 (an aspect of his identity, as noted earlier, that 
the Goldin and Shim study told us correlates with her changing her 
name299). Only six states’ forms expressly ask the spouses for their 
names after marriage, and all six ask for both spouses’ names.300 Iowa 
forms nonetheless vary her section of the form by also asking, in the 
                                                                                                                           
tion, online at http://www.lavote.net/RECORDER/PDFS/confMarriageApp.pdf (visited July 8, 
2007) (requesting “Birth Last Name (if different)”).  
 297 For an example of this, see the amended complaint in the current ACLU suit in Los 
Angeles County, which alleges the following interaction in response to a query about how the 
husband could take his wife’s name:  
Michael and Diana asked a clerk how they could effect the desired change of Michael’s 
surname to “Bijon.” The clerk responded that “there’s not a box [on the application] for 
you [Michael]” and said, “you can’t use this form for a man to change his name.” She stated 
to Michael, “if she wants to change her name, fill out this line,” pointing to a box on the ap-
plication under the column “Bride’s Personal Data” marked “Current Last Name (If Dif-
ferent).” No similar box appears under the column “Groom’s Personal Data.” The clerk 
then said, “He will not be able to change his name at this courthouse or on the marriage 
application. He will have to go downtown to the L.A. Superior Court.” 
First Amended Complaint, Buday v California Department of Health and Services, Civil Action 
No CV06-08008 at *5 (CD Cal filed Jan 22, 2007).  
 298 See, for example, Town of Cape Elizabeth, Maine, online at http://www.capeelizabeth.com/ 
wedapp05.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (asking for bride’s “maiden surname”); Manatee County, 
Florida, online at https://www.clerkofcircuitcourt.com/Marriage/mrg_lic_frm.asp (visited July 8, 
2007) (displaying the request for the groom’s “suffix” across from the request for the bride’s 
“maiden name (if different)”). Some rearrange the size of her boxes or blanks on the top lines, 
such as for her birthdate, or insert a blank box for him, to realign the formatting immediately. 
See for example, Marin County, California, online at http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/CC/ 
Main/clerk/Forms/Regular_Marriage_License_Application.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (readjust for 
hers); El Dorado County, California, online at http://www.co.el-dorado.ca.us/countyclerk/pdf/ 
APP_LICENSE_MARRY_MAY02.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (shaded box for his). But others let 
the extra line make the entire set of blanks off one step for bride and groom all the way down the 
page. See, for example, Kern County, California, online at http://www.co.kern.ca.us/ctyclerk/marriage/ 
PDF/APPLICATION_PUBLIC.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (asking for “maiden last name (if 
different than current)”). 
 299 See Goldin and Shim, 18 J Econ Persp at 157 (cited in note 32) (finding that grooms 
with such suffixes were somewhat less likely “to marry a woman who retained her surname”); 
text accompanying note 98 (same). 
 300 See note 262 and accompanying text (identifying those states as Georgia, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota). 
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line for her current (premarriage) name, for her “Maiden last name as 
on birth certificate.”301 
Note also that even identical forms imply that women’s names 
change and men’s do not. For example, all but one of the state forms 
that ask for the spouses’ parents’ names ask for the mother’s “maiden 
name,” but ask only for the father’s “name,” thus assuming that the 
mother’s name changed and that the father has only ever had one 
name.302 Additionally, on the vast majority of the states’ forms that in-
clude both bride and groom’s information on one form, the groom’s 
information comes first—either in the top half or the left column—
although no one ever says “the groom and bride.”303 Particularly given 
that some of the forms don’t ask her to duplicate all the information, 
this implies that her information—and quite possibly her name—will 
be derivative of his. While it’s true that women disproportionately 
change their names, and that this is therefore a statistically accurate 
generalization, the frame conveys a message about naming practices 
that bears the traces of the state’s prior mandatory regime. 
Forms also convey messages about what information the state 
considers relevant. Consider another example, this time involving race 
rather than sex. Forms from more than half the states ask for the race 
of the prospective spouses.304 Some forms just include race among a 
number of other personal characteristics, sometimes even saying (al-
most apologetically) that such details are “required statistical informa-
tion.”305 By contrast, others, such as Mobile County, Alabama, un-
                                                                                                                           
 301 Iowa Marriage Application (cited in note 291) (asking for maiden last name after asking 
for bride’s current last name).  
 302 Thirty of thirty-one states with consistent forms. The outlier state is Massachusetts, 
which asks for the maiden or birth name of both father and mother. See Massachusetts, Notice of 
Intention to Marry (cited in note 219) (requesting for both spouses the “surname at birth or 
adoption”). 
 303 Thirty-one out of thirty-eight jurisdictions with consistency in this regard. Arkansas, 
Arizona, Connecticut, DC, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. I thank Jordan Connor for the point about the order of 
the phrase “the bride and groom.” Relatedly, it is interesting to note that men’s first names are 
generally said first—when couples are named by the first names alone—and that work in linguis-
tics indicates that this reflects phonological properties of men’s versus women’s names, their 
frequency in the language, as well as an independent effect of the gender of names. See generally 
Saundra Wright, Jennifer Hay, and Tessa Bent, Ladies First? Phonology, Frequency, and the Nam-
ing Conspiracy, 44 Linguistics 531 (2005). 
 304 Twenty-seven of the forty-eight states with consistent forms. Alabama, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 305 See, for example, Oregon, Marriage License Worksheet, online at http://www.clackamas.us/ 
docs/recording/marriage.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (also indicating race as “optional” under the 
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apologetically ask for race on the very first line of blanks, next to the 
name and date of birth.306 By asking for this information, the state sug-
gests that race is relevant to marriage. Particularly given this country’s 
history of antimiscegenation laws, to suggest that race is relevant to a 
marriage seems troubling. 
Embedded frames may be more or less coercive. Even requesting 
information is coercive,307 a fact that some states seem to recognize 
with regard to the race of the parties, for instance, when they flag such 
questions as optional or explain that the information will not appear 
on the marriage license.308 In some instances, the questions themselves 
are asked in a way that forces or prevents certain answers. So for a 
prospective spouse whose parents hyphenated their names, what name 
does he fill in for his father’s “name” alongside his mother’s “maiden 
name”? Does the state want his father’s current, married name, or his 
birth name? If a form asks the spouses for their (one) postmarital ad-
dress, what address do they put if they are making the (atypical) deci-
sion not to live together? Embedded frames suggest the right answers 
to the questions they pose, as well as suggesting what information and 
hierarchies are relevant to the choices being made. 
New York is the only state that prescribes by statute an aspect of 
the appearance of the marriage license application form. As noted 
earlier, a law passed in 1985 in New York requires that “[e]very appli-
cation for a marriage license shall contain a statement” informing par-
ties of the law of marital names.309 The New York statute is discussed 
further in the next Part as requiring a certain informational frame, but 
note here also that printing that information on the form may provide 
a contextual frame that competes with misleading or normative desk-
clerk law. States would do well not only to copy this example, but to 
create framing rules that dictate the subtler features of the forms—to 
                                                                                                                           
required statistical information); Madison County, Illinois, Marriage Brochure, online at 
http://app1.co.madison.il.us/countyclerk/marriagebrochure.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (listed under 
“Information For Statistical Purposes Only”). 
 306 Mobile, Alabama, Marriage License Application (cited in note 296). See also Indiana 
statewide form (in top right corner); Horry County, South Carolina, Application for Marriage 
License, online at http://www.horrycounty.org/probatecourt/mrg_lic_app.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) 
(on the second line); Cass County, Minnesota, Application for Marriage License, online at 
http://www.co.cass.mn.us/auditor/pdfs/marriage_lic_app.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (on third line). 
Note, as another example of different forms for bride and groom, that on the bride’s portion of 
the form for Mobile County, Alabama (the bottom half of the form), race is actually requested 
on her second line of information, since her “maiden last name (if different)” bumps the race 
blank off the first line. 
 307 See text accompanying note 268 (discussing the coercion involved in forced choosing).  
 308 See, for example, North Carolina, Work Sheet for Preparation of Marriage License 
Form, online at http://www.wataugacounty.org/deeds/marlicense.pdf (visited July 8, 2007) (asking 
for “race-groom (optional)” and “race-bride (optional)”). 
 309 NY Dom Rel Law § 15(b). 
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promote symmetry and egalitarian values, rather than implying that 
couples should continue unequal practices previously required by law. 
C. Informational Frames: What Accompanies the Question 
Informational framing rules could take a variety of forms, from 
modest to quite creative. Examples of four types follow. 
1. Informing choosers about the law. 
First, a state could provide information about the law. New York 
already requires this. By statute, marriage license application forms 
must inform prospective spouses that neither of them is required to 
change her name, that both have the option of changing their names, 
and which specific naming options are available.310 Though no data 
document popular misperceptions about the law of marital naming, we 
know that people are mistaken about the law in other domains of per-
sonal significance, such as whether the default legal regime of their state 
is employment at will or for cause.311 And the legislative history of the 
1985 New York law indicates that its proponents thought there was 
widespread ignorance about the law of marital names at that time.312 
From conversations and research in this area, I would expect that many 
people continue to think the law is other than it is. Particularly given the 
history of mandatory name change for women for various state pur-
poses, it seems likely that a significant number of women think they 
have to change their names at marriage, or at least think that will be the 
easiest choice under law. Moreover, it seems likely that many people 
would not know that a man can change his name through marriage—
                                                                                                                           
 310 Id. See also note 283 (quoting the statute). 
 311 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Percep-
tions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L Rev 105, 106–10 (1997) (arguing that 
employees are “likely mistaken about the law and misled by their employers at the time of hir-
ing”). 
 312 See, for example, Senator John J. Marchi, Memorandum in Support of Amendment to 
Dom Rel L § 15(1), Sen Bill 110, in NYLS’S Governor’s Bill Jacket (“Most people are unaware 
of their rights regarding name changes and, more specifically, of their right to change or not 
change their name upon marriage.”); letter from Madeline Kochen, Legislative Counsel, New 
York Civil Liberties Union, to Gerald C. Crotty, Counsel to the Governor (June 27, 1985), in 
NYLS’s Governor’s Bill Jacket: 
Age-old customs regarding name changes, particularly the custom by which women assume 
their husband[s’] surnames upon marriage, have obfuscated this issue so as to render their 
choice of name, a virtual nullity. The tradition of a woman assuming her husband’s name 
has been so embedded in our society that many, if not most, people are under the mistaken 
impression that what [is] custom is law. 
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not least because that option is not even widely known among those 
individuals who work at the Social Security Administration.313 
2. Informing choosers about conventional and  
unconventional practices. 
Second, a state could supply information about naming options, 
explaining in more or less detail both conventional and unconven-
tional options. Because most people probably know the conventions 
well and the alternatives less well, this might inform people of unfa-
miliar options. It might also create some of the context-dependence 
effects discussed above in relation to menus. That is, mutual options 
that retain the integrity of individual names, such as both spouses’ 
hyphenating, might come to seem relatively more acceptable once 
people learned of couples choosing merged names, entirely new 
names, or Mr. Her Name.314 Moreover, through information about al-
ternative practices, the state could dispel misconceptions about the 
workability of certain options by illuminating their mechanics. As dis-
cussed earlier, people almost invariably respond to the idea of hy-
phenation by asking what happens at the second generation, when Mr. 
A-B marries Ms. C-D. By explaining simply how biphenation could 
work—and where applicable, how the state supports it through facili-
tative defaults—a state might expand spouses’ decision sets. 
Relatedly, the state could supply data about the prospects for cer-
tain naming choices so people knew how many women who change 
their names eventually change them back, either because they change 
their minds or because they get divorced. Relevant information could 
also include the number of women who keep their names and then 
eventually change them, and how many children get their father’s sur-
name, even if their mother keeps her name. Of course, the latter sort 
of information—about conventional rather than unconventional prac-
tices—could backfire, as it could help create or reinforce the cascades 
that support existing social conventions.315 
                                                                                                                           
 313 See notes 232–35 and accompanying text (describing telephone conversations with 
various states’ SSA office clerks). 
 314 See Kelman, Rottenstreich, and Tversky, 25 J Legal Stud at 310 (cited in note 255); note 
255 and accompanying text (discussing work on comparison and contrast effects). 
 315 Any data would also need to be chosen carefully—and carefully described—since the 
valence of the information might affect its reception. See note 289 and accompanying text (not-
ing that the mere measurement effect may be reversed in the face of negative attitudes to the 
activity in question). For instance, one might worry about negative effects of presenting data 
about men tending to have negative feelings about their wives’ decisions not to become Mrs. His 
Name. See note 54 and accompanying text. 
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3. Providing choosers with concrete examples. 
Third, the state could provide examples of people who have made 
unconventional choices. The principle of social proof suggests that 
people are strongly influenced by what they perceive other people to 
be doing.316 If people don’t know of others who have made less con-
ventional naming choices, then simply providing information that such 
people exist might shift behavior. Which examples, and how many, 
could affect the potential for effects. For instance, the examples of un-
conventional namers could be of famous people—such as the mayor 
of Los Angeles mentioned earlier for having created a merged name 
of Villaraigosa—or Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt’s children, who bear 
the surname Jolie-Pitt. But people are more influenced by the behav-
ior of those they deem similar to themselves,317 so stories of Everymen 
and Everywomen might be more effective. Data also suggest that 
more examples are likely to have a greater effect than one or two.318 So 
a significant number of examples from diverse populations might have 
the most potential to affect choices. 
As with the information about options, the state could try to 
shape choices by presenting only information about unconventional 
practices. One might expect, though, greater resistance (of the Orwell-
effect type) because this approach might seem too obviously trying to 
steer choices away from existing conventions.319 Thus, providing exam-
ples of both conventional and unconventional options might be more 
effective. Since the conventional choices are already well known, 
though, presenting the unconventional options even alongside the 
conventional ones could plausibly have the social proof effect. 
4. Providing choosers with individually tailored information. 
Finally, the state could supply information about what the marry-
ing couple’s names would look like in various combinations. Research 
suggests that people are sometimes more likely to do things that they 
picture themselves doing, as discussed earlier. As we know, young girls 
often picture themselves with their husband’s name; boys and men 
may picture a woman bearing their name. The state could possibly 
level the imaginative playing field a bit by, for example, generating for 
couples what their name would look like hyphenated, and how bi-
phenation could work in their family. (The success of this effort would 
likely depend, though, on whether the couple had a positive or nega-
                                                                                                                           
 316 See Robert B. Cialdini, Influence 116 (Morrow 1993). 
 317 See id at 142.  
 318 See id at 118. 
 319 See note 280 and accompanying text. 
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tive attitude to that imagined activity.320) This idea overlaps with the 
suggestions of switching the default to something normative or facili-
tative, discussed earlier. But this intervention is less intrusive in a 
sense, as it involves only providing information, rather than supplying 
a rule that kicks in unless parties say otherwise. 
A cautionary note is in order here: framing efforts have the po-
tential to backfire. As noted earlier, mere measurement effects—that 
is, increases in behavior merely from being asked a question about 
intentions—have been shown to reverse in response to questions 
about undesirable behaviors.321 Thus, the decisionmakers’ attitudes to 
the activity presented—such as hyphenation—may affect whether 
being asked whether they would do the thing makes them more, or 
possibly less, likely to do it.  
The tone in which any such information is presented may well be 
important.322 In light of the tendency of many desk clerks to spontane-
ously express negative views about unconventional naming choices—
when speaking to people considering unconventional naming choices—
it is possible that providing informational frames about unconventional 
choices in a more positive tone could be a useful corrective. 
D. Time Matters: The Timing of Frames 
Framing rules also include timing rules: when does the state ask 
the question, and when does it provide the information that frames 
the question? 
For instance, informational frames could be provided through the 
marriage license application process, or at some other time in a cou-
ple’s, or a person’s, life. A state could have framing rules that require 
information about different marital options to be supplied a certain 
number of days prior to the issuance of the license; in states that have 
waiting periods or counseling requirements for marriage, such a rule 
would fit easily within the existing scheme.323 The information could 
also be separated from the marriage process altogether. For instance, a 
state’s framing rules could require high school home economics 
classes to supply information on the marital naming laws, alternatives, 
and processes. 
                                                                                                                           
 320 See note 289 and accompanying text. 
 321 See id. 
 322 See note 315. Whether the tone of the questioner affects the perceived valence of the 
activity and thus the mere measurement effect is an interesting empirical question. 
 323 Twenty-six states require a waiting period, ranging from one to ten days, between the 
application and reception of a marriage license. National Conference of State Legislators, Marriage 
Waiting Periods, online at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/waitperiod.htm (visited July 8, 2007). 
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In addition, the actual question of what couples want to do with 
their names could be divorced from the time of applying for the mar-
riage license. Much public attention, and much feeling, surrounds the 
moment of marrying. Between social pressure and bounded rational-
ity, this might be less than an ideal time to choose one’s name.324 
Perhaps people could be asked to make a marital naming choice 
(or even merely to predict one) well before the time of marriage. Indi-
viduals could be asked to precommit to an individual default—that is, 
a person could be asked when young, say in college, what default rule 
she would like to apply to her marital naming decision.325 (We might 
call these self-made defaults.) She wouldn’t be precommitting herself 
to a rule she couldn’t alter; she could always change her mind. But 
unless she did change her mind, the default rule she set earlier would 
apply.326 Moreover, any informational frames supplied during pre-
adulthood, such as in school, could also help inform the naming 
choices of those who never formalize their relationships with the 
state—such as the same-sex couples who currently do not have the 
option of state marriage, as well as the many different-sex couples 
who choose not to marry.327 
Alternatively, the marital naming question could be asked later, 
after the drama and emotional intensity of the marriage moment is 
over. The state could invite people to choose their marital names at 
some later point, say, one year after marriage.328 The postmarriage 
name time could operate as a mandatory waiting period, a default 
naming-decision time, or a decision-reversal period (akin to those im-
posed on purchases from door-to-door salemen).329 The idea would be, 
                                                                                                                           
 324 See Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 Fam L Q 255, 270 (2002) (rec-
ognizing that “the problem of bounded rationality might be particularly important for parties’ bargain-
ing about marriage”). See also George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic 
Behavior, 90 Am Econ Rev 426, 430 (2000) (discussing the effects of hot states on decisionmaking).  
 325 As noted earlier, college students surveyed about their marital-name expectations seem 
to predict more egalitarian choices than the average population’s actual marital-naming choices, 
suggesting that self-made defaults set at college age might be more egalitarian. See Part II.B. 
 326 This might have an effect through the general stickiness of defaults, but also through a kind 
of self-generated validity whereby the earlier thinking on the subject influenced the later decision. 
See Jack M. Feldman and John G. Lynch, Self-Generated Validity and Other Effects of Measurement 
on Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior, 73 J Applied Psych 421, 421 (1988). The timing of the 
earlier question could affect the likelihood of any influence on the later decision. See id. 
 327 See Part II.A.2 (discussing name changes by same-sex couples). 
 328 For the majority of states, which do not invite a naming decision as part of the marriage 
license application process, a waiting period of sorts is already imposed, though it does nothing 
active to encourage waiting until a “cooler” period. 
 329 See Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1238–47 (cited in note 178) (discussing mandatory 
cooling-off periods and decision-reversal periods). 
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however gently or aggressively, to push naming choices to a time of 
less emotion and less public scrutiny.330  
E. Whose Frame: Different Framing Entities  
This discussion has focused on a state’s framing rules for marital 
names, but various private as well as public entities can frame the 
choices we make. Unlike legal default rules, menus, or altering rules, 
frames are not the exclusive purview of the state. Private advertise-
ments, education, and media could all contribute to framing decisions 
in a choice regime. Compared to any governmental effort, we might 
plausibly expect more effects on practices if Angelina Jolie and Brad 
Pitt made a short film—or a major romantic picture—about their love, 
which either explained or romanticized (or both) their decision to 
hyphenate their children’s names. 
F. Beyond Names: Implications for Other Areas of Law  
The idea of framing rules applies to many areas of law. For in-
stance, Miranda warnings are legally mandated decisional frames: the 
government must provide you with certain information before you 
choose whether to speak.331 Rules about what you must be told before 
making a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, or rules about what 
jurors must be told before deciding on a verdict, or rules in some 
states about what information can or cannot be put on a ballot and in 
what order, are all examples of framing rules.332 
Framing rules may also comprise governmental rules about what 
private parties must tell one another before making legally salient 
decisions: for instance, consumer protection laws that require certain 
disclosures by sellers, or landlord-tenant laws that require landlords to 
disclose the presence of lead or other aspects of the property. These 
disclosures sometimes involve the private parties’ speaking in their 
own words, but sometimes the government requires specific words to 
be spoken, or even issues documents or labels that must be presented 
in the designated form—such as the surgeon general’s warnings on 
cigarettes. Similarly, the unconscionability doctrine in contract law 
might be thought of as a kind of interrogative framing rule, requiring 
parties making certain kinds of deals (especially if the deal is substan-
                                                                                                                           
 330 Of course it’s an empirical question what effect this would have. It might lead to more 
Keeping for women, for instance, but less openness to biphenation by men as well as women. 
 331 See generally Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 
 332 The existing framing rules that come most readily to mind are informational frames, 
some useful examples of which can be found in Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1230–38 (cited 
in note 178). 
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tively less fair to one party) to be sure the contract is procedurally 
generous—for example, that the contestable provisions are underlined 
or in bold or at least not in small or incomprehensible writing. 
Bringing framing rules into focus should help us to see at least 
three things. First, frames are important, as indicated implicitly by the 
fact that we already have framing rules in a range of areas—some of 
them a matter of constitutional significance—as well as by the grow-
ing literature documenting the effect of decisional frames in a range of 
areas. Be they informational frames (such as jury instructions as to 
points of law), interrogative frames (such as rules about how census 
takers can ask questions), or embedded frames (such as rules about 
the size of typeface in which certain contractual provisions are writ-
ten), framing rules can address ignorance of law, as well as individual 
choosers’ susceptibility to the descriptive and normative suggestions 
implicit in the way questions are asked of them. 
Second, framing rules need to be enforced, even though they’re 
merely words and are thus sometimes neglected by those charged with 
following them. The penalties for government’s neglect of frames are 
apparent in some contexts, such as the Miranda warnings, but not so in 
others, such as some New York clerks’ failure to tell marriage license 
applicants their complete naming options despite the statute that re-
quires the naming options to be printed on the marriage license appli-
cation form.333 
Finally, this discussion should help us to see places where we need 
framing rules but do not have them yet. Framing rules are a tool for 
affecting behavior, and one that may seem less interventionist than 
mandating behavior or even than changing the underlying substantive 
options or switching the default rule. For instance, organ donation 
rates would presumably rise, even if the default were left as an opt-in 
system, if citizens’ choices whether to opt in were framed by certain 
information or if the question were asked in one way rather than an-
other.334 Many other examples may be imagined. 
VII.  TWO POSSIBLE REFORMS 
This Article concludes with a very brief discussion of two alterna-
tive constructive steps a state could take. To include this is not to 
evince any conviction that a state legislature would take action on this 
                                                                                                                           
 333 See notes 343–44 and accompanying text. 
 334 See Johnson, Steffel, and Goldstein, 24 Health Psych at S19 (cited in note 178). See 
generally Eric J. Johnson, Steven Bellman, and Gerald L. Lohse, Defaults, Framing and Privacy: 
Why Opting In–Opting Out, 13 Marketing Letters 5 (2002) (demonstrating that both frames and 
defaults produce independent effects on revealed preferences for further contact from a website). 
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issue. Among other things, data indicating that the number of women 
making unconventional naming choices has decreased since the 1980s 
suggest that this is not a moment when change is likely to occur.335   
That said, the recent lawsuit filed by the ACLU to challenge a 
man’s difficulty changing his name in Los Angeles County has drawn 
attention to the issue of marital names—and to the aspect of the issue 
that I have highlighted as particularly naturalized and thus problem-
atic: the assumption that it is women’s, not men’s, names that change. 
Such public attention to the issue, even if met by some derision, may 
suggest the potential going forward for a new recognition of the ways 
the Mrs. His Name convention hinders men—in their own naming 
choices and in their nominal lineage if they have only daughters.336 As 
discussed here, there is an alternative practice—biphenation—that 
could preserve many of the benefits of the current regime, with few 
new costs, while removing some of the losses for both women and men 
of the intergenerational discontinuities of the Mrs. His Name conven-
tion. If people better understood that there is a possible convention 
with these features, perhaps change is not impossible. 
As discussed above, it is not clear that law can do much in this 
area. The status quo has effectively been a kind of experiment—with 
the minoritarian default for women of Keeping—and we’ve seen that 
most women nonetheless go through the trouble of becoming Mrs. His 
Name. This suggests the convention is strong and the law is relatively 
weak. However, the Keeping default does nothing to target the con-
vention for men’s names; if anything, by extending the Keeping de-
fault, the current approach further naturalizes the convention with 
regard to men. Perhaps a law that focuses on men’s names or both 
names could do more. We do not know what the tipping point would 
be for overcoming the collective action problem associated with this 
convention, so perhaps a little movement in a new direction could go 
further than expected. Regardless, even if the impact may be small, 
the state has to set the default in some way, and particularly in light of 
the state’s role in a past mandatory regime of convention and law, the 
state should choose to set the default in the way that encourages—
rather than discourages—awareness and consideration of egalitarian 
alternatives to the formerly mandatory regime. 
                                                                                                                           
 335 See note 85 and accompanying text. 
 336 See, for example, Jo Johnson, Mum Is Finally the Word in France, Financial Times 11 (Jan 
8, 2005) (noting that the lawsuit that led to France’s new law permitting a mother to pass her 
name to her children “was instigated, ironically, by a male député with three daughters, who 
feared seeing his family name die out”). See also note 64 and accompanying text (citing articles 
about men who were frustrated in trying to change their names). 
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The first proposal is simply that states adopt a statute modeled on 
New York’s current law, which combines framing rules with a kind of 
forced choosing. This would inform deciders and desk clerks that the 
convention is not law, and help to put egalitarian alternatives on a 
more equal footing, in terms of transaction costs, with Mrs. His Name. 
The second, less modest, proposal is that states adopt a default 
rule of biphenation coupled with framing rules that provide informa-
tion about the law and the way biphenation works. As in the first pro-
posal, the framing rules would help to make sure that deciders and 
desk clerks know the law and legal options. It would go further, 
though, in calling attention to biphenation and creating the possibility 
that biphenation might, in some cases, stick. 
A. The New York Model: Framing Rules and Forced Choosing 
New York provides a useful model for a regime that goes some 
way towards using framing rules to overcome misleading desk-clerk 
law and using forced choosing to level the playing field between Mrs. 
His Name and other options. New York’s law would be a useful re-
form in other states, with a few modifications. 
Inspired by concerns about widespread misunderstanding of the 
law of marital names, New York Domestic Relations Law § 15, dis-
cussed earlier, requires marriage license application forms to inform 
prospective spouses that neither of them must change their names, 
that either can, and that there are a range of naming options available 
to them.337 The options are Keeping for both, each spouse taking the 
other’s (current or former) name, hyphenating for one or both, or 
merging of all or part of their names.338 
The law creates a form of forced choosing by inviting each spouse 
to state how his or her postmarital name will be printed on the mar-
riage license.339 By providing the spouses with the option of a new legal 
name through this process, and providing documentation of that name 
through the marriage license, the law helps to equalize the costs im-
                                                                                                                           
 337 See note 283 (quoting the language of the statute). 
 338 See id. 
 339 New York’s regime in practice is not technically forced choosing. Some localities go so 
far as to say “optional” on the line inviting postmarital names (for example, Mendon County), 
and clerks contacted in several jurisdictions said that parties aren’t forced to fill in that line. 
Clerks in Lake George, Seneca Falls, and Mendon County all reported that if parties leave that 
line blank, their names remain as their premarital names on the marriage license. Telephone 
conversations (Feb 1, 2007) (Andrew Brantingham). In that sense, the default is, as in other 
places, Keeping. Nonetheless, the line inviting people to state their postmarital names forces 
choice in the sense of provoking a choice, rather than never asking the question at all. 
Note that we might also understand New York’s regime as a menu regime, in that there is a 
specified range of options available to people by statute. 
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posed on changes to unconventional naming options.340 By posing the 
question about postmarital names to both spouses, the law also invites 
recognition and deliberation of that option for the groom as well as 
the bride. 
New York’s law also serves as an informational and contextual 
framing rule by requiring that the choosers’ decision be framed with 
certain facts about the law. This may help to shape choices by provid-
ing accurate information and indicating that the legal options are wider 
than the social conventions. It may also help to overcome or avoid mis-
leading desk-clerk law by providing the information to choosers and to 
desk clerks in clear written form. 
The New York statute provides a useful model of a very modest 
change to existing law. The model could be improved in several minor 
ways, however. First, the law should require that forms provide egali-
tarian contextual frames.341 That is, information about the bride and 
groom, and their parents, should be asked in ways that do not subtly 
assert inegalitarian social conventions. For instance, rather than asking 
for the “father’s name” and the “mother’s maiden name,” the form 
should ask for each parent’s “name” and “birth name (if different).”342 
Second, the form of the frames should be altered to increase the 
chances of overcoming problematic desk-clerk law. Despite New 
York’s framing rules, calls to New York clerks showed that even New 
York desk clerks do not always report the law accurately. Despite the 
fact that merged names are a statutory option, a town clerk in Seneca 
Falls stated, in response to a query about merged names, that the 
caller should call Albany to check if that’s an option.343 Even more 
surprisingly, a DMV clerk indicated in an email that a court order 
would be required for a merged name or for Mr. Her Name.344 So the 
law printed on the form itself is apparently insufficient to eliminate all 
flawed desk-clerk law at the level of local and state agencies. 
                                                                                                                           
 340 See Part IV (discussing the greater costs that appear to be imposed, both formally and 
informally, on unconventional name-change options, relative to Mrs. His Name). 
 341 See Part VI. 
 342 The form for the town of Southampton, New York, for instance, asks for parents’ name 
information in the former way. See Application for Marriage License, Town of Southampton, 
New York, online at http://www.town.southampton.ny.us/deptdirectorygallery/clerk/marriage.pdf 
(visited July 8, 2007).  
 343 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Seneca Falls, New York, Town Clerk’s Office (June 
21, 2006). 
 344 An email from the New York DMV on June 22, 2006, stated: “With a marriage certifi-
cate, you can have your last names hyphenated or you can change your last name to your hus-
band’s last name. If you want any other kind of change, you will need to get court ordered forms 
for a name change.” This was in response to a direct question about merged names and Mr. Her 
Name, as well as hyphenation. 
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That said, New York was one of only two states in which a clerk 
read the applicable statute over the phone in response to questions, 
suggesting that some desk clerks were influenced by the framing 
rule.345 One possible improvement would be to present the information 
in a prominent way. For instance, the form and placement of the rele-
vant information on the marriage license application form could take 
a lesson from unconscionabilty doctrine—by favoring information 
presented in large rather than small print, or otherwise highlighted 
through prominent placement or bold or underlining. More aggres-
sively, the statute could require desk clerks to read the statute aloud in 
all cases or, for a possibly less tedious and less costly alternative, to 
point all applicants to the relevant language about their name-change 
options. This would involve the desk clerk in the affirmative task of 
informing the public about this aspect of the law, while also repeatedly 
calling it to the attention of the clerk. 
A further step might be to require applicants to check a box indi-
cating that they had read the relevant information about names. This 
does not ensure compliance—people often check boxes saying they 
have read things when they have not—but it does call attention to that 
information. The desk clerks who read out the statute here did so in 
response to queries about unconventional naming options. Requiring 
clerks to direct all applicants to the rules on names, and requiring ap-
plicants to check a box saying they had read the material, would help 
to ensure that all applicants—not just those already seeking uncon-
ventional naming possibilities and thus more likely to be informed 
about them already—were alerted to the information. 
Finally, the law might require that the frame indicate its status as 
law. Most simply, the marriage license application could cite the statu-
tory authority below the statement of the naming options. This slight 
change would have three aims. First, it could reassure the hesitant or 
skeptical desk clerk that an option that might sound odd or unlikely 
(such as merging) is not just mentioned on the form as a local possibil-
ity but is actually required by statute. (This might have helped with 
the clerk who advised the caller to call Albany to confirm if merging is 
possible.) Second, it could enhance the authority of the applicant 
                                                                                                                           
 345 Telephone conversation with Clerk, Mendon County, New York (June 21, 2006) (Re-
sponding to a query about alternative naming options, the clerk said, “I think that is written up 
on the form. If you’ll hold, I’ll get it and read it to you,” and then, after reading the form, saying, 
“[b]asically, whatever name you have ever gone by in the past is an option in any combination. 
Or you can just leave your name the way it is.”); telephone conversation with Clerk, Lake 
George, New York (June 21, 2006) (responding to the alternative naming options query by say-
ing “I’ll tell you what the form says,” reading the language on the form, and then saying, “[s]o 
those are your options”). 
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seeking to adopt an unconventional option, if she meets a recalcitrant 
or disbelieving desk clerk. (Showing the marriage license application 
form—with the statutory citation—to the DMV clerk might have 
helped persuade him or her that merging was an option.) That said, it 
is hard to know what could help to overcome the influence of the type 
of clerk who makes up rules in defiance of the form just to “give you a 
hard time.”346 Though it would raise implementation costs, perhaps 
forms could tell applicants whom to contact with questions or con-
cerns about the procedure or their options. Lastly, citing the law on 
the form would suggest that the weight of the law is behind that 
choice, which might reassure prospective applicants (or their skeptical 
partners) that others have made this choice and that some people in 
authority approve of it. This might prompt choosers to take the op-
tions more seriously or to feel less burdened by the social pressure 
favoring conventional choices. 
B. A More Ambitious Model: Framing Rules and the  
Biphenation Default 
Because of the robustness of the Mrs. His Name convention, 
stronger steps than forced choosing might be in order. Specifically, per-
haps the “iron law of default inertia,” though weak for women when the 
default is Keeping, could have some impact here.347 A more aggressive 
proposal, then, would combine a default rule of hyphenation (and bi-
phenation, where prospective spouses already have hyphenated names) 
with framing rules not only setting out the naming options but also ex-
plaining the practice and uses of biphenation. Before proceeding, I 
should note that a truly aggressive proposal would involve mandatory 
rules, which are not uncommon for names outside the U.S. But given 
the personal and constitutive nature of names, at least to individuals in 
this country, I bracket this possibility entirely here. 
Under this proposal, a default of hyphenation (and biphenation) 
would be both a normative default (a default that aims to encourage a 
certain solution) and a facilitative default (a default that aims to solve 
practical problems involved in adopting that solution).348 It would be 
normative in that it would aim to encourage people to see that that 
                                                                                                                           
 346 See text accompanying note 236. 
 347 See Ayres, 73 U Chi L Rev at 5 (cited in note 178). See Part IV for a discussion of possible 
reasons why Keeping is apparently a nonsticky default for women (though very sticky for men). 
 348 See Part V. If more people have hyphenated names, then the default would more fre-
quently require the principles of biphenation, discussed earlier as an approach to merging the 
names of individuals who each have hyphenated names already.  
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solution is feasible, to realize that others do it, and to adopt it.349 It 
would be facilitative in that it would supply a default selection and 
ordering of the names. 
As a practical matter, since relatively few individuals currently 
have hyphenated names before they marry, the principal effect of this 
approach would be to supply a simple default of hyphenated names.350 
The process for supplying the hyphenation default would be easiest in 
a computerized process. But since most if not all localities still use pa-
per forms, the process at present would be this. After filling in their 
names and other details, the form would explain to them that, unless 
they say otherwise, their family name upon marriage will become their 
two names hyphenated. (In a computerized system, the order could be 
randomly generated; with a paper form, the clerk could flip a coin.) If 
either or both of them already have hyphenated names, the form 
could direct them to a separate section. This biphenation section of 
the form would explain that, if their names are already hyphenated, 
their default family name will comprise one of each of their surnames, 
randomly selected.351  
After explaining how their default name will be generated from 
their premarital names, the form can then provide a separate box to 
check if they reject the default name. If they check that box, then they 
                                                                                                                           
 349 See text accompanying note 180 (discussing, as reasons that defaults sometimes stick, 
loss aversion, laziness, and social influence of others’ judgments or practices). 
 350 Note here that a default of hyphenation (and biphenation) goes further even than the 
imagined biphenation convention requires. Remember that one of the advantages of the bi-
phenation scheme is that the scheme is indifferent as between parents’ choosing to adopt the 
new biphenated family name and parents’ choosing to keep their premarital names and only 
share partial name continuity with any children through the children’s biphenated names. To 
encourage awareness and uptake of the alternative convention, however, the legal default would 
opt for the spouses to hyphenate (or biphenate) their own names, in order to demonstrate what 
the hyphenated (or biphenated version) would look like. Moreover, as noted earlier, until or 
unless there is more uptake of hyphenated names more generally, children may appreciate that 
their parents are also willing to share the burden of additional transaction costs imposed on 
those with hyphenated names in which hyphens are uncommon. In addition, similar defaults 
could be imagined in the context of naming children, an area more commonly regulated explic-
itly by statute. Similar principles could be applied there. 
 351 This would be simplest if the marriage license application process were computerized; in 
the absence of such a system, a clerk could simply flip a coin three times (or use a number gen-
erator to simulate a coin flip) or draw the names out of a hat (or similar). See text accompanying 
note 163 (describing the coin flipping process). While tedious, this might also have salutary ef-
fects on desk-clerk law by involving the clerk in the default-generating process, such that he or 
she would have to learn what the law actually was and take an active part in its implementation. 
Compare Kahan, 67 U Chi L Rev at 630, 641–42 (cited in note 241) (suggesting that legal efforts 
to shift sticky norms may be more successful if key decisionmakers have a neutral investment in 
others’ compliance with the new norm). On the other hand, clerks might resent having to go to 
the trouble, inspiring new reasons for negative desk-clerk law making. All things considered, a 
computerized scheme would seem best—and, it seems safe to assume, is likely to precede in time 
any possible adoption of a biphenation default. 
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need to write out the name each of them will bear post marriage. A 
line on the form can direct them to an instruction sheet stating what 
naming options are available to them. 
The instruction sheet will be dictated by the framing rules portion 
of the proposal. As with the New York model, the instruction sheet 
will explain to them that neither of them has to change their name, 
that either can, and what their naming options are. In addition, for the 
biphenation proposal, the instruction sheet would state the reasons 
that hyphenation is the default,352 and explain clearly how hyphenation 
works, as well as what happens to names at the next generation under 
the biphenation principle. Given that everyone’s question about hy-
phenation is “What happens when two hyphenators marry?,” this 
might best be represented in the form of “Frequently Asked Ques-
tions.” 
Ideally, a biphenation default proposal at the clerks’ office would 
be accompanied by state rules or policies dictating that government 
entities facilitate the use of hyphenated names more generally. That 
means forms that include enough blanks to accommodate hyphenated 
names, and the ability to enter a hyphen on computer-generated sys-
tems. A first step of this kind at the national level would be reforming 
the Social Security Administration’s system for printing social security 
cards so that hyphens can appear on them.353 Under the framing rules 
of the system, the forms or clerks would be required to tell the decid-
ers that state law mandates that all public entities ease the use of hy-
phenated names in these ways.354 
One concern about a hyphenation (and biphenation) default 
would be that it could generate resistance in the form of Lessig’s Or-
well effect. This is certainly an advantage of the forced choosing alter-
native in the New York proposal, but perhaps this could be overcome 
by framing words making clear that deciders do get to choose—and 
that the hyphenation (and biphenation) defaults simply facilitate mak-
ing those particular choices, if choosers wish to adopt them. 
CONCLUSION 
Naming is a peculiar topic, because names are both trivial and 
foundational. They are typically chosen by others and are thus distinct 
from the self, and yet they are a crucial point of connection between 
                                                                                                                           
 352 See the end of Part III.B for a list. 
 353 Of course, private entities also create administrative problems of this sort, but it is a 
more difficult question whether private entities should be required to remedy these problems. 
 354 One might worry that even mentioning the difficulties with forms could make such 
difficulties salient at the decisionmaking moment; one would have to weigh this consideration in 
deciding whether to have the framing rules require mention of this. 
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our identity and the outside world. The government has historically 
been involved in forcing women to participate in an inegalitarian 
practice of naming on marriage. Now women have a choice, as do 
men, but for a variety of reasons the existing choice regime seems in-
adequate and cannot be described as one of unconstrained choice. 
First, discussions of marital names always emphasize women’s 
choices and the women’s right to choose their names, but women 
aren’t given real choices so long as there’s typically no chance that 
men will change their names in any way. If names were truly a matter 
of indifference, one imagines we would all know at least one man who 
had taken his wife’s name. Instead, women, and only women, effec-
tively have no naming option involving continuity of names across 
their past, present, and future. The fact that men will almost always 
keep their name thus imposes a significant limitation on women’s 
freedom of choice. 
Second, our current choice regime produces a widespread prac-
tice of women taking their husbands’ names at marriage and, even 
more commonly, children being given their fathers’ surnames. For 
those concerned about creating an equal playing field between boys 
and girls, there would seem something troubling about this. Among 
other reasons, the world must look very different to the child who 
grows up thinking his name will be his no matter what, as opposed to 
the child who grows up thinking she’ll lose her name if she’s lucky 
enough to be loved. And so while adults should be able to make what-
ever choices they want about their names, we perhaps should worry 
about what we’re teaching our children about themselves through our 
naming practices, about which children have no say.  
Third, there exists an appealing alternative convention that few 
people know about, much less adopt: biphenation. If everyone hy-
phenated, and then the next generation simply kept one of each per-
son’s prior names and hyphenated those, then both mothers and fa-
thers could share full or partial names with their own parents, their 
premarital selves, their spouses, and their children. We’d have more 
information about genealogy and family connections, because we’d 
have information about the male line and the female line. (The system 
works equally well if the parents don’t change their own names at 
marriage, but just use this biphenation approach with their children’s 
names.) 
Fourth, under our current convention, whether men pass on their 
name depends on whether they have sons, and whether their sons 
have sons. Fathers might prefer to have a chance of passing on their 
name through either sons or daughters. This would make things fairer 
between those men who have sons and those who have daughters, and 
might well lead to more equal treatment, on some level, of daughters. 
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Having previously participated in a mandatory regime of inegali-
tarian naming practices, states should design the default regimes for 
marital names to try to promote a sustainable egalitarian social prac-
tice, such as hyphenated and biphenated names. For instance, the de-
fault could be set to facilitate those options by supplying a randomly 
generated version of the spouses’ names hyphenated (or biphenated, 
where either or both already have hyphenated names). Menus and 
altering rules might also be used to encourage active choices and 
egalitarian values. Presenting some options and not others in a menu, 
with a careful attention to the order of the options, might encourage 
preferred options. Or the hierarchy created by our current altering 
rules—which makes Mrs. His Name easier than other name-change 
options including hyphenation—could be reversed, to try to ease the 
path of those who make the unconventional, egalitarian option. 
Most importantly, states should pay closer attention to the frames 
they create. The way a question is asked matters. States should thus be 
careful about what words are used by forms and clerks to ask questions 
about marital names; about the layout and surrounding questions on 
marriage license application forms and administrative interactions; and 
about the information provided to marrying couples. New York has 
taken a modest step in the right direction by requiring that marriage 
license applications forms tell marrying parties that neither of them 
must change his or her name, that either can change his or her name, 
and that various name-change options are available and facilitated by 
the state. Bolder and more creative steps—such as the biphenation de-
fault described here—can be imagined and should be tried. Going for-
ward, states should design framing rules, along with other aspects of our 
choice regime for marital names, to help rather than hinder parties in 
overcoming the weight of history and social norms in order to choose 
greater equality in the highly personal realm of names. 
More broadly, this analysis invites us to think about the ways that 
states set defaults and frame choices in a wide range of arenas that 
permit individual choice. In particular, when states have historically 
forced certain decisions through mandatory regimes that are inegali-
tarian or even unconstitutional, it is not enough that states putatively 
extricate themselves from those domains and leave those decisions to 
individual choice. Further empirical work remains to be done in this 
area, but given what we already know about the effects of defaults and 
frames, it is clear that states cannot get out of the business of shaping 
choices. Even where individuals are the ultimate decisionmakers, the 
state has to set defaults in some way; it has to frame choices somehow. 
And so states should set defaults and frame individual decisions—
particularly in realms like marital names where there is a history of 
inegalitarian state practices—in ways that promote egalitarian choices. 
